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Abstract 
 
Background: There is a small growing body of literature exploring moral 
reasoning in adult male offenders with mild intellectual disabilities (ID). These 
offenders have demonstrated more mature moral reasoning than their non-offending 
counterparts. No published studies have explored this in females with ID, despite the 
existence of sex differences in moral reasoning being widely debated. This study aims 
to address this gap in the literature.  
Methods: Using a cross-sectional 2 (Sex: Men vs Women) X 2 (Offence history: 
Offenders vs Non-Offenders) between-subjects design, 68 adults with mild ID from 
secure settings and community settings were recruited. In addition to an assessment of 
intellectual functioning, participants completed the Socio-Moral Reflection Measure-
Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992) and the Emotional Problem 
Scale (EPS; Prout & Strohmer, 1991). An informant version of the EPS was also used.  
Results: Offenders with ID demonstrated stage 2(3) reasoning, significantly 
higher than the stage 2 reasoning demonstrated by non-offenders. Offenders’ moral 
reasoning was higher on six of the individual SRM-SF constructs, however differences 
disappeared on two constructs after controlling for Full Scale IQ. Non-offenders 
reasoned below stage 2 on the Law and Legal Justice constructs, where decision making 
driven by obeying authority and avoiding punishment was likely to have prevented 
them offending. No significant sex differences were found. Total SRM-SF scores were 
not significantly related to offence severity. A significant positive relationship was 
found between moral reasoning and emotional/behavioural problems, with the study 
partially supporting the prediction that offenders would have higher EPS scores. 
  
XV 
 
 Conclusions:  Offenders, irrespective of sex, engaged in more mature moral 
reasoning than non-offenders, supporting previous findings. This study attempted to 
address methodological limitations of previous studies, such as through using a measure 
standardised for ID. Further research would be valuable to help develop suitable and 
effective interventions for this client group.  
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Chapter One- Introduction 
 
1.1 Overview of Chapter 
This chapter begins with defining intellectual disability (ID) in terms of its 
diagnostic criteria. It then presents data on current prevalence rates of ID within 
England, and briefly describes common comorbid difficulties experienced by 
individuals with ID and their families. The relationship between ID and offending 
behaviour is then explored, with prevalence rates of offending by individuals with ID at 
various stages of the criminal justice system discussed, including studies that draw on 
data from police stations, prison services and the probation service. The most 
commonly found types of offending behaviour amongst people with ID are then 
discussed and potential risk factors for offending behaviour are considered.  
 The chapter progresses to focus on moral reasoning, where the key theoretical 
approaches are considered in turn and their limitations are discussed. The relationship 
between moral reasoning and offending behaviour is then examined amongst the 
general population. Following this, the relationship between ID and moral reasoning is 
presented and the literature is reviewed, with a particular focus on the role of an 
individual’s sex. The links between moral development, offending behaviour and ID are 
then proposed and explored, followed by a brief review of treatment intervention 
approaches, both for the general population who offend and the ID population who 
offend. 
Finally, this chapter presents information regarding the development of the 
current research study, including the theoretical, clinical and methodological rationale 
for why this area requires further exploration. The chapter closes with the presentation 
of four research questions along with specific hypotheses.  
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1.2 Intellectual Disability 
1.2.1 Definition. According to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV-TR), intellectual disability (termed as ‘mental 
retardation’) is defined as “significantly subaverage intellectual functioning (an IQ of 
approximately 70 or below) with onset before age 18 years and concurrent deficits or 
impairments in adaptive functioning” (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000, p. 39).  
ID is further defined, depending on specific IQ score. An individual with an IQ 
between 50 - 70 would be classified with mild ID, between 35 - 50 with moderate ID, 
between 25 - 35 with severe ID, and any person with an IQ of below 25 would be 
classified with profound ID (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000). In addition, individuals with an 
IQ between 71 - 84 can be classified as having borderline intellectual functioning 
(DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000). 
1.2.2 Prevalence. It is difficult to determine precise prevalence rates of 
individuals with ID in England. In 2001, Valuing People, the Government white paper 
on ID (Department of Health, 2001) estimated that there were approximately 1.4 million 
people in England with ID. It estimated that 210,000 of these people had severe or 
profound ID, of which around 65,000 were young people and 145,000 adults. It 
estimated that a much larger proportion of these people, approximately 1.2 million, had 
mild or moderate ID. 
Emerson and Hatton were commissioned in 2004 by the Department of Health 
to produce revised prevalence estimates, drawing on information from both local 
authorities and census data. They adjusted data to reflect the higher percentage of ID 
found within younger age groups and the lower percentage in the older adult age group, 
which they stated was not factored into the Valuing People estimates. Emerson and 
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Hatton (2008) estimated that there are 985,000 people in England who have ID, 
equating to approximately 2% of the population.  
1.2.3 Comorbid difficulties. People with ID have high rates of mental health 
problems (O’Brien, 2002) and physical health problems (Lennox & Kerr, 1997); which 
can often go undetected and therefore untreated in this population (Holland, 2004). 
Problems that can be common within the ID population can include epilepsy (Kerr, 
Fraser & Felce, 1996), depression (Richards et al., 2001), anxiety (Dagnan & Jahoda, 
2006) and substance misuse problems (Taggart, McLaughlin, Quinn & Milligan, 2006).  
In addition, families supporting children with ID have been found to have a 
significantly increased risk of adverse socio-economic circumstances (Emerson & 
Hatton, 2005; Fujiura & Yamaki, 2000). Mothers of children with ID (Singer & Floyd, 
2006), and in particular single mothers of children with ID have been found to 
demonstrate higher levels of depression (Olsson & Hwang, 2001) along with lower 
levels of self-esteem, happiness and self-efficiency than mothers of children who do not 
have ID (Emerson, Hatton, Llewellyn, Blacker & Graham, 2006). Mothers of children 
with autism have been found to be at increased risk of experiencing high levels of stress 
(Eisenhower, Baker & Blacher, 2005). These experiences are likely to have subsequent 
impact on the child with ID.  
1.3 Intellectual Disability and Offending Behaviour 
The relationship between ID and offending behaviour is complex (Holland, 
2004). Firstly, establishing clear definitions for ‘ID’ and ‘offending’ has proved 
problematic in research studies (Holland, Clare & Mukhopadhyay, 2002; Jones, 2007), 
making it difficult to identify prevalence rates, and draw comparisons between studies. 
Measuring offence rates and estimating prevalence is difficult in any population, due to 
the variation of when the data is collected within the criminal justice process. This 
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process is complicated further within the ID population for numerous reasons; including 
the judicial system route not being pursued if a guilty state of mind preceding the 
offence (‘Mens Rea’) cannot be proved, if challenging behaviour is defined as an 
offence, or if evidence from a victim with ID is required (Holland, 2004).  
It has also been suggested that people with ID are likely to make false 
confessions whilst they are in police custody (Clare & Gudjonnson, 1993), are more 
likely to be misled by leading questions (Hayes, 1996), and are less likely to understand 
their rights and the criminal justice system proceedings (Baroff, Gunn & Hayes, 2004; 
Johnston & Halstead, 2000). In addition, individuals with ID have been found to be 
more likely to confess to offences, are more likely to be denied parole, and are at 
increased risk of being victimised whilst they are in prison (Glaser & Deane, 1999). 
 However, offending by those who have an IQ of below 50 has been described 
as rare (Simpson & Hogg, 2001), particularly in the UK. Simpson and Hogg conducted 
a systematic review of offenders with ID, focusing on the methodology and the 
prevalence rates drawn from the studies conducted. They concluded that there was not 
sufficient evidence from the 15 papers reviewed to suggest that offending rates are 
higher amongst people with ID, than the general population. However, papers that did 
not accurately measure or classify ID, and those that did not clearly define offence 
status or offence type, were excluded from the review. Although this could be said to 
increase the accuracy of the review, the problems with establishing such definitions 
(mentioned above) are commonly faced by researchers in this field, which therefore 
resulted in high exclusion rates from this review. A total of 42 papers out of the 73 
identified initially were excluded for these reasons.  
 In their study of data obtained from the Office of National Statistics (ONS, 
1999), Dickson, Emerson and Hatton (2005) found that adolescents with ID reported 
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higher rates of anti-social behaviour than their peers without ID. However, the authors 
reported that this difference was accounted for by the increased rates of mental health 
problems and social deprivation rates amongst this ID group. 
1.3.1 Prevalence. Prevalence of offending behaviour in adults with ID is 
difficult to accurately determine and appears to differ, depending on where and how the 
sample was drawn. It has been suggested that people with ID may be over-represented 
in the criminal justice system (Lindsay, Law & MacLeod, 2002), however this view is 
not always supported. Some of the main areas where research in this area has been 
conducted are discussed below. 
 1.3.1.1. Police. Research suggests that illegal behaviour by people with ID 
occurs far more frequently than inferred by statistics obtained from police stations 
(Hales & Stratford, 1996).  Two studies explored offences (including alleged offences) 
by adults in contact with their local ID services in 1995 and found that 2% of those in 
the Cambridge area (Lyall, Holland & Collins, 1995) and 5% in London (McNulty, 
Kissi-Deborah & Newsom-Davies, 1995) had previous involvement with the criminal 
justice system. However, people with ID not known to their local ID service were 
obviously not included in these statistics. Therefore these findings are likely to be an 
underestimation of prevalence rates (Murphy & Mason, 1999).  
 In another study; Gudjonsson, Clare, Rutter and Pearse (1993) found that 8.6% 
of the 156 suspects screened at two London police stations had a full scale IQ (FSIQ) of 
less than 70, placing them within the ID range. They found that a further 25.1% of the 
sample had a FSIQ falling between 70 and 75, placing them in the borderline ID range. 
However, a diagnosis of ID in this study was determined by IQ score alone, and 
information regarding social or adaptive functioning or development, was not obtained 
by the authors.  
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 1.3.1.2 Prison. Typically, studies exploring the prevalence of people with ID in 
English prisons have found considerably lower rates than those presented by police 
custody studies. However these estimated rates vary considerably, and this is associated 
with differences in methodology, tests administered, the time point of custody, and 
many other factors (Holland et al., 2002). Murphy, Harnett and Holland (1995) found 
that no men in their study of 157 males in a London remand prison, had a FSIQ of 
below 70,  However despite this, 21% of their sample reported either having attended a 
special school, or having ‘reading problems or intellectual disabilities’. Therefore, a 
zero prevalence rate of individuals with ID may be an unfair representation of this 
prison population.  
 Fazel, Xenitidis and Powell (2008) conducted a systematic review of surveys 
that explored the prevalence of ID amongst general prison populations between 1988 
and 2004. They compiled information on 11,969 prisoners, drawn from 10 surveys 
across five countries; Australia, UK, USA, New Zealand and Dubai. The majority of 
studies reviewed reported a prevalence of people who had a clinical diagnosis of ID 
between 0.5% and 1.5% of the prison population. This data was predominantly drawn 
from the male prisoner population (92% male).  
A greater prevalence of ID was found in an English male prison by Hayes, 
Shackell, Mottram and Lancaster (2007). They reported that 7.1% of their randomly 
selected sample (140 prisoners from a population of 1400) had an IQ below 70, when 
measured by the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1999), and 
10.1% scored below 70 when measured by the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale 
(VABS; Sparrow, Balla & Cicchetti, 1984). However, although the authors report that 
these prevalence rates portray greater numbers of people with ID in prison than previous 
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findings suggest, they also state that only four of their participants (2.9%) met criteria 
for ID diagnosis, with scores <70 on both measures.   
In another study, Herrington (2009) investigated the prevalence of ID amongst 
185 young male prisoners (18 - 21 years old). The Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test, 2nd 
Edition (KBIT-2; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) was used to measure intelligence and the 
VABS-2nd Edition (Sparrow, Cicchetti & Balla, 2005) was used to measure adaptive 
behaviour. The KBIT-2 provides IQ composite scores, along with verbal and non-verbal 
scores. Herrington reported a range of composite IQ scores from 55 to 119. When both 
IQ and adaptive behaviours were measured, she reported that not one man scored within 
the ID range. However, when IQ composite scores alone were considered, Herrington 
found that 10% men scored an IQ of below 70, indicating significant impairment in 
cognitive functioning. The contrast in these findings highlights the difficulties faced 
when comparing studies with one-another, as different classification criterion are often 
used. In addition, the KBIT-2 was standardised on the US population, and not with the 
British population used within this study.  
 1.3.1.3 Probation services. Less research has been conducted to explore the 
number of people with ID who are on probation. In one study, Mason (1998) reported 
that 6% of a sample of 70 male offenders on probation were identified as having an IQ 
of below 70, together with impaired social functioning, therefore classifying them as 
having an ID. However, Mason and Murphy (2002) suggest that the probation service is 
likely to hold only a ‘significant minority’ of people with ID in their care.  
1.3.1.4 Summary. As illustrated, both rates of offending amongst the ID 
population and prevalence rates of ID amongst the offending population differ between 
research studies. The classification and methodological differences between these 
studies, including the test administered to determine ID and the point of custody during 
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which the data was collected, impacts on the recorded prevalence rate (Holland et al., 
2002). This in turn limits how useful any comparisons may be.  
Despite these difficulties, research into adults and adolescents with ID who are 
involved with the criminal justice system is vast, with a multitude of studies exploring a 
range of other areas. Such areas include (but are not exhaustive of) exploring treatment 
interventions with offenders with ID, for example the effectiveness of fire-setting  
intervention groups (Taylor, Thorne, Robertson & Avery, 2002), and exploring attitudes 
of staff to offending behaviour by adults with ID, including differences in tolerance 
levels and what staff would report to the police (Lyall et al., 1995). Other areas include 
exploring people’s views of individuals with ID within the criminal justice system (Cant 
& Standen, 2007) and the need for better staff training at all stages of the criminal 
justice system in how to work with, and how to best help individuals with ID (Hayes, 
2007).  
1.3.2 Offence type. There has been some research looking at the most common 
types of offences committed by people with ID. Day (1994) suggested that the 
incidence of sexual offences committed by people with ID is around four to six times 
higher than offences committed by the general population. Violent offences and petty 
crime have been identified as the most frequent offence types in ID (Barron, Hassiotis 
& Barnes, 2004), although these authors also suggest that sex offences and arson are 
commonly observed - a finding which appears consistent with findings from other 
studies (Cullen, 1993; Day, 1993; Lund, 1990).  
However, it was previously believed that people with ID were over represented 
in the population who committed arson or sexual offences (e.g. Day, 1994; Walker & 
McCabe, 1973). Jones (2007) has described how this view was developed from studies 
that were based on biased samples of offenders who were sentenced to time in prison or 
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hospital settings. She states that as this sample was biased, these findings cannot be 
generalised to the larger population of ID offenders.  Holland et al.’s (2002) research 
supports this, stating there is little evidence to suggest over-representation of ID in these 
specific groups. 
Simpson and Hogg’s systematic review (2001) explored types of offences 
committed by people with ID. They found some evidence to suggest that the prevalence 
of sexual offending, burglary and criminal damage is relatively higher in those who 
have borderline ID, compared to the general population. Again, it is difficult to establish 
whether these are in-fact the most common offences, or whether these offences are more 
likely to result in criminal justice service involvement.  
1.3.3 Risk factors for people with ID. Considering the problems presented in 
determining accurate prevalence rates, Jones (2007) has stated that it is hard to identify 
defining characteristics of offenders with ID. Despite this, there has been an array of 
potential risk factors for offending behaviour in people with ID presented in the 
literature.   
Low IQ during childhood has been suggested as a predictor of offending 
behaviour in adulthood (Farrington, 2000). Farrington has also suggested that offenders 
with low IQ are more likely to be from a larger family, from economically 
disadvantaged families, and to have experienced higher levels of parental conflict 
(Farrington, 2000). In addition early delinquency, social disadvantage, conduct disorder, 
and contact with social services have all been proposed as predictors for people with ID 
to have later involvement with the criminal justice system (Barron et al., 2004; Simons, 
2000), along with family criminality (Winter, Holland & Collins, 1997) and 
unemployment (Jones, 2007). Being young (Holland et al., 2002), having a mild to 
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borderline ID (Cullen, 1993), and being male (Thompson, 1997) have all been identified 
as risk factors for increased offending behaviour in people with ID. 
One study that set out to explore the typical characteristics of offenders with ID 
(Hogue et al., 2006) compared a sample of 212 offenders housed in three different 
levels of security; high secure, medium/low secure, and community offenders, using the 
same methodological approach. They found that adults in higher security units were 
significantly younger at the time of their first offence than the community based 
offenders. They also found that those in secure settings had more complex presentations 
and were increasingly likely to have co-morbid personality disorder diagnosis than 
community offenders. 
1.3.3.1 Emotional and behavioural risk factors. Furthermore, the incidence of 
mental illness in offenders with ID has been reported as high, and this has been 
suggested to be a significant contributor to offending behaviour (Barron, Hassiotis & 
Banes, 2002). Poor coping strategies (Holland, 2004), mental health difficulties 
(Murphy, Holland, Fowler & Reep, 1991; Noble & Conley, 1992) and personality 
disorder (Reed, Russell, Xenitidis & Murphy, 2004) have all been shown to be 
associated with offending behaviour in people with ID.  
Hall (1999) conducted research with young offenders with ID who were residing 
in secure units. He found a high prevalence of psychiatric disorders in this population, 
including behavioural disorders, mood disorders, anxiety disorders and substance 
misuse. Behavioural problems have also been self-reported as a common experience by 
offenders with ID in both childhood (Day, 1993; Winter, Holland & Collins, 1997) and 
adulthood (Holland, et al., 2002). In addition, a combination of both historical 
behavioural problems and comorbid mental health needs have been identified in the 
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literature as factors that increase individuals with ID’s contact with the criminal justice 
system (Jones, 2007; Simons, 2000).  
A range of disorders have been found to be prevalent amongst the ID offender 
population. Mood disorders are prevalent in the ID population, particularly amongst 
those who offend (Smith & O’Brein, 2004), including dysthymia (Day, 1990). 
Substance misuse is also common amongst the ID offender population, with Ashton 
(2002) finding 40-60% of their sample of offenders with ID aged between 18 and 25, 
having used cannabis. Furthermore, in their study of 61 adults with ID who had 
offended, Baron et al. (2004) found high rates of psychopathology (51.71%), with 
psychotic illness being particularly prevalent (43.3%).   
Aggressive behaviour is the most common reason people with ID are admitted 
to hospital (Lakin, Hill, Hauber, Bruininks & Heal, 1983; Taylor, Novaco, Gillmer & 
Robertson, 2004). Considerably fewer studies however, have explored the 
characteristics and experiences of women with ID who have offended (Holland et al., 
2002). Lindsay, Steele, Smith, Quinn and Allan’s (2006) inspected 12 years referral 
information for women admitted to high-secure hospitals. They reported that the most 
common reasons for referral included aggression, self-mutilation and attempted suicide. 
However more research is required in this field, particularly in exploring the differences 
in risk factors for offending behaviour amongst male and females with ID. 
1.4 Moral Reasoning 
One psychological theory that has been proposed to attempt to explain why 
some people offend whilst others do not, is moral reasoning theory. Moral reasoning has 
been defined as “the cognitive and emotional processes occurring within a person when 
they are attempting to determine whether or not an event is morally right or wrong” 
(Langdon, Clare & Murphy, 2010).  
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1.4.1 Piaget’s theory of moral reasoning. Piaget (1932), through his work 
exploring child development, first described moral reasoning as a developmental 
process where judgments are made, based on the social experiences the child has 
encountered. Piaget proposed that moral development occurs alongside and is 
dependent upon the development of logical reasoning abilities.  
Piaget described how a child’s cognitive reasoning develops in stages, each 
more complex than the last, which build over time. Infants initially enter the 
sensorimotor stage from birth, where learning occurs predominantly through their 
sensory experiences and motor skills (Palmer, 2003). At around two years, the infant 
progresses into the preoperational stage, where they start to learn that objects can be 
represented by language and images. Until about aged seven, children’s thinking 
remains ego-centric, and they are able to solve practical, concrete problems (Slater, 
Hocking & Loose, 2003). At around seven years old the child enters into the concrete 
operational stage of development, where their thinking becomes more logical, 
systematic and rational, and conservation skills are learned. (Slater & Bremner, 2003). 
Piaget's final stage of cognitive development is the formal operations stage, which is 
entered into during early adolescence. The skills developed in this stage enable 
individuals to think abstractly, hypothesise, plan and solve more complex problems, 
through strategies such as the manipulation of variables.   
Piaget’s theory of moral reasoning suggests that moral development is therefore 
dependent on advancement through these logical reasoning stages. He described how 
children and young people engage in either hetereonomous or autonomous moral 
reasoning. Hetereonomous reasoning is based on rules that the child believes are rigid 
and unchangeable because they are implemented by an authority figure (e.g. parent). 
Piaget stated that this type of reasoning is typically engaged in by younger children.  
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Autonomous reasoning is typically engaged in by children from about age 10 
years (Slater & Bremner, 2003). Reasoning is based on the understanding that laws and 
rules have been developed by people and society in general, and that when an action is 
judged, both an individual’s intentions and the subsequent consequences should be 
considered. Rights and rules are no longer understood as one-way, but as reciprocal 
(Hart, Burock, London & Atkins, 2003), and principles of justice and fairness are 
fundamental. Piaget stated that in order to reach autonomous moral reasoning, an 
individual is required to have developed formal operational thinking ability (Palmer, 
2003). 
1.4.2 Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning. Kohlberg (1969, 1976) set out to 
develop Piaget’s theory of moral reasoning. Piaget’s model was developed on and 
restricted to children and as a result, Kohlberg sought to explore the development and 
role of moral reasoning in adolescence and adulthood, hence hoping to broaden the 
theory. 
Through his research Kohlberg developed his six-stage model of moral 
development (Table 1). The higher the stage, the more abstract and complex the 
decision-making and reasoning becomes. Kohlberg described how individuals initially 
reason at stage 1, and over time move through the stages to more complex reasoning. 
However, not all individuals are thought to reach stage 6 of moral development.  
Kohlberg described how Preconventional reasoning (stages 1 and 2) occurs 
when an individual views rules as separate entities to themselves and their reasoning is 
egocentric. They typically make decisions based on rules, on authority figures (e.g. 
parent figures) and on their own needs, and are typically unaware of shared moral 
norms and expectations (Ashkar & Kenny, 2007). During Conventional reasoning 
(stages 3 and 4), individuals demonstrate reasoning based on other people, including  
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Table 1. 
 Kohlberg’s stages of moral development (1969, 1976) 
Level Stage 
number 
Reasoning is based on: 
 
 
Preconventional 
 
 
  
 
1 
 
2 
 
 
Rules, obeying authority and avoiding punishment.  
 
Egocentricity; one’s own needs take priority.   
 
Conventional 
 
 
 
 
 
Postconventional 
 
 
 
3 
 
  
4 
 
 
5 
 
 
6 
 
 
 
Other people’s needs, prioritising personal 
relationships.  
 
Societal rules and keeping order. 
 
 
The relationship between individuals and society, 
and understanding rules can sometimes be broken. 
 
The acquisition of self-chosen moral and ethical 
principles. 
 
 
consideration of personal relationships and societal rules. In stage 3 reasoning, people 
are typically concerned with how they are being evaluated by others. Postconventional 
reasoning (stages 5 and 6) represents reasoning based on self-chosen ethical and moral 
principles, with the understanding that if their own beliefs or principles are breached, it 
is reasonable to break a law. Progression through these moral reasoning stages is 
dependent on an individual’s level of cognitive development (Colby et al., 1987). 
1.4.3 Criticisms of Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning. Kohlberg’s model 
of moral development has been heavily criticised on the grounds that it biased in 
relation to both sex (Brown, Tappan & Gilligan, 1995; Gilligan, 1982) and culture 
(Snarey, 1995).  
1.4.3.1 Culture criticisms. Kohlberg believed that his moral judgement stages 
were universal, and were experienced across all cultures (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau & 
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Thoma, 1999). Snarey (1994) reviewed studies drawn from a range of cultures to 
explore moral reasoning levels. Although Snarey found evidence to support the 
existence of stages 1 to 4 cross-culturally, they did not find evidence for 
postconventional reasoning in non-western cultures. This supports earlier findings by 
Schweder (1982), who also argued that there was weak evidence for the existence of 
postconventional reasoning. Snarey therefore argues that there is a need to incorporate 
other ways of thinking about morality other than Kohlberg’s stages, including 
communitarian and religious ways (Rest et al., 1999).  
Despite there being evidence to suggest the non-existence of postconventional 
reasoning cross-culturally, it is not clear whether this reasoning is not experienced by 
some cultures (particularly non-Western cultures), or whether it the stage-model fails to 
accurately measure this reasoning. This therefore may be seen as a limitation of 
Kohlberg’s stage model approach. 
1.4.3.2 Sex criticisms. A vast amount of research has explored moral 
development in relation to sex and gender. Gilligan (1982) criticised Kohlberg’s model 
for discriminating against the moral reasoning of women. Kohlberg developed his 
model following numerous interviews with young males, which Gilligan claimed 
resulted in it being biased towards male-orientated morality. Gilligan ensured that she 
interviewed both sexes in her research, and as a result concluded that males and females 
differ in their moral judgements. She proposed that whilst women typically base their 
moral decisions on care and empathy related factors, men base their moral decisions on 
justice and fairness. She argued that women express their morality “in a different voice” 
(Gilligan, 1982). 
Gilligan’s claims were supported by Lyons (1983) who conducted open-ended 
interviews and demonstrated that the majority of males (79%) judged by a ‘rights’ 
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orientation, whereas females (75%) judged by a ‘care’ orientation. Despite such claims 
Lyons’ research can be criticised for various reasons. Firstly, her research was 
conducted on a relatively small sample (N = 32). In addition, her participants spanned a 
considerable age range (8 - 60 years), and included only those who had received a high 
level of education and had a high level intelligence (Rothbart, Hanley & Albert, 1986). 
This biased sampling is therefore highly likely to reduce the generalisability of her 
claims to the greater population.  
Gilligan linked her theory to Chodorow’s gender theory (Chodorow, 1978); 
suggesting gender-related differences in identity are formed during early socialisation. 
Gilligan proposed that a boy’s identity is developed in relation to the world, whereas a 
girl’s identity is developed in relation to other people. As a result, Gilligan argued that 
Kohlberg’s model automatically assigns females to a less mature stage than males, 
based on their tendency for care-related decision making (Gilligan, 1982). Moral 
decisions based on relationships and the needs of others typically fit Kohlberg’s stage 3, 
whereas decisions based on maintaining laws and societal rules, fit within stage 4 
reasoning. Gilligan therefore suggests that care-orientation is devalued by this model.  
However, there remain inconsistencies within the literature investigating the 
existence of sex differences in moral reasoning. Gilligan’s argument has received some 
support from the literature, with studies demonstrating that whilst females adopt a care-
orientated approach, males draw on a more justice-orientated approach to decision-
making, (Baumrind, 1986; Ford & Lowery, 1986; Yacker & Weinberg, 1990).  
Gilligan’s claims have also been disputed. Other studies have found no 
differences in stage scores between males and females (Friedman, Robinson & 
Friedman, 1987; Gregg, Gibbs & Basinger, 1994; Rest, 1979; Snarey, 1982; Walker, 
1984), or in the predominance of a care or justice-orientation approach to moral 
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reasoning (Rothbart et al., 1986).  Rothbart et al. (1986) set out to test Gilligan’s 
hypothesis that women are more likely to base their reasoning on care and relationships, 
whereas males are more likely to base reasoning on justice and rights. Their findings 
countered Gilligan’s hypotheses, demonstrating that males and females draw on both 
reasoning types. They therefore argued that not taking both orientations into account is 
a “short-coming” of any moral reasoning framework.  
In addition to criticising Kohlberg’s theory of moral reasoning, Gilligan (1982) 
also criticised the assessment of moral reasoning. She argued that the hypothetical 
moral dilemmas used by most measures are biased towards justice-orientation, therefore 
discriminate against females. As a result, Gilligan suggested that using real-life 
dilemmas would better serve care-oriented reasoning.  
Once more, inconsistencies are shown within the literature. Research adopts a 
range of methods to measure moral reasoning and presents mixed findings, with some 
studies finding no differences between males and females when either real-life (Derry, 
1989) or hypothetical dilemmas (Garrod, Beal & Shin, 1990) were administered. 
Walker (1984) conducted a meta-analysis which looked at 79 studies, investigating 
whether gender differences were detected across the 180 samples measured, using 
Kohlberg’s Moral Judgement Interview (MJI; Colby & Kohlberg, 1987). Walker found 
that the MJI demonstrated a non-significant preference towards moral reasoning in men, 
concluding that this measurement tool did not demonstrate sex-bias.   
Interestingly, there are some research studies that have shown females scoring at 
a significantly higher moral stage than males. This counters Gilligan’s criticisms that 
the hypothetical dilemmas used in moral reasoning assessment discriminate against 
females (Duckett et al., 1997; Self, Safford & Shelton, 1988). Both studies made use of 
the Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest, 1975), which was developed in an attempt to make 
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moral-reasoning assessment more standardised. The populations studied comprised 
nursing students and veterinarians (respectively), which may limit how reliably one can 
generalise these findings to the general population. People who enter into such caring 
professions may hold specific characteristics that impacted upon their responses to 
questions. In addition, both studies had considerably more participants of one sex which 
was likely to have skewed the findings. Replication of the studies with equal 
representation of men and women is therefore required to be able to validate these 
conclusions.  
There is however some evidence that fictional and real life moral dilemmas may 
tug at different moral reasoning stages, with dilemmas eliciting different moral 
judgement (Krebs & Denton, 2005). Controversy therefore persists as to whether the 
moral reasoning abilities of men and women differ because of their sex. 
1.4.4 Gibbs’ theory of moral reasoning. In 1979, Gibbs revised Kohlberg’s 
model in an attempt to overcome some of the criticisms that have been presented, 
including the limited evidence that supports the existence of stage 6, particularly cross-
culturally (Gibbs, 1979). Gibbs removed Kohlberg’s Postconventional stages (stages 5 
and 6), proposing that these do not constitute a Piagetian stage of development. Gibbs 
stated that Piagetian stages should be potentially achieved through natural progression 
across all cultures.  
Gibbs, Basinger and Fuller (1992) and Gibbs (2003, 2010) proposed the 
Sociomoral Stage theory, a four-stage model of moral reasoning. In this model the first 
two stages constitute what Gibbs termed ‘Immature’ reasoning’, and the latter two 
stages constitute ‘Mature’ reasoning (See Table 2).  During stage 1, moral decision 
making is typically based on obeying rules and ‘powerful’ authority figures. Physical  
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Table 2. 
Sociomoral Stage Theory (Gibbs et al., 1992; Gibbs 2003; 2010) 
Stage 
number 
Title Description of reasoning 
 
 
Immature 
reasoning: 
1 
 
 
 
Unilateral and 
Physicalistic 
 
 
 
 
Reasoning is based on unilateral authority, 
particularly regarding people perceived as 
‘powerful’. Rules are viewed in absolute terms. 
Physical consequences of behaviours are considered 
when decision making.  
 
2 
 
Exchanging 
and 
Instrumental 
 
Morality remains external to individual and 
superficial in nature. Reasoning is concerned with 
the needs of self or others. Tit-for-tat exchanges 
may be made to determine reasoning. 
 
Mature 
reasoning: 
3 
 
 
 
Mutual and 
Prosocial 
 
 
 
Reasoning considers interpersonal relationships, 
empathy, care and expectations. Individuals are 
more likely to consider the consequences of 
violating social norms. 
 
4 
 
 
Systemic and 
Standard 
 
Reasoning considers the complex social systems in 
which individuals live; including rights, values, 
responsibility to society, and an individual’s 
conscience. 
 
 
consequences such as being punished or beaten up, along with labels such as ‘stealing is 
bad’ are considered when decisions are made at this level.  
Stage 2 reasoning is instrumental, based on one’s own needs, where ‘tit-for-tat’ 
exchanges can be made for personal gain. For example an individual may decide to help 
someone out, knowing that they will owe them a favour at a later stage. Needs and 
advantages are also considered at this stage, such as believing that people may like you 
more for behaving in a certain way.  
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During stage 3 reasoning, moral decisions consider individuals relationships 
with others, where care, empathy, normative expectations and intrapersonal approval 
play key roles. For example an individual may base their decision on the knowledge that 
their action will leave them feeling proud and good about themselves, as a consequence. 
Stage 4 is the most mature reasoning stage, according to Gibbs’ model. Reasoning at 
this levels typically considers the impact the decision may have on society; 
incorporating features such as values, rights, responsibility and their personal 
conscience into the decision making process. 
However, despite Gibbs revising Kohlbergian theory to deal with evidence that 
stage 6 exists infrequently cross-culturally, and with his model having been found to 
demonstrate validity cross-culturally (Gibbs, Basinger, Grime & Snarey, 2007), he did 
not revise the theory in an attempt to remedy the criticism that it is inherently sexist, 
which stands as its biggest criticism. 
1.5 Moral Reasoning and Offending Behaviour 
It has been proposed that Kohlberg’s moral reasoning theory can be linked to 
offending behaviour at each stage of development (Palmer, 2003; Tarry & Emler, 
2007). For example, Palmer suggested that offending at stage 2 reasoning would be 
justifiable if the individual perceives the rewards they will gain by committing an 
offence, as being greater than the risks they are placed under by offending. Offending at 
stage 3 might be justified if relationships are maintained as a consequence of 
committing an offence. Palmer’s theory therefore justifies offending behaviour at any 
stage of moral development. Tarry and Emler (2007) support this concept, however they 
state that it is stage 2 reasoning where personal needs are prioritised, which in turn 
characterises delinquent and antisocial behaviour.  
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Despite illegal behaviour being justifiable at any stage of development, Palmer 
(2003) suggests that offenders are less likely than non-offenders to enter the more 
mature (higher) stages of moral development, which is consistent with findings in the 
literature (Arbuthnot, 1984; Jurkovic, 1980). Stams et al. (2006) support this claim, 
suggesting that offending behaviour appears more “morally acceptable at the self-
centred lower stages”, which are predominantly driven by “avoidance of punishment 
(stage 1) or instrumental advantage (stage 2)”.  
Gibbs (1993) has suggested that children who are not exposed to role-taking 
opportunities when they are growing up, which would enhance their ability to 
perspective take, will be less effective at demonstrating age-appropriate moral reasoning 
skills by adolescence.  He suggests that such individuals may therefore remain 
egocentric, increasing the probability that they will engage in anti-social behaviours. 
The developmental delay in moral reasoning leads to distorted cognitions which an 
individual uses to rationalise and justify their offending behaviours (Gibbs, 2003; 2010; 
Palmer, 2003). 
The research base exploring moral development and offending behaviours has 
grown in recent years. The vast majority of this research compares male adolescent 
offenders with adolescent non-offenders (Chandler & Moran, 1990; Palmer, 2003; 
Palmer & Hollin, 1996). Prevalence rates of offending behaviour are considerably 
higher amongst boys than girls (Snyder & Sickmund, 1999; Stams et al., 2006), which 
is likely to have an impact on why more research is conducted with males.  However 
some studies do include female offenders or female non-offenders in their samples 
(Gavaghan, Arnold & Gibbs, 1983; Gregg et al., 1994), with Garmon, Basinger, Gregg 
and Gibbs (1996) proposing that young females demonstrate stage 3 reasoning at a 
younger age than males. Stams et al. (2006) counter this, stating differences between 
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moral judgement stages in young male and female offenders are observed less 
consistently amongst the studies included in their review. 
Studies in this area typically measure moral reasoning through presenting 
participants with hypothetical dilemmas or questions, and recording their responses. 
Production measures such as the Moral Judgement Interview (MJI; Colby & Kohlberg, 
1987) or the Socio-moral Reflection Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 
1992), both commonly used in this field, require participants to provide moral 
justifications. Alternatively, recognition measures such as the Defining Issues Test 
(DIT; Rest, 1975) require participants to evaluate a list of set statements related to moral 
dilemmas. Scores on these measures are converted to stage scores of moral 
development.  
Overall, young offenders have been found to typically score at a less mature 
stage of moral reasoning than non-offenders (Blasi, 1980; Lee & Prentice, 1988; 
Nelson, Smith & Dodd, 1990; Smetena, 1990; Van Vugt et al., 2011b), predominantly 
scoring at the preconventional level. This has been found both within studies that 
compared just males, and those that compared males with females. In their study, 
Palmer and Hollin (1998) found that the majority of young offenders (13 – 22 years old) 
engaged in some stage 2 moral reasoning, compared to mostly stage 3 reasoning 
amongst same age non-offenders.  In Stam’s et al. (2006) meta-analysis of moral 
judgement, the authors found that young offender’s moral judgement was significantly 
lower than non-offending peers, even when gender, age, culture and intelligence were 
controlled. Their findings are strengthened by their extremely large sample (N = 2,316 
offenders, N = 2498 non-offenders) and large effect size (d = .76).  
Ashkar and Kenny (2007) explored the moral reasoning abilities of juvenile 
offenders; comparing a group of sexual offenders with offenders who had not 
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committed sex-offences. They concluded that there were no overall differences in moral 
reasoning ability between the two types of offenders, which was consistent with other 
research (Wilson, Goodwin & Beck, 2002). However, Ashkar and Kenny (2007) did 
find some differences within the individual moral reasoning questions. They found that 
the moral reasoning stage engaged in by offenders differed in relation to the offending 
context; more specifically, that moral reasoning deficits were demonstrated that were 
offence specific. Offenders presented with more immature reasoning in the area they 
had offended, with more preconventional reasoning shown within a sexual-offence 
context by those who had committed sex-offences than the non-sex offenders, and vice 
versa for non sexual offending contexts (Ashkar & Kenny, 2007).  
This study potentially highlights a limitation of stage-based models of moral 
development. The findings suggest that individuals can function at different stages at 
different times, in different contexts. This therefore suggests that moral reasoning is not 
fixed, and that perhaps there are environmental contributing factors that play a role.  
However, in this study it cannot be established whether these moral reasoning 
deficits specific to offences were a cause or effect of peoples’ offending behaviour. In 
addition, although their findings were clinically interesting, data was only presented for 
male juvenile offenders, and therefore generalising findings to the greater offending 
population should be done with caution. This is further restricted by the small sample 
recruited (N = 16).  
The link between cognitive development and moral stage score has been well 
established (Colby et al., 1987), and many of the referenced studies controlled for IQ 
when comparing populations. However, much of the research base focuses on young 
people and considerably less research in this area has been conducted amongst the adult 
population. In one adult study, Buttell (2002) explored moral reasoning among women 
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who were convicted for domestic violence offences, finding that they demonstrated 
significantly lower levels of reasoning than non offending adults. These findings were 
comparable with studies that looked at male ‘batterers’ (Buttell, 1999; Buttell, 2001); 
with both groups demonstrating moral reasoning levels of two standard deviations 
below those of non-offenders. Buttell (2002) likened these moral reasoning scores to 
those presented by institutionalised juvenile offenders.  
DeWolfe, Jackson and Winterberger (1988) compared moral reasoning and 
moral character in incarcerated adult males and females. The authors found that male 
offenders scored at a more mature level of moral reasoning than female offenders. 
When reflecting on their findings, the authors suggested that females may have been 
disadvantaged in their responses to the justice-orientation dilemmas, presented by the 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure (SRM; Gibbs & Widaman, 1982). Contrasting results 
however were presented by Gregg et al. (1994). They demonstrated that both female 
groups (offender and non-offender) engaged in more mature moral reasoning than did 
their male peers, whilst controlling for IQ and age. 
As briefly discussed, there are limitations of using a stage-based model of moral 
development, especially when considering the different stages of reasoning engaged in 
by different offending contexts. Ashkar and Kenny (2007) identified offence-specific 
deficits in reasoning which proposes that moral reasoning is not as fixed as theory 
proposes, and may in-fact be influenced somewhat by external and environmental 
factors. However, despite these criticisms, stage theories of moral reasoning offer a 
pragmatic approach to measuring and understanding an individual’s general level of 
moral development.  
Despite the link between moral reasoning and offending behaviour being firmly 
established and widely researched, considerably less is known about moral development 
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in people with ID. Van Vugt et al. (2011a) suggest that the cognitive impairment 
experienced amongst people with ID reduces their moral development abilities, which 
in turn exacerbates their risk for engaging in delinquent behaviour. 
1.6 Moral Reasoning and Intellectual Disabilities 
Within the general population, research into moral reasoning has found 
significant positive relationships between the IQ of children and their level of moral 
development (Hoffman, 1977). In addition, higher intelligence, higher level of 
education received, and subsequently a greater level of abstract reasoning have been 
linked to more mature stages of moral reasoning (Colby, Kohlberg, Gibbs & Lieberman, 
1983). Despite these links between intelligence and moral development, considerably 
less is known about moral development within the ID population. Furthermore, the 
cognitive developmental approaches of moral reasoning; as proposed by Piaget, 
Kohlberg and Gibbs, did not consider individuals with ID in their theoretical 
development. 
To explore how much and what is known about the moral development of 
people with ID, Langdon et al. (2010a) conducted a systematic literature review within 
this field. Due to the quality of this review, how recently it was conducted and the 
similarity of area being explored, a new systematic literature review to mirror their 
findings will not be presented within this research project. However, Langdon et al.’s 
(2010a) review of the literature will be discussed, particularly in relation to the sex of 
participants involved in the studies, which is a key focus of the current research study. 
Following this, papers published within this field since Langdon et al.’s (2010a) review 
will be presented and critiqued.  
 Langdon et al. (2010a) used a wide selection of search terms in their systematic 
review of the literature. This increased the inclusion of papers in their study, as it 
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accounted for the changing terminology of ‘intellectual disability’ both cross-culturally 
and throughout history. This is essential as the terminology has changed considerably 
over the last 200 years, including terms such as ‘mental disability’, ‘mental handicap’, 
‘mental subnormality’ and ‘mental retardation’ (Schalock et al., 2007). If this review 
had narrowed the search criteria then it would have restricted its findings to a small 
proportion of the available literature.  
 The review identified 20 papers that explored moral reasoning in people with 
ID. The majority of studies (N = 16) comprised children and adolescent participants 
alone, making it difficult to generalise findings to adult populations. In their discussion, 
Langdon et al. (2010a) highlight the difficulty in drawing reliable or valid conclusions 
from, or making comparisons between studies, due to the varied measures of moral 
reasoning used. Typically unstandardised measurement tools were administered, which 
emphasises the importance of drawing any themes or interpreting findings with caution. 
 However, although mindful of the potential limitations regarding reliability of 
the findings and the difficulties faced comparing the studies; several themes were 
observed. Overall, Langdon et al. (2010a) concluded that the papers from this review 
demonstrated that moral development of children, adolescents and adults with ID, 
typically develops at a slower rate than their peers (e.g. Foye & Simeonsson, 1979; Lind 
& Smith, 1984). This was observed when participants were matched to peers by 
chronological age. People with ID therefore scored at less mature stages of moral 
reasoning than people without ID; reflecting their developmental level. However these 
differences were found to disappear once participants were matched on ‘mental age’, 
which emphasises the important role of cognitive ability within moral development. The 
authors of this review also concluded that moral reasoning is linked to behaviour 
amongst people with ID (Langdon et al., 2010a). 
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 All but one of the studies reviewed, Grant, Boucher, Riggs & Grayson (2005), 
were conducted between 1941 and 1985, with the majority of papers published in the 
1970s and 1980s. Langdon et al. (2010a), usefully points out that much of this research 
was conducted prior to key theoretical developments within the field of moral reasoning 
and makes links to the social context at this time. This highlights the need for more 
current research within this field, to enable a more accurate understanding of moral 
development in people with ID in the 21st century.  
 1.6.1 Sex differences. The papers featuring in Langdon et al.’s (2010a) review 
that included both males and females in their study were retrieved for further inspection, 
to explore whether potential differences existed between the sexes. Of the 20 papers 
reviewed by Langdon et al. (2010a), two papers were excluded from further review for 
recruiting only females (Abel, 1941; Miller, Zunoff & Stephens, 1974) and an 
additional three papers for recruiting only males (Kahn, 1976; 1983; 1985). The 15 
remaining papers comprised both males and females in their sample (See Table 3). 
These papers will be presented and discussed in terms of the role sex played in their 
study, and regarding whether they found sex differences in the moral reasoning of 
people with ID.  
  In three of the reviewed studies (Bender, 1980; Gargiulo & Sulick, 1978; Grant 
et al., 2005), no mention of sex was made in any stage of the paper. Gargiulo and Sulick  
(1978) recruited a large sample of participants in their study (N = 135). They compared 
young people between six and 16 years old who did not have ID, with individuals who 
had an IQ between 50 - 80, and with individuals who had an IQ  between 25 – 50.  
Significant differences were found in the moral reasoning abilities between the 
groups. However, this study was limited by not providing more expansive information  
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Table 3. 
A summary of studies that recruited both male and female individuals with IDs 
Study Sample 
size 
Number 
of males 
Number 
of 
females 
Groups Groups 
matched 
on sex? 
Measures used Were sex 
differences 
measured? 
Were sex 
differences 
observed? 
Bender 
(1980) 
 
42 
 
NR 
 
NR 
 
1. Children of average 
intelligence (M age = 
94.7 months) 
2. Children in “educable 
mentally retarded” 
classes (M age = 117.7m; 
M  IQ = 62) 
3. Children in “trainable 
mentally retarded” 
classes  (M age = 
192.4m; M  IQ = 40.7) 
 
No 1. Unstandardised 
moral stories 
 
 
 
No 
 
   No 
 
Blakey 
(1973) 
 
40 20 20 1. Adults with ID (Med age 
= 26y; M MA = 6y) 
2. Children with no-ID 
(Med age = 6y) 
 
Yes 1. Unstandardised 
moral stories 
 
Yes 
 
No significant 
sex differences 
were found in 
moral 
judgement. Sex 
differences were 
found in the 
rates of 
punishment 
advocated. 
  
29 
 
 
Boehm 
(1967)  
 
 
67 39 28 1. Adolescents with ID    
(M age = 18y; M IQ = 
61)  
 
 
N/A 1. Modified 
Piagetian moral 
stories 
Yes No significant 
sex differences 
found. 
 
Foye & 
Simeonsson 
(1979) 
60 30 30 1. Children with no-ID    
(M age = 77.5m; M IQ = 
107) 
2. Adolescents with mild 
ID (M age = 171.65m;  
M  IQ = 61.15) 
3. Adults with moderate ID 
(M age = 316.35m;        
M  IQ = 55.5) 
 
 
 
Yes 1. Unstandardised 
moral stories 
No No 
Gargiulo 
(1984) 
 
94 50 44 1. Children with ID          
(M age = 10.1y;             
M IQ = 62.58) 
2. Children with no-ID    
(M age = 6.5y; M IQ = 
109.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 1. Matching 
Familiar Figures 
test 
2. Unstandardised 
moral judgement 
stories 
 
 
Yes No significant 
sex differences 
found between 
moral 
judgement of 
girls and boys. 
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Gargiulo & 
Sulick 
(1978) 
135 NR NR 1. Children/ adolescents 
with no-ID (age 6 - 16) 
2. “Educational mentally 
retarded” children/ 
adolescents (age 6-16; IQ 
50 – 80) 
3. “Trainable mentally 
retarded” children/ 
adolescents (age 6- 16; 
IQ 25 – 50) 
 
No 1. Unstandardised 
moral judgment 
stories 
No No 
Grant, 
Boucher, 
Riggs & 
Grayson 
(2005) 
56 NR NR 1. Children with Autism  
(M age = 146.4m;          
M VIQ = 74.18) 
2. Children with mild ID 
(M age = 153.8m;          
M VIQ = 66.65) 
3. Children with no-ID     
(M age = 100.85m;         
M VIQ = 99.45) 
 
 
No 1. Six stories based 
on Piagetian 
stories 
No No 
Jackson & 
Haines 
(1982) 
96 48 48 1. Children with ID           
(M age = 12.2y) 
2. Children with no-ID    
(M age = 7.1y) 
Yes 1. Self report 
measure - stealing 
situations are 
presented. Asked 
what they “would 
do” and “should 
do” 
Yes No significant 
sex differences 
found in the 
moral 
judgement 
“should do” 
responses. 
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Lind & 
Smith 
(1984) 
112 NR NR 1. “Educable mentally 
retarded” children 
2. Average children 
(M MA of both groups       
5-9y) 
Yes 1. Stanford-Binet 
Intelligence scale 
2. Slosson 
Intelligence test 
3. Modified 
Piagetian Moral 
Stories 
4. Marble Pull 
Apparatus 
 
 
No No 
Mahaney & 
Stephens 
(1974) 
150 NR NR 1. Children/ adolescents 
with no-ID (3 age 
groups; 6–10, 10-14,   
14-18) 
2. Children/ adolescents 
with ID (3 age groups; 
6–10,  10-14, 14-18) 
 
 
 
NR 1. Moral stories No No 
Moore & 
Stephens 
(1974) 
150 NR NR 1. Children/ adolescents 
with no-ID (3 age 
groups; 6–10, 10-14,   
14-18) 
2. Children/ adolescents 
with ID (3 age groups; 
6–10,  10-14, 14-18) 
 
NR 1. Behaviour of 
participants were 
observed to 
assess moral 
conduct 
No No  
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Ozbek & 
Forehand 
(1973) 
32 11 21 1. Child/ adolescents with 
ID (M age = 155.3m;    
M MA = 88.6m;             
M IQ = 58.9) 
NA 1. Missouri 
Children’s 
Behaviour 
Checklist 
2. Piagetian Stories 
 
 
Yes No differences 
found between 
sexes. 
Petrovich 
(1982) 
 
170 94 76 1. 9 year olds 
2. 11 year olds 
3. 13 year olds 
4. 15 year olds 
5. 17 year olds 
      Males M IQ = 64.88 
      Females M IQ = 66.43 
 
No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Children asked to 
make judgements 
on their 
behaviour. These 
were classified 
into themes (good 
acts or bad acts). 
Responses were 
categorised and 
trends identified.  
 
 
 
Yes No significant 
sex differences 
were found for 
the good/ bad 
category 
responses. 
Sigman, 
Ungerer & 
Russell 
(1983) 
 
 
 
 
 
20 10 10 1. M age = 16.2y,              
M MA = 11.3y,             
M IQ = 70.2 
 
 
 
Equal 
number 
1. Kohlberg’s Moral 
Judgement stories 
No No 
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Taylor & 
Achenbach 
(1975) 
60 31 29 1. “Low” MA. Children 
with no-ID  
(M age = 75m;               
M IQ = 104) 
2. “Low” MA. Children 
with ID (M age = 121m; 
M IQ = 76) 
3. “Middle” MA. Children 
with no-ID                   
(M age = 79m;               
M IQ = 115) 
4. “Middle” MA. Children 
with ID (M age = 138m; 
M IQ = 76) 
5. “High” MA. Children 
with no-ID                   
(M age = 96m;               
M IQ = 113) 
6. “High” MA. Children 
with ID (M age = 150m; 
M  IQ = 79) 
 
 
 
 
 
No 1. Piagetian tasks 
2. Peabody Picture 
Vocabulary Test 
3. Role taking 
within game play 
4. Moral judgement 
stories 
Yes No significant 
sex differences 
found in moral 
judgement. 
Note. NR = Not recorded; M age = Mean age; M IQ = Mean IQ score; Med age = Median age; M MA = Mean mental age; M VIQ = Mean verbal 
IQ score, M age = Mental age. 
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on the sample, making it difficult to generalise the findings to other groups with any 
confidence. 
Bender (1980) compared three groups of children and adolescents on their level 
of moral judgement, whereas Grant et al. (2005), the most recent published study in this 
review, compared children without ID, children with mild ID and children with autism 
on moral reasoning. These groups were matched on ‘mental age’. The authors found 
that the group without ID, although younger, performed better than the other two 
groups. They also found that the justification for their responses by the group with 
autism were not as good as responses from either of the other two groups. 
In these studies total sample sizes were presented, however the individual 
numbers of males and females were not, and groups were not matched on sex. This 
therefore leaves the reader questioning the proportions of males and females in these 
studies. Apart from age and IQ, no demographic information was provided and 
therefore it is not possible to determine how representative these participants were of 
the general ID population.  
Two further papers (Mahaney & Stephens, 1974; Moore & Stephens, 1974) fail 
to provide information on how many males and females were recruited in their studies. 
The same sample of children and adolescents were used in these two longitudinal 
studies, which set out to explore the moral development and conduct of young people 
with ID. Longitudinal studies exploring moral development in ID are rare and these 
studies revealed some interesting findings, including the observed development of both 
moral reasoning and moral conduct amongst the ID groups, although these differences 
were not as marked as in the non-ID groups. These studies failed to break down the 
findings into girls and boys which would have been clinically interesting and relevant. 
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Although the Langdon et al. (2010a) review stated that these studies were matched for 
sex, the reader is left uncertain as the papers do not specify this.  
The final paper that did not specify the number of boys and girls within the 
sample was a study conducted by Lind and Smith (1984). They compared children with 
ID with children with no ID, reporting that both groups had a mean ‘mental age’ of 
between five and nine years old. This paper does however report that the groups were 
matched on sex, which infers that they had equal proportions of boys and girls within 
the two groups. By matching groups on sex, it strengthens the study as reduces the 
likelihood of sex impacting on the findings. 
The six papers discussed do not contribute in any way to our understanding of 
the role of sex in moral reasoning within the ID population. These papers fail to specify 
the numbers of males and females they recruited in their studies, and do not break 
analysis down to explore potential sex differences in moral reasoning abilities. Sex or 
gender is not mentioned within any these papers, apart from one (Moore & Stephens, 
1974) where the discussion mentioned that five people had committed “acts of 
misconduct” which was broken down into ‘girls’ and ‘males’. In addition, all of these 
papers used unstandardised measures of moral reasoning, so the findings in general 
should be interpreted with caution. 
One paper in this review; Foye & Simeonsson (1979) provided information 
regarding the number of males and females in the study, yet did not make any reference 
to sex or measure potential sex differences in its analysis. Foye & Simeonsson used 
unstandardised moral stories to measure moral judgement in three groups; children 
without ID, adolescents with mild ID and adults with moderate ID, finding no 
significant differences between the groups overall. Groups were matched on sex, 
meaning equal proportions featured across the groups. Once more, without specific 
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analysis to explore potential sex differences in moral judgement, little can be learnt 
from this study regarding the role of sex in moral development within the ID 
population.  
The final paper that did not measure sex differences in moral reasoning was by 
Sigman, Ungerer & Russell (1983). Their study comprised one group of adolescents so 
matching could not occur, however they included an equal number of males and females 
within the group. Despite the limitation of the small sample size (N = 20) and being 
unable to contribute to the debate on whether there are sex differences in moral 
reasoning, this was the only paper in review that administered a standardised measure of 
moral reasoning; Kohlberg’s moral judgment stories. However, these have not been 
validated for the ID population.   
One final criticism of this study is in regards to the sample. The mean IQ 
documented was 70.2, which infers a proportion of the population fell outside of the 
diagnostic criteria for ID. It states in the paper that seven participants had an IQ score 
between 70 – 80, with an additional three participants had an IQ score between 80 – 90, 
which is significantly higher than the ‘70’ cut-off criteria to diagnose ID. This limits the 
value in comparing these findings with other studies.  
Five papers in the review provided information on the numbers of males and 
females, and measured sex differences in their study, yet did not match groups on sex. 
Two of these however were made up of a single group, so matching could not occur, yet 
they had unequal proportions of males and females (Boehm, 1967; Ozbek & Forehand, 
1973). Boehm’s (1967) study found no sex differences amongst the moral judgement of 
adolescents with ID. The effect of sex on moral judgement was one variable that the 
authors set out to explore, however they made no hypothesis, and did not provide a 
rationale for why they were exploring this.  
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Ozbek and Forehand (1973) was the final single-group study included in this 
review that looked at moral reasoning in children and adolescents with ID. They 
reported finding no differences in moral reasoning between males and females, however 
the sample size was small (N = 32), and comprised unequal numbers of males (N = 11) 
and females (N = 21). In addition, some of the data was reported missing for five of the 
participants, yet the authors failed to state the sex of these participants. The gender gap 
could have therefore been widened considerably as a result (e.g. 6 males vs. 21 females) 
or narrowed (16 vs. 21), which would have an impact on the interpretation of the 
findings. This lack of information is a flaw of the study.  
The three studies which measured sex differences in moral reasoning but did not 
match groups on sex, were conducted by Gargiulo (1984), Taylor and Achenbach 
(1975), and Petrovich (1982). Gargiulo (1984) compared children with ID with children 
with no ID, matched on 'mental age’. Despite an uneven number of males and females 
being included in the study, these were equal across the groups (25 boys and 22 girls in 
each group). No significant differences in moral judgement were found between the 
groups, or between girls and boys. Exploring sex differences was not an aim of the 
study, was not linked to any proposed theory, and was not supported by hypotheses. 
Taylor and Achenbach (1975) set out to explore moral reasoning in relation to 
age and ‘mental age’; matching groups of ‘low mental age’, ‘middle mental age’ and 
‘high mental age’. They found a significant relationship between moral reasoning and 
mental age. Although not matched, numbers of boys and girls were roughly equal across 
the group; with between four and six boys and girls in each of the groups. No significant 
differences were found in the moral judgement of boys and girls. However, the sample 
size was fairly small (N = 60) to be divided across six groups, comprising both sexes. 
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Petrovich (1982) conducted a cross-sectional qualitative study exploring moral 
development amongst children with ID. She recruited males and females across five age 
groups from schools for children and adolescents with ID. There were unequal numbers 
of boys and girls in each group, with 94 males in total compared to 76 females. This 
was a limitation of the study as it makes it harder to make useful sex or age-group 
comparisons.  
In this study, children were interviewed and asked to provide justifications for 
their past behaviours. Themes of responses were identified for ‘good acts’ and ‘bad 
acts’ and categories were created.  Sex comparisons were then made in terms of the 
frequency of responses in each category. Although significant gender differences were 
not found, girls stated that “helping others” was the reason for their behaviour (58%) 
more often than boys (44%). Despite a higher proportion of females giving “helping 
others” as a justification for their behaviour, this was the most popular response by both 
sexes. Petrovich did not make links between her findings and moral development 
theory, or make sex-related hypotheses when she set out to conduct her research. The 
qualitative method of measuring moral responses makes it impossible to compare her 
findings accurately to those of other papers. 
All of the five papers described used unstandardised forms of measurement. 
Four of the studies administered unstandardised moral stories; the other asked questions 
about behaviours and scored these qualitatively. A larger number of each sex in each 
group would have increased our confidence in their findings. 
The final two papers to be reviewed detailed the numbers of males and females 
in their study, had the methodological strength of matching their groups on sex, and 
measured sex differences in their analysis. These studies should therefore, in theory, 
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provide the most useful information when exploring sex differences in the moral 
reasoning of people with ID.  
Blakey (1973) compared adults with IDs, with children who did not have ID’s, 
matching them on sex and ‘mental age’. The author set out to explore potential sex-
differences in moral judgment as one aim of the study. However no hypothesis or 
rationale for exploring this was presented. Blakey (1973) did not find significant 
differences in the moral reasoning abilities between adults with ID and non-ID children, 
or between males and females. The author describes how females tended to advocate 
punishments of greater severity than males, but proposes that this may be as a 
consequence of depicting male characters in the moral story for all participants, rather 
than altering it to match the sex of the respondent. The unstandardised stories 
administered in the study reduces the reliability and validity of the findings presented.  
Jackson & Haines (1982) compare children with ID to children with no-ID to 
explore differences in their moral judgement. Groups were matched on sex, ‘mental 
age’ and socio-economic status. They compared responses on eight hypothetical 
dilemmas where children were presented with a temptation to steal, and asked to state 
what they “would do” and “should do”. The authors found no significant sex differences 
in moral judgement, the “should do” responses. However the non-ID group resisted 
stealing significantly more often than the ID population, which was suggested to be due 
to an age-sex interaction effect, where the younger non-ID girls resisted stealing more 
often than older girls with ID. This finding was not explored in relation to moral 
reasoning theory.  
 In summary, the 15 studies reviewed that included both male and female 
participants in their studies, comprised varying levels of information regarding sex; 
from five studies that do not specify numbers, do not match groups or report sex-
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differences, to two studies that report all of these factors. All but one study (Sigman et 
al., 1983) employ unstandardised forms of measurement of moral reasoning, therefore 
the validity and reliability of such measures is unknown, limiting the usefulness of its 
findings. Only two of the reviewed studies (Blakey, 1973; Foye & Simeonsson, 1979) 
included adults in their samples, and in both cases the adults with ID were compared 
only to children without ID.  
Therefore despite no significant sex differences being observed in these studies 
that explored moral reasoning in the ID population, it is unclear how accurate this is. 
Measurement tools were typically not standardised, many studies had small or uneven 
samples, and over half of the studies neglected to explore sex and potential differences 
at all. Furthermore with studies being restricted to children and adolescents, findings 
cannot be generalised to the adult ID population. 
Exploring sex differences and moral reasoning abilities within the adult ID 
population remains under-researched, and more studies are therefore required that 
include both males and females in their samples, and make gender comparisons. 
1.7 Moral Development, Offending Behaviour and Intellectual Disability.  
As discussed, the relationship between cognitive and moral development has 
clearly been established in the literature. Links between moral reasoning and anti-social 
behaviour have also been identified (Blasi et al., 1980; Nelson et al., 1990; Stams et al., 
2006). In addition, the relationship between cognitive development and anti-social 
behaviour has been established, with low IQ being identified as a key risk factor for 
delinquent behaviour in adolescents (Farrington, 2005), both in young males (Koenen, 
Caspi, Moffitt, Rijisdijk & Taylor, 2006; Seguin, Pihl, Harden, Tremblay & Boulrice, 
1995) and females (White, Moffitt & Silva, 1989). Therefore expanding our 
understanding of the roles that moral reasoning and anti-social behaviour play within 
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the ID population may have important clinical implications, and potentially inform 
subsequent treatment interventions for this client group. Van Vugt et al. (2011a) have 
highlighted the importance of exploring moral development in offenders with ID, to 
determine whether methods of enhancing it, work effectively.  
There have been very few papers published on moral development within the ID 
population since Langdon et al.’s 2010 review; emphasising the need for ongoing 
research in this area. Two further papers in this field have been identified, both of which 
were published exploring moral development in offenders with ID.  These papers will 
be discussed below. Only one additional paper was downloaded for further review, 
however was excluded as moral reasoning was not explored, just mentioned (Lindsay et 
al, 2011). 
Van Vugt et al. (2011a) investigated moral judgment within juvenile sex 
offenders, comparing sex offenders with ID to sex offenders without ID.  From their 
research, they concluded that adolescents with ID typically demonstrated stage 2 
reasoning, whereas adolescents who did not have ID demonstrated more transitional 
stage 2/3 moral reasoning. The author’s report that individuals with ID made decisions 
based on “instrumental and pragmatic reciprocity” as opposed to the consideration of 
relationships, demonstrated by the higher reasoning stage engaged in by the non-ID 
group. This confirmed the researcher’s hypothesis that the ID population would 
demonstrate lower stage reasoning than the non-ID population.  
One criticism of this study however is in regards to the participant sample. The 
authors defined their ID group as any person with an IQ between 50 – 85, with their 
sample having a mean FSIQ score of 72. Therefore this combines both people with 
‘mild’ ID (between 50 - 70) and ‘borderline’ IQ (71-84; DSM-IV-TR, APA, 2000), 
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which would make it difficult to accurately compare their findings with those of other 
studies, and to generalise these findings to the ID population. 
A strength of this study lies in the selection of the Socio-Moral Reflection 
Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992) to measure moral reasoning 
abilities. This measure has been demonstrated to have good psychometric properties 
when administered to people with ID (Langdon, Murphy, Clare & Palmer, 2010). 
Alongside the 11 questions standardly asked in this measure, Van Vugt et al. (2011a) 
supplemented it with additional questions. They asked participants a further four 
questions with a sexual content (although this is slightly confusing as five questions are 
presented in their appendix), such as “How important is it that rapists are being 
punished?”, and four questions regarding their own victim for example, “How important 
is it to tell the truth about the sex offence you committed?” The paper does not however 
provide information on how these questions were developed, or whether they were 
piloted prior to administration. 
 In terms of psychometric properties, the authors of this paper present internal 
consistency levels of α = .59 for the additional questions with sexual content, and         
α = .63 for the additional questions focusing on their victim. However, Cronbach’s 
values of between α = .7 and α = .8 are generally viewed as ‘acceptable’ values for 
internal consistency within research (Field, 2009), with higher values being preferable.  
The values presented in Van Vugt et al.’s (2011a) paper therefore do not reach 
acceptable levels of reliability. Furthermore, values for test-retest reliability are not 
presented. It is therefore difficult to determine the usefulness of data collected from 
these additional questions.  
 The other paper that explored moral reasoning within the ID population was 
published by Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Steverson and Palmer (Langdon, et al., 2011b). 
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The authors recruited four groups of adults; people with ID who had committed 
criminal offences, people without ID who had offended, people with ID who had no 
offence history and people without ID who had no offence history. Groups were 
compared on moral reasoning stage, distorted cognitions and empathy.  
 The study comprised 80 participants, all of whom were over 18 years old, and 
male. The authors reported not including women in their study due to potential 
differences in the way women make moral decisions. However no elaboration was 
given as to how or why men and women reason differently. Providing clearer rationale 
as to why males alone were selected for recruitment would have strengthened this paper. 
 Langdon et al. (2011b) did not detect any significant differences in empathy 
scores between the offenders and non-offenders with ID. Both of the non-ID groups 
scored significantly higher on empathy than the ID-offender group, and the non-ID 
group who had not offended scored significantly higher empathy scores than the ID 
group who had not offended. Regarding cognitive distortions, both offender groups 
were found to engage in significantly higher levels of cognitive distortions that their 
comparable non-offender group. Both ID groups engaged in higher levels of cognitive 
distortions than the non-ID groups, with males with ID who had offended, engaging in 
the highest levels. 
Notably, a strength of this study was the authors choice of moral reasoning 
measure; the SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 1992). By using this measure, Langdon et al. 
(2011b) found that both non-ID groups demonstrated more mature reasoning (stage 3) 
than both ID groups (stage 2). These differences in moral reasoning stages remained 
when both spoken language and intelligence were controlled for (Langdon et al., 
2011b).  
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The SRM-SF comprises 11 questions which measure seven constructs; Contract, 
Truth, Affiliation, Life, Property, Law, and Legal Justice. The ‘Contract’ construct is 
measured by the first three questions, which explore individual’s views about the 
importance of keeping promises to people (e.g. to friends or strangers). Question four 
explores individual’s justifications for telling the truth, and is the only question to 
represent the ‘Truth’ construct. The ‘Affiliation’ construct explores an individual’s 
justifications for helping other people, particularly helping parents and helping friends. 
Questions five and six measure this construct.  Questions seven and eight represent the 
‘Life’ construct and ask individuals to justify their views on the importance of saving a 
strangers life if they had the opportunity, and on living when someone doesn’t want to. 
‘Life’ can be conceptualised as being of value for the individual, for others, for society, 
or for God (Gibbs et al., 1992).   
 The ‘Property’ construct comprises question nine, which explores people’s 
opinions regarding the importance of not stealing from others. Questions 10 enquires 
about the importance of obeying the law, representing the ‘Law’ construct. Both of 
these constructs focus on the general functions that laws serve and the potential 
consequences that may arise from law-breaking for the individual, for others and for 
society. The final construct, ‘Legal Justice’ is addressed by question 11, which asks the 
individual about the importance of law-breakers being sent to jail by judges. Once 
again, the responses typically concern the impact on the individual, others and society.  
Despite both of the ID groups reasoning at stage 2 in the Langdon et al. (2011b) 
study, scores differed across several of the constructs. The authors found that both 
offenders and non-offenders reasoned at earlier developmental stages for the Property, 
Law and Legal Justice constructs, than the remaining four constructs. Langdon et al. 
(2011b) found that whilst offenders demonstrated stage 2 reasoning across these 
  
45 
 
constructs, basing decisions on exchanges, their own needs, preferences and advantages, 
non-offenders with ID demonstrated stage 1(2) reasoning for Property, stage 1 for Law, 
and stage 2(1) for the Legal Justice construct. The non-offenders with ID typically made 
their decisions based on authority, rules and avoiding punishment (Langdon et al., 
2011b), and scored considerably lower on these three constructs than the remaining four 
constructs. Both of non-ID groups scored predominantly at stage 3 for these constructs. 
The offender group without ID did however score stage 2 reasoning for the Property 
construct alone.  
It has been suggested that men with ID who have an offence history have a 
similar developmental delay in moral reasoning as young offenders (Langdon et al., in 
press). This therefore has potential clinical implications regarding suitable interventions 
for the ID population, as considerably more research has been conducted with young 
offenders and exploring interventions that are effective.  
In their study, Langdon et al. (2011b) helpfully linked their findings from the 
male ID group who had offended (stage 2 reasoning), to the literature on young 
offenders and their tendency to reason at stage 2, particularly regarding the Law, Legal 
Justice and Property constructs. Scores have been found to be lower in these three 
constructs in the non-ID literature (e.g. Gibbs, 2010; Palmer & Hollin, 1998), with 
Gibbs proposing that the greatest delay in moral reasoning is found within the Law 
domain (Gibbs, 2010). He described how non-offending youths typically reason at a 
more advanced level, concerned with the potential impact on society and loss of trust, 
than delinquent youths. Gibbs described how delinquents’ responses tend to be shaped 
by their concern for getting caught and going to prison, therefore illustrating 
significantly less developed reasoning.  
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Palmer and Hollin (1998) also compared young offenders with non-offenders 
and found that moral reasoning was less developed on constructs relating to offending 
behaviour (Property and Law) for both offenders and non-offenders, with offenders 
typically scoring lower. The remaining four constructs (Contract, Life, Truth and 
Affiliation) have not been directly linked to offending behaviour in the literature. 
In addition to the SRM-SF’s sound psychometric properties both within the ID 
and non-ID populations, Langdon et al’s (2011b) paper presents excellent interrater 
reliability (r = .99). This value was calculated using 19% of the questionnaires that 
were randomly scored by two raters. No information is provided however as to how this 
random sample was selected. 
 Recent research that has explored moral reasoning and anti-social behaviour has 
suggested that their relationship is moderated by intelligence; forming an inverted ‘U’ 
shape curve (Langdon et al., 2010a; Langdon et al., 2010b; Langdon, Clare & Murphy, 
2011a). These authors have suggested that non-offenders with ID are more likely to 
demonstrate immature reasoning, typically making decisions based on rules and 
authority. Therefore the lowest levels of moral reasoning may protect against offending 
behaviour.    
Alternatively, people with ID who engage in offending behaviour typically have 
slightly higher IQ, and their reasoning is based on egocentric decision making (their 
own needs) (Langdon et al., 2011a). They have also suggested that those who do not 
have an ID demonstrate moral development at more mature stages and therefore as a 
result, engage in less egocentric thinking and lower rates of offending behaviour. In 
summary, higher and lower levels of moral reasoning have been associated with lower 
rates of offending behaviour (Langdon et al., 2011a). 
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There has therefore been some recent research interest exploring moral 
reasoning in the ID offender field, but this research tends to be limited to the male 
population (Langdon et al., 2011b). Gilligan (1982) presented an argument that 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development was inherently sexist, for not giving enough 
focus to relationships and care-based reasoning within it. The debate regarding the 
existence of sex differences in moral reasoning has not been explored within the ID 
forensic population. In-fact very little remains known about moral reasoning in the 
female ID forensic population, with no clear rationale as to why this client group 
remains so under-researched.  
1.8 Treatment Approaches. 
 As it has been suggested that male adults with ID who offend have similar moral 
development to young offenders, intervention programmes used with young offenders 
that have been based on moral development theories need to be considered for their 
effectiveness. 
1.8.1 Treatment approaches within the general offender population. As 
previously discussed, moral reasoning abilities of offenders have typically been found 
to be less mature developmentally, than in adults who do not offend. The development 
of intervention programmes to enhance moral reasoning abilities of offenders is 
therefore justified, despite links between moral behaviour and moral ability not being 
empirically evidenced (Ashkar & Kenny, 2007).  
 Cognitive-developmental theory proposes that moral reasoning can be enhanced 
through moral discussion groups (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972), particularly through 
discussion with people at a more mature moral development stage (Taylor & Walker, 
1997). Approaches to enhance moral reasoning abilities aim to encourage exposure to 
the higher moral reasoning stages. This in turn, helps to enable adaptation to higher 
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order reasoning, which Kohlberg stated people have a preference for given the 
opportunity (Kohlberg, 1984).  
Group based interventions are often used with both juvenile and adult offenders 
to encourage discussion of moral issues. These have been explored within the literature 
to observe whether there is an increase of moral reasoning levels in those who engage in 
this type of intervention. Moral education programmes have been shown to be effective 
in boosting moral reasoning scores (MacPhail, 1989; Rest & Navarez, 1994; Schlaefli, 
Rest & Thoma, 1985), which in turn has been found to reduce offending behaviour 
(Blasi, 1980; Little, Robinson, Burnette & Swan, 1999; MacPhail, 1989). In addition, 
Rosenkoetter, Landman and Masak (1980) found that the moral reasoning stage of 
young offenders increased following group discussion of moral issues and dilemmas. 
Gibbs, Arnold, Ahlborn and Cheeseman (1984) delivered a weekly intervention 
programme with 60 incarcerated juvenile offenders, aged between 14 and 18 years-old. 
The eight week programme encouraged group discussion about sociomoral dilemmas. 
Participants were either allocated to a consensus dilemma discussion group who had to 
reach a “best decision” agreement with one-another, a non-consensus dilemma 
discussion group who did not have to reach a shared agreement but discussed the 
dilemma, or a ‘no discussion group’. Participants in the latter group did not meet for 
discussion, but completed pre-testing and post-testing at the same time points. Gibbs et 
al. (1984) found that 87.5% of participants in the consensus and non-consensus groups 
who scored stage 2 reasoning on the SRM (Gibbs & Widaman, 1982) completed prior 
to intervention, had an increase in moral reasoning scores following intervention, to 
stage 3 reasoning. This was in comparison to 14.3% of people in the non-discussion 
group who initially scored at stage 2 reasoning, whose scores increased to stage 3 
reasoning post-intervention testing. 
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 A study by Arbuthnot (1984), measured the effects of two moral-education 
programmes on enhancing moral reasoning abilities. Both programmes, one modelled 
on the cognitive-developmental approach and the other on a critical-reasoning approach, 
were administered to prisoners over an 11-week period. Compared to a control sample, 
both groups showed significant increases in their moral reasoning scores. There were no 
significant differences found between the two types of intervention groups. Palmer 
(2003) has described how group based interventions attempt to enhance moral reasoning 
abilities, predominantly through social-perspective taking to challenge the egocentric 
thinking that shapes immature reasoning, along with exposing individuals to moral 
dilemmas at higher stages of development. This may explain the increases of moral 
reasoning ability demonstrated by participants of each intervention group in 
Arbuthnot’s study (1984), compared to the control participants who did not access 
either intervention.  
 Similar findings however are not consistently identified within the literature. 
Other studies have found no significant improvements in moral development, following 
group intervention (Buttell, 2003; Copeland & Parish, 1979). Research into programmes 
that aim to boost moral reasoning have also been found to be ineffective in reducing 
offending behaviour (Niles, 1986).  
In another study, Claypoole, Moody and Peace (2000) investigated whether 
moral dilemma discussions proved an effective group intervention for male and female 
juvenile offenders. They delivered 10 group sessions of moral reasoning discussion, 
measuring an individual’s moral reasoning ability using the DIT (Rest, 1975). 
Claypoole et al. (2000) concluded that these discussion groups were useful in improving 
an individual’s behaviour, but that as a stand-alone intervention they were not 
successful in enhancing moral reasoning of offenders. Female offenders were found to 
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display significantly higher rates of moral reasoning than their male peers, both before 
and after the group.  
Through their research, Ashkar and Kenny (2007) demonstrated that an 
offender’s moral reasoning ability differed depending on the offending context, with 
individuals displaying offence-specific deficits. They proposed that for interventions to 
be successful in reducing reoffending rates through enhancing moral reasoning abilities, 
these offence-specific deficits need to be targeted.  
However, delivering offence specific interventions may have limitations. It may 
be less feasible and less cost-effective for services to offer a range of offence-specific 
interventions. Such programmes may also have to be run less frequently to be able to 
achieve enough group members who have committed a specific offence (e.g. fire-
setters) and who are ready to start their treatment programme, than interventions that 
could be administered to individuals with all types of offence histories. Delivering 
group interventions that can include a greater number of participants may therefore have 
benefits in being more practical and cost-effective. 
1.8.2 Treatment approaches within the ID offender population. Despite 
potential intervention programmes and their effectiveness in enhancing moral reasoning 
abilities being researched within the general offender population, considerably less is 
known about this area within the ID population.  
 However, recently Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Palmer and Rees (in press) 
evaluated one such treatment intervention amongst adults with ID. They demonstrated 
that an adapted version of the ‘Equipping Youth to Help One Another’ programme 
(EQUIP) was a promising treatment for male offenders with intellectual and other 
developmental disabilities.  
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The EQUIP programme was originally developed as a multi-modal programme 
to enhance moral development through encouraging perspective taking (within a group 
setting), reducing cognitive distortions and building social skills (Gibbs, Potter & 
Goldstein, 1995; Gibbs, Potter, Barriga & Liau, 1996; Potter, Gibbs & Goldstein, 2001). 
The programme uses moral dilemma discussions, social skills training and anger control 
techniques to encourage behaviour change among the group attendees. Within the male 
juvenile population, the EQUIP programme was found to positively influence post-
release behaviours (Gibbs, Potter, Goldstein & Brendtro, 1996). This type of multi-
modal group which addresses several aspects for intervention may therefore achieve 
greater benefits for those who attend, than groups that focus on moral discussion alone. 
Langdon et al. (in press) demonstrated that the adapted EQUIP programme led 
to improvements in participant’s moral reasoning abilities, increased some aspects of 
problem solving abilities, and reduced cognitive distortions, all of which were desirable 
effects. According to some research, although benefits have been observed in the young 
offender populations following administration of this programme, for example in 
reducing cognitive distortions; benefits in boosting moral reasoning have not been 
observed (Nas, Brugman & Koops, 2005). The results observed by Langdon et al. (in 
press), and the gains made by their participants appear promising for the ID population, 
and this programme has been suggested as a suitable first treatment for this client group.   
However Langdon’s study is not without criticisms. Being a single-case series 
study, causality of the findings could not be established. In addition, the sample size 
was small (N = 7) so it is difficult to predict if these effects would have been repeated in 
a larger population. Four of the participants had a diagnosis of Asperger Syndrome, and 
their FSIQ was > 70; with the FSIQ of one participant as high as 111. The remaining 
three participants had no Autistic Spectrum Disorder, but had a FSIQ of < 70. No 
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information was provided about any potential difficulties that may have been 
encountered in adapting and delivering the intervention to individuals with different 
needs and cognitive abilities, a flaw of the study. As only three of the participants in the 
group had mild ID, only their moral reasoning abilities and subsequent changes post-
intervention have relevance to the current research project. Two of the three participants 
demonstrated an increase in moral reasoning stages, and one stayed consistently at the 
transitional stage 3(2) reasoning.    
A control group of participants with which to draw comparisons would have 
been useful, and would have strengthened the reader’s confidence in their findings. 
Without a control group it is not clear whether these gains would have been made 
regardless, as the result of living in a busy inpatient environment with lots of 
opportunities to perspective take and problem solve.       
Group-based treatments in general for this client group do however have the 
added benefit of encouraging perspective-taking and developing skills in this area. This 
may as a consequence, enhance the moral reasoning skills of participants, irrespective of 
the focus of the group treatment.   
1.9 Development of the Research Study 
  1.9.1 Theoretical and clinical rationale. Women in contact with the criminal 
justice system have been found to present with both different circumstances and 
different needs to men. Evidence suggests that women commit far fewer violent crimes 
than men (Bloom, Chesney-Lind & Owen, 1994), and that when violent crimes are 
committed, they are far less likely to be towards the general public (Phillips & Harm, 
1998). Chesney-Lind and Bloom (1997) have suggested that substance misuse, abuse 
and poverty are the most common precipitators of crime in females. In response to some 
of the differences between men and women who offend, Bloom and Covington (1998) 
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suggested that effective gender-specific programmes and interventions may be helpful 
to address women’s needs. Furthermore, studies have recommended that treatment 
programmes should take gender roles and female socialisation into account (Beckman, 
1994), along with the general context of women’s lives (Abbot & Kerr, 1995). 
Women are typically under-researched in the forensic field, which is often 
justified by researchers as due to the smaller number of women in contact with the 
criminal justice system. However, Bloom and Covington (1998) suggest that despite the 
smaller proportion of females within the criminal justice system, these women often 
have been or later become “extensive users of the system”. It is therefore vital that 
women who offend are not excluded from research or intervention-based programmes 
on the basis of their sex alone. 
 Regarding interventions for offenders, the evidence to support treatment 
approaches that enhance moral reasoning abilities whilst reducing reoffending 
behaviour within the general offender population, remains mixed. The literature 
presents some studies which demonstrate increased moral reasoning abilities (e.g. 
Schlaefli et al., 1985), others which observe reductions in re-offending rates (MacPhail, 
1989), whilst some present limited effects of such intervention programmes (e.g. 
Copeland & Parish, 1979). There is however, a small amount of emerging evidence to 
demonstrate that psychological interventions which incorporate moral development 
theory may be effective for the ID population. Expanding research in this area is 
therefore important as may have key implications for subsequent treatment 
interventions.  
Although the findings presented by Langdon et al. (in press) appear promising 
for the ID population, their small study was restricted to the male population. It would 
be clinically valuable therefore to understand and explore whether sex differences exist 
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in the moral decision-making of people with ID. This would enable treatment 
interventions based on moral development theory for offenders to be tailored to suit the 
need of either sex, in-line with recommendations made by Beckman (1994) and Abbot 
and Kerr (1995), depending on whether sex-differences are detected. It is crucial to 
expand our knowledge about the role of moral reasoning within people with ID, 
especially within the female population where little is known. This will enable care 
packages and potential interventions to be properly considered, and treatment tailored to 
an individual’s needs.  
 The current study aimed to address the need for further research into moral 
reasoning abilities within the ID population, comparing adults who had offended with 
adults who had not offended. It aimed to include both men and women in the sample 
and to draw comparisons, exploring whether sex differences exist within either 
community or forensic groups. Women in contact with the criminal justice system 
remain under-researched in general with regards to their moral reasoning abilities. 
Despite some advances in the research base and in our understanding of the moral 
reasoning abilities of male ID offenders, there are no published studies that explore this 
within women. This remains a deficit in the literature which requires addressing in order 
to help inform subsequent treatment. 
As discussed in Section 1.3.3.1 above, a number of factors place individuals 
with ID at risk of offending behaviour. These factors include emotional and behavioural 
difficulties, such as mental health difficulties (Murphy et al., 1991), poor coping 
strategies (Holland, 2004), substance misuse (Ashton, 2002) and aggression (Taylor et 
al., 2004). Along with higher levels of emotional and behavioural problems found in 
offenders with ID, the moral reasoning abilities of offenders with ID have been shown 
to be more mature developmentally than non-offenders with ID. It was therefore also of 
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interest, to explore the role of emotional and behavioural difficulties further, especially 
in relation to moral development, given the literature on moral reasoning and offending 
in individuals with ID.  
Finally, much of the research that has explored moral reasoning within the ID 
population was conducted a considerable time ago, predominantly in the 1970s and 
1980s. Current research in this field is therefore essential in order to compliment and 
build on what is already known.  
1.9.2 Methodological rationale. Several methodological limitations have been 
identified in previous studies, which in particular make it difficult to draw comparisons 
between their findings. The current study attempts to address these methodological 
limitations. These will be discussed below in turn. 
Many of the studies exploring moral reasoning within the ID population have 
used unstandardised measures of assessment (Langdon et al., 2010a), which creates 
problems in the interpretation of findings in terms of their reliability and validity. As a 
result of this observation from their review of literature, Langdon et al. (2010b) set out 
to explore the psychometric properties of two measures of moral reasoning. They 
focused on the Moral Theme Inventory (MTI; Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell & Bentley, 
1999), a recognition measure, and the SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 1992) a production 
measure of moral reasoning. The authors found that the SRM-SF demonstrated overall 
‘satisfactory’ properties both for men with and without ID. This proved to be a better 
measure of moral reasoning than the MTI, which demonstrated poor test-retest 
reliability. By administering this psychometrically sound measure within the current 
research project, it overcomes the common methodological flaw of many existing 
studies in moral reasoning, particularly of those studies within the ID field.  
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 A further methodological criticism of previous research within the ID population 
concerns the population recruited and how ID is defined.  It is clear that ID is not 
always defined by adherence to DSM-IV guidelines, with many studies including 
participants with IQ scores in the borderline range (71-84) (e.g. Barron et al., 2004; Van 
Vugt et al., 2011a). With studies using different definitions of ID, careful consideration 
is required when making references or generalisations to the wider ID population, and 
when findings are compared across different research studies. By administering a formal 
measure of IQ and strictly adhering to the cut-off scores presented by the DSM-IV for 
mild ID (DSM-IV-TR; APA, 2000) and excluding those who do not meet criteria, this 
research project addresses this common methodological flaw.  
 An additional limitation of much of the research into the ID field, highlighted by 
Langdon et al. (2010a) in their review of the literature, is the failure of many studies to 
fully describe and provide information on the participant sample recruited. Once more, 
this makes it difficult to accurately draw conclusions and apply said findings to the ID 
population.  
The participants recruited for the current research project are described in detail, 
with comprehensive information provided on both the inclusion and exclusion criteria 
and the rationale for these, providing the reader with a clear picture of who took part in 
the study. 
 Finally, both men and women are included in the current study. This removes 
the flaw of some studies in failing to reasonably justify why their research was only 
conducted on one sex, predominantly males. It also enables members of both sexes to 
have an opportunity to partake in research, ensuring that an individual is not excluded 
on the basis of their sex alone. 
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1.9.3 Summary. Controversy persists regarding whether significant gender 
differences exist in moral reasoning.  Research has suggested that changes in moral 
reasoning stages can be stimulated by encouraging discussions about structured moral 
dilemmas, both amongst children (Blatt & Kohlberg, 1975) and adults (Self, Baldwin & 
Wolinsky, 1992). The potential for raising moral stage-scores has implications for 
clinical practice and prospective intervention programmes, and therefore understanding 
more about possible sex differences may inform how such interventions are delivered. 
Understanding more about the moral development amongst male and female adults 
within the ID forensic population, where relatively little is known, is essential to enable 
potential interventions to be considered.  
1.9.4 Research questions and hypotheses. The current study aims to 
investigate moral reasoning abilities of adults with ID, taking into consideration an 
individual’s sex and offence history. The research questions addressed by the study and 
the specific hypotheses made for each of these, are presented below:  
 
Research question 1: Are there significant differences in moral reasoning scores 
between men and women with mild ID who have offended, compared to men and 
women with mild ID who have no offence history? 
o Hypothesis A: It is hypothesised that overall, offenders will have higher 
moral reasoning scores than non-offenders. 
o Hypothesis B: It is hypothesised that there will be no significant 
differences between men and women in moral reasoning scores. 
 
Research question 2: Are there significant differences in any of the moral reasoning 
construct scores between the groups? 
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o Hypothesis C: It is hypothesised that the offender groups will have 
higher scores on the Property construct on the SRM-SF than the non-
offenders. 
o Hypothesis D: It is hypothesised that the offender groups will have 
higher scores on the Law construct on the SRM-SF than the non-
offenders. 
o Hypothesis E: It is hypothesised that the offender groups will have 
higher scores on the Legal Justice construct on the SRM-SF than the 
non-offenders. 
 
Research question 3: Is there a relationship between moral reasoning stage and offence 
severity? 
o Hypothesis F: It is hypothesised that moral reasoning stage and offence 
severity will be positively correlated.  
 
Research question 4: Is there a relationship between moral reasoning stage and 
emotional and behavioural problems? 
o Hypothesis G: It is hypothesised that the offender groups will score 
higher in emotional and behavioural problems than the non-offenders. 
o Hypothesis H: It is hypothesised that there will be a positive correlation 
between moral reasoning stage and level of emotional and behavioural 
problems experienced.  
 
 
 
  
59 
 
Chapter Two- Method 
 
2.1 Overview of Chapter 
This chapter presents the methodology used within the study. It begins by 
describing the design of the study, the participants recruited and the inclusion and 
exclusion criteria that were adhered to during recruitment. It then provides detailed 
information on the measures used, including their psychometric properties and the 
procedures that were followed. Ethical issues are considered, and a description of the 
data analysis is presented. The chapter is concluded with inter-rater reliability 
calculations and tests of normality.  
2.2 Study Design 
To address the first two research questions, a 2 (Sex: Men vs Women) X 2 
(Offence history: Offenders vs Non-Offenders) cross-sectional between-subjects 
descriptive design was used. The main effects and interactions were examined.  
To address the latter two research questions, a correlational design was used. 
The relationships between moral reasoning and offence severity, and moral reasoning 
and emotional and behavioural problems were explored. A correlational design was 
appropriate due to the exploratory nature of this study, to investigate whether 
relationships between the variables existed. Measures were completed at one time point. 
2.3 Participants 
Participants were adults with mild IDs who resided in Suffolk or Norfolk.  
Participants were allocated to one of four groups depending on their sex and whether 
they had a history of offending or not.  Group 1 were men and Group 2 were women, all 
of whom had a documented history of criminal offending. These participants were 
recruited from medium and low-secure NHS and independent hospitals. Participants 
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were detained under the Mental Health Act 1983 (amended 2007), under civil and 
criminal sections.  These participants had committed at least one offence which was 
dealt with by a Crown Court in England and were subsequently sentenced to custody 
within a secure hospital or were later transferred from prison to hospital under Section 
47/49 (Mental Health Act; 1983, 2007).  
 Group 3 consisted of men and Group 4 women, who had no known history of 
arrests, cautions or convictions. These participants were recruited from NHS 
Community Learning Disability (LD) teams and independent day services. Clinicians 
and day-service managers were initially asked to identify and nominate only 
participants who had no known forensic history, and to confirm this with them when 
introducing the study. This was double-checked when the researcher first met the 
potential participant, and featured as a question in the demographic information.  
2.3.1 Inclusion criteria. Participants from all four groups were required to meet 
the following criteria: 
• Mild ID; with a FSIQ between 50 – 70, associated difficulties with adaptive 
behaviour and onset before age 18 (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). FSIQ 
was measured within this study, whereas adaptive behaviour difficulties were 
assumed if the individual accessed local ID services, as this is typically a requisite.  
• 18 years old or over. 
• Sufficient English language skills to complete the measures. 
2.3.2 Exclusion criteria. Participants were excluded from the study if they met 
any of the following criteria: 
• Any participant who had a FSIQ of above 70 or below 50. 
• Any person who lacked mental capacity to consent to take part in the study. 
  
61 
 
• Any participant in either community group (Group 3 or 4) with a known offence 
history or who reported having a history of arrests, cautions or convictions during the 
initial meeting. Such participants were excluded from the study as may have 
contaminated the findings. 
• Any person with a formal Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD) diagnosis was 
excluded. This was due to the associated difficulties someone with ASD may 
experience with social perspective taking, which would have in turn, impacted on the 
assessment of moral reasoning. 
2.3.3 Power. A sample size calculation was based on data drawn from a recent 
study that compared offenders and non-offenders with ID (Langdon et al., 2011b), when 
controlling for FSIQ. Determining eta² establishes the proportion of variance accounted 
for by the main effects, interaction and error in ANOVA studies (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2001). Derived from the Langdon et al. (2011b) paper, partial eta² = 0.147 (between-
group effect divided by total amount of variance in the data), which converts to f = .415. 
Therefore, to adopt a 2 X 2 between-subjects ANOVA, achieving a power of 0.80 at the 
5% significant level, based on an effect size of f = .415; a total sample size of 68 
participants was required.  
For the correlational design, an effect size of d = .76 was drawn from a meta-
analysis by Stams et al. (2006) that explored moral judgement, which equates to r = .36. 
To achieve power of 0.80 at the 5% significance level, a sample of 47 participants was 
required. Therefore to enable both parts of the analysis to be conducted, 68 participants 
were required for this study; each of the four groups comprising 17 individuals. 
2.3.4 Participant demographics. Sixty-eight people with a diagnosis of mild ID 
and an average age of 35.68 years participated in the study. Half of the participants were 
women, and half were men, recruited evenly from the community and forensic secure 
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services. The majority of the sample were White British (94%). Living with family 
members was the most common place of residence for the community sample, followed 
by living independently and then supported living.  
A large proportion of the sample (N = 65) classified themselves as single. One 
non-offender female was cohabiting, and two offender females described themselves as 
separated or divorced. Nine participants of the 68 recruited were parents. Of these, only 
one resided in the community, whereas eight were from offender groups.  
The vast majority of participants attended ‘special school’ education. FSIQ 
scores ranged from 50 to 70, covering the full spectrum of mild ID. From the total 
sample, 31 people reported having a serious physical health problem and 30 participants 
reported having a mental health problem. Within the forensic population, the number of 
offences committed ranged from one to 35, and the number of months spent in secure 
services ranged from two to 544 months. Demographic information is displayed in 
Table 4 and Table 5. 
 
Table 4. 
Demographic information for the total participant sample (mean and range scores). 
 
Demographic information 
 
Range Mean (SD)  
 
Age 
 
20 - 66 
 
 
35.68 (12.58) 
 
FSIQ 
 
50 - 70 
 
     59.90  (5.73) 
 
 
Number of offences (offender 
population) 
 
1 - 35 
 
       6.74   (7.70) 
 
 
Number of months in secure 
services (offender population) 
2 - 544 
 
 
 131.06 (160.96)  
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Table 5. 
Demographic information for the total participant sample (frequencies and 
proportions). 
  Demographic information 
 
N (%)
 Sex 
Men  
Women 
 
34 (50%) 
34 (50%) 
 
  
Ethnicity  
White British      
White Irish          
White/ Black Caribbean              
Black Caribbean  
 
 
 
64 (94%)                         
2   (3%) 
1 (1.5%) 
  1 (1.5%) 
 
 Living Status 
Secure services   
With family        
Independently 
Supported living  
 
 34 (50  %) 
 20 (29.4%) 
  9 (13.2%) 
  5   (7.4%) 
 
 
    Marital status 
Single 
Cohabiting 
Separated/Divorced 
 
65 (95.5%) 
1 (1.5%) 
      2 (3%) 
 
 
 Parental status 
Parent 
No children 
 
  9 (13%) 
59 (87%) 
  
 
 School attended 
Special school  
Mainstream 
Other      
  
 56 (82.4%) 
9 (13.2%) 
          3 (4.4%) 
 
 
 Physical health problem 
Yes 
No 
 
31 (46%)  
37 (54%) 
 
 
 Mental health problem  
Yes 
No 
 
30 (44%) 
38 (56%) 
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2.3.5 Recruitment. 
 2.3.5.1 Participants from the community. Psychology leads from Community 
LD Services across Suffolk and Norfolk were contacted by the researcher who 
explained the research project and the rationale behind the study. These clinical 
psychologists were provided with a ‘Recruitment information sheet’ (Appendix A) 
which contained information about the study, together with the inclusion and exclusion 
criteria. Psychologists who expressed interest in supporting the study were asked to pass 
this information on to fellow clinicians.  
Interested clinicians were asked to identify potential participants who met 
inclusion criteria from their community teams, and to provide them with an 
‘Introductory handout’ (Appendix B) about the study. Clinicians were requested not to 
pass information sheets on to people in the community with known forensic histories.  
The introductory handout advised participants to inform their staff member if 
they were interested in taking part in the study. Clinicians were asked to contact the 
researcher with the contact details of any interested person. The researcher then 
contacted the individual by telephone, introduced herself and arranged a convenient 
time and location to meet with them to discuss the study and provide further 
information (Appendix C). The participant was given the option of where they wanted 
the meeting to be held; at the local LD team community building, their day-service or 
their home.  
 Day service managers were approached in the same manner; the study and 
rationale were explained and the recruitment information sheet (Appendix A) provided. 
Day-service staff were also asked to identify and approach people who appeared to meet 
the study’s inclusion criteria. Day-service staff did not have knowledge of, or access to, 
any FSIQ scores of their members. Therefore any participant recruited from day-
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services, following informed consent (Appendix D), had their FSIQ assessed at the start 
of the testing session, to explore whether they met inclusion criteria. All willing 
participants recruited from day services completed the study at the day service centre, at 
a date and time when they would have routinely attended. 
 2.3.5.2 Participants from forensic settings. Regarding the forensic sample, 
psychology leads for medium and low secure hospitals in Suffolk and Norfolk were 
contacted and provided with the ‘Recruitment information sheet’ (Appendix E). They 
were asked to identify potential participants who met the study inclusion criteria. These 
inpatients were given the initial information sheet (Appendix F) by staff, and anyone 
who was interested in participating in the study was asked to inform a staff member. 
Staff were asked to notify the clinical lead, who contacted the researcher to inform them 
that there were people who were interested in finding out more about the study. The 
researcher then arranged to visit the hospital ward, met with interested participants and 
explained the study further (Appendix G). With participants who wished to take part in 
the study, informed consent (Appendix D) was obtained and the measures were 
completed. 
2.4 Measures 
2.4.1 Demographic information. Demographic information was sought from 
participants. This information comprised sex, age, ethnicity, marital status, living 
residence and type of school attended. Information regarding the presence of any 
physical or mental health difficulties and whether they had a history of arrests, cautions 
or convictions was collected directly from participants.  
2.4.2 Wechsler abbreviated scale of intelligence. If it was not possible to 
obtain a recent reliable score from an existing measure of participants’ FSIQ, then the 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999) was administered. 
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A ‘recent’ score was deemed as a FSIQ score that was measured within the last five 
years by either the WASI, the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - 3rd Edition (WAIS-
III; Wechsler, 1997), or the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – 4th Edition (WAIS-IV; 
Wechsler, 2008). This was crucial to ensure that participants’ FSIQ fell within the mild 
range of ID, therefore meeting inclusion criteria for the study.  
 The WASI is an abbreviated version of the WAIS-III (Wechsler, 1997). The 
WAIS-III comprises of 14 subtests, whereas an individual’s general level of intellectual 
functioning (FSIQ) can be measured by the WASI using a two subtest or four subtest 
version.  
As far as possible, this study used the four-subtest version of the WASI.  The 
four subtests measure both fluid and crystallized intelligence, verbal knowledge and 
non-verbal reasoning (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 1999). The four subtest WASI takes 
approximately 30 minutes to complete and can be administered to people between six 
and 90 years-old. It therefore provides a quick measure of general intellectual 
functioning, which Goldstein, Beers and Hersen (2003) suggest is important for 
research purposes where a more extensive IQ battery may not be necessary or feasible. 
The WASI can be scored immediately which enabled the researcher to establish right 
away whether someone met inclusion criteria for the study. This in turn reduced the 
amount of time that people who fell outside the inclusion criteria spent engaging in the 
study. 
Alongside the FSIQ score, two further scores are obtained. The Verbal IQ (VIQ) 
is determined by scores on two subtests; Vocabulary and Similarities. The Vocabulary 
task asks participants the meaning of a selection of words (e.g. “What is a shoe?”), 
measuring word knowledge and verbal concept formation. The Similarities task requires 
participants to explain how two words are similar to one another, for example “In what 
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way are a COW and a BEAR alike?” This task measures concept formation and verbal 
reasoning. Both of these subtests present questions and require responses vocally.  
 The Performance IQ (PIQ) measures non-verbal reasoning abilities and consists 
of the Block Design and Matrix Reasoning tasks. Block Design requires the participant 
to copy patterns (first modelled, then from a two-dimensional diagram) using three 
dimensional coloured blocks, within a specific time limit. This test measures nonverbal 
concept formation, visual-motor skills, visual-spatial skills and visual-motor 
coordination. The Matrix Reasoning task requires participants to select the missing 
piece from a pattern that is presented, from a selection of five choices. This task 
measures abstract reasoning skills and visual processing.  
On six occasions during this study, the two-subtest version of the WASI was 
used. The two-subtest version comprises the Vocabulary (verbal) and Matrix Reasoning 
(non-verbal) tasks, and yields only the FSIQ score. The authors of this measure do 
however suggest that it is a useful screening instrument of an individual’s general 
cognitive functioning. The two-subtest version was used with six non-offender 
participants (four women and two men) who had cerebral palsy. These participants had 
no, or limited use of their hands. The Block Design task requires manipulation of 3D 
blocks against a stopwatch, and was therefore deemed unsuitable. By using the two-
subtest WASI to screen FSIQ, it removed the chance of people capable of engaging 
with the rest of the study from being excluded due to physical disability alone. 
The WASI has been described as demonstrating “outstanding” psychometric 
properties (Stano, 2004). Reliabilities have been reported as generally quite high; with 
an average reliability coefficient for the FSIQ of r = .98, and test-retest reliability of      
r = .92 for the FSIQ four-subtest version and r = .88 for FSIQ two-subtest (Kaufman & 
Lichtenberger, 2005). Interrater reliability for the WASI has been reported as r = .98 for 
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the Vocabulary subtest and r = .99 for the Similarities subtest. The WASI has been 
demonstrated to have good internal consistency reliability coefficients; r = .96 for both 
VIQ and PIQ, r = .89 for FSIQ four-subtest, and r = .96 for FSIQ two-subtest (Kaufman 
& Lichtenberger, 2005).  
The WASI has also been demonstrated to have good concurrent validity, 
correlating strongly with overall FSIQ scores from the WAIS-III (r = .92; Garland, 
2005). However not all papers support these claims, with Axelrod (2002) stating that the 
WASI does not consistently provide accurate predictions of WAIS-III scores. Axelrod 
(2002) suggests that caution should be applied when precise estimates of WAIS-III 
scores are required. Nevertheless, it was felt that the WASI was an appropriate tool to 
screen FSIQ for the purpose of this research study. 
2.4.3 Socio-moral reflection measure-short form. The Socio-Moral Reflection 
Measure-Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs et al., 1992) is a production measure of moral 
reasoning. It was administered to every participant who met the study inclusion criteria.  
The SRM-SF asks participants questions which aim to elicit moral reasoning; for 
example it asks questions about the importance of saving lives and the importance of 
keeping promises (e.g. “Think about when you’ve made a promise to a friend of yours. 
How important is it for people to keep promises, if they can, to friends?” and “How 
important is it for people not to take things that belong to other people?”). Participants 
are asked to select from three choices whether they believe each dilemma is “very 
important”, “important” or “not important”, and to state their reasons for their choice.  
The SRM-SF takes around 20 minutes to administer and comprises 11 questions, 
of which, seven answers are required to reliably score the measure. It measures seven 
constructs; Contract, Truth, Affiliation, Life, Property, Law, and Legal Justice. In this 
study the SRM-SF was conducted as an interview to reduce the need for reading and 
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writing skills, therefore making it more accessible for the ID client group. Exact 
participant wording was recorded on the response sheets. 
On this measure, participant’s responses are assigned a rating that reflects a 
moral stage score in-line with Gibbs’s Socio-moral reasoning theory. After responses 
are scored, a summary score representing participants overall level of moral reasoning is 
calculated, and stage scores are generated for each of the seven constructs. Finally, the 
summary score is multiplied by 100, generating scores between 100 and 400. This score 
represents an individual’s global-stage score; for example scores between 175 - 225 
represent Stage 2 reasoning. Scores and their corresponding moral stages are presented 
in Table 6.  
 
Table 6. 
Sociomoral Reflection Measure – Short Form (SRM-SF) scores and the equivalent 
moral stage. 
Score Moral Stage 
100 – 125 
126 - 149 
150 - 174 
175 - 225 
226 - 249 
250 - 274 
275 - 325 
326 - 349 
350 - 374 
375 – 400 
Stage 1 
Transition Stage 1 (2) 
Transition Stage 2 (1) 
Stage 2 
Transition Stage 2 (3) 
Transition Stage 3 (2) 
Stage 3 
Transition Stage 3 (4) 
Transition Stage 4 (3) 
Stage 4 
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The SRM-SF has good test-retest reliability (r = .88) and excellent internal 
consistency (r = .92; Gibbs et al., 1992), along with excellent interrater reliability         
(r > .9).  It has been shown to be a reliable measure for both the ID and non-ID 
populations within the UK (Langdon, et al. 2010b), hence its selection for this study. 
Acceptable levels of concurrent validity have been shown between the MJI (Colby & 
Kohlberg, 1987) and the SRM-SF (r = .69, p < .0001; Gibbs et al., 1992). The SRM-SF 
has also demonstrated good convergent validity, correlated with age (r = .66), and good 
discriminant validity by showing no correlation with a measure of social desirability 
(Gibbs et al., 1992). 
The scoring process of the SRM-SF is self-taught. Gibbs et al. (1992) suggest 
that this process requires a minimum of 30 hours training, completed over a four to 
eight week period. The principal author of this research project exceeded the 
recommended number of training hours prior to scoring the response sheets.  
2.4.3.1 Interrater reliability. Thirty percent of the questionnaires in this study 
(N = 20) were randomly selected and second-rated by an expert rater, in-line with 
Gibbs’ et al. (1992) recommendations, to ensure interrater reliability of r ≥ .80.  An 
interrater reliability score of r = .99 (p < .001) was achieved in this study. The expert 
rater had considerable experience using and scoring this measure.  
2.4.4 Emotional problem scale. The Emotional Problem Scale (EPS) was 
developed to assess problems in individuals with mild to borderline ID (Prout & 
Strohmer, 1991). It assesses both emotional problems (e.g. depression) and behavioural 
problems (e.g. aggression).  The EPS consists of two parts. 
2.4.4.1 Emotional problem scale self-report inventory (EPS-SRI). The Self-
Report Inventory (SRI) is a 147-item measure completed by the participant, requiring a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ response to statements about thoughts, feelings and actions, such as; 
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“Nobody really understands me” and “I like myself”. These statements were read aloud 
to participants who responded verbally.  
The EPS-SRI comprises six subscales; positive impression, thought/behaviour 
disorder, impulse control, anxiety, low self-esteem and depression. By summing these 
subscales (apart from ‘Positive Impression’), a Total Pathology score is obtained. High 
total pathology scores on the EPS-SRI represent problems and difficulties experienced 
across a range of emotional and behavioural areas.  
The EPS-SRI has demonstrated good internal consistency, with alpha 
coefficients ranging between r = .77 and r = .96, and a mean score of r = .86 (Prout & 
Strohmer, 1991). Test-retest reliability has been demonstrated to range from r = .65 to   
r = .92 (mean = 0.83), amongst a sample of participants whose average FSIQ was 69.  
2.4.4.2 Emotional problem scale behaviour rating scale (EPS-BRS). The 
Behaviour Rating Scale (BRS) is 135-item measure, which explores behaviours 
exhibited over the previous month. The BRS is completed by someone familiar to the 
participant, for example their named nurse, a support worker or family member. The 
selected person is asked to rate how frequently the participant engages in particular 
behaviours (e.g. “How often do they complain of being tired?”). Responses are scored 
on a four-point Likert scale, representing the responses “almost never”, “rarely”, 
“occasionally” or “often”.  
 The EPS-BRS comprises 12 subscales. These are thought/behaviour disorder, 
verbal aggression, physical aggression, sexual maladjustment, non-compliance, 
hyperactivity, distractibility, anxiety, somatic concerns, withdrawal, depression and low 
self-esteem. The ‘Externalising Behaviour Problems’ score is calculated by summing 
four of the subscales (physical aggression, verbal aggression, non-compliance and 
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hyperactivity). People who typically act out their feelings tend to score high 
externalising behaviour problem scores. 
Summing three subscales form the ‘Internalising Behaviour Problems’ score 
(depression, anxiety and self-esteem). People who score highly on the internalising 
behaviour problem scale are reported to often experience high levels of mental health 
problems. 
The EPS-BRS subscales have excellent internal consistency, with alpha 
coefficients ranging between r = .90 and r = .97, with a mean of r = .93 (Prout & 
Strohmer, 1991).  Interrater reliability for the EPS-BRS varies between r = .26 and        
r = .96, with a mean of r = .84. Only one subscale however (sexual maladjustment), fell 
below a reliability coefficient r = .79 (scoring r = .29).  
Convergent and discriminant validity has been examined previously by 
correlating scores on the EPS-BRS and the EPS-SRI. Correlations between behaviour 
ratings and self-report ratings were found to be small to modest (Prout & Strohmer, 
1991). However, differences in correlations such as this have been suggested to reflect 
differences in informant perspectives and self-report perspectives, as opposed to 
inadequacies in measurement (Achenbach, McConaughey & Howell, 1987). This 
measure was selected as it has been suggested to be a useful outcome measure of 
emotional and behavioural difficulties often experienced in forensic settings (Hogue et 
al., 2007). 
2.4.5 Offence-related information. Every participant was asked whether they 
had ever been charged, cautioned or convicted of a criminal offence. Anyone in the 
community sample who reported having a criminal history was excluded from the 
study. Information regarding convictions, in terms of frequency and offence-type, was 
sought from the offender participants directly. With their consent, this information was 
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clarified and on occasions expanded through talking to staff or referencing their case-
files.  
 Following all of the data being collected, offences were ranked in terms of 
severity, in line with Francis, Soothill and Dittrichs’ (2001) findings. They looked at a 
series of 7,443 offenders convicted in 1973, who were followed up until 1994. These 
offenders attended a total of 31,135 court appearances over the 19 year period (Soothill, 
Francis, Ackerley & Sanderson, 2000). Using this data, Francis et al. (2001) used 
paired-comparisons to devise ranks and scores that represent offence seriousness; for 
example a conviction of ‘murder’, ‘manslaughter’ or ‘attempted murder’ was ranked as 
the most serious type of offence, ‘rape’ was ranked as the second most serious offence 
and so on.  
 A list of the top 20 most serious offences according to Francis’ et al., (2001) 
paired-comparisons method is presented in the appendices (Appendix H). This current 
study ranked participants by their most severe conviction, in ascending order, according 
to Francis’ et al.’s (2001) scores. 
2.5 Procedure 
2.5.1 Recruitment and initial contact. As described, local LD community 
teams, day services and secure services were approached by the researcher and the study 
was explained. Staff identified potential participants who were provided with an initial 
information sheet (Appendix B for non-offender groups, Appendix F for offender 
groups). Interested individuals informed their staff members and consented to their 
details being passed on to the researcher. The researcher then arranged with the 
participant themselves (non-offender group) or with staff (both for day services and 
offender group), a convenient time to visit the participant to provide more detailed 
information about the study (Appendix C for non-offenders, Appendix G for offenders). 
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For the non-offender participants, if they appeared to meet inclusion criteria and 
expressed interest in participating in the study, a second appointment was made with 
them to carry out the assessment. If however they requested to complete the study 
straight after the initial meeting, this was facilitated. These appointments were 
conducted within the day-service centre, community team building or at the 
participant’s home; in-line with the Trusts lone-working policy. Inpatient appointments 
for the offender groups were conducted within the ward setting. For these participants 
the testing session was either arranged for a separate day, or run straight from the initial 
meeting, depending on the participant’s preference and availability.  
Before the initial contact session, a file search was completed by a clinician 
within that service, to explore whether an IQ assessment had been completed within the 
last five years for interested participants. If no recent FSIQ score was documented then 
the WASI was added to the assessment session.  
2.5.2 Testing session. The information sheets, consent form and the 
questionnaires were read aloud to participants and their responses were recorded by the 
researcher. Therefore reading and writing skills were not a requirement of the study, 
widening the inclusion criteria.  
At the start of the testing session the study information was read to the 
participant (Appendix C for non-offenders, Appendix G for offenders) and any 
questions were answered. Participants were then asked to sign a consent form 
(Appendix D). They were informed of their right to withdraw and that participating in, 
or withdrawal from the study would not affect their routine treatment.  
 For participants who required their FSIQ to be assessed, the WASI was 
conducted at the start of the session and scored immediately after. This determined 
whether participants met the inclusion criteria. If they did not fall within the mild ID 
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range, they were thanked and then excluded from the study. If they met inclusion 
criteria, demographic information and offence related information were collected, and 
the SRM-SF and EPS-SRI administered. Participants detained under the Mental Health 
Act were asked to only talk to the researcher about crimes that were known to staff. 
They were informed that confidentiality could not be maintained if an undisclosed 
offence was disclosed to the researcher.  
The assessment took around one hour to complete. This time was reduced if the 
WASI was not required. Whilst the researcher conducted the assessment session with 
the offenders, an available staff member who knew the participant well, (ideally their 
key worker), was given the EPS-BRS to complete. If staff were not available, this 
measure was left for their key-worker to complete and post back to the researcher. 
For the non-offenders (community groups), if the participant was accompanied 
by a carer or family member to the appointment, or the appointment was in their home 
environment where a carer or family member was present, they were asked to complete 
the scale at the same time. More typically, when the participant attended the assessment 
alone, they were provided with the measure, along with a carer information sheet 
(Appendix I), carer consent form (Appendix J) and a stamped addressed envelope to 
return to the researcher. Permission for a carer or family member to complete this 
measure featured in the participants consent form. 
At the end of the session, participants were given the opportunity to ask any 
questions, were thanked for their time and provided with a debrief sheet about the study 
(Appendix K for non-offenders, Appendix L for offenders). Every participant, including 
those who were deemed not to meet inclusion criteria but who had requested to partake 
in the study, were given a £5 shopping voucher to thank them for their time. Participants 
were given the choice of two local supermarkets for their shopping voucher. A brief 
  
76 
 
explanation of how to use this voucher was given to the non-offender participants. In 
contrast, the voucher was shown to the offender groups so that they could see the gift, 
and then passed on to staff to be put with the participants finances for safe keeping.  
To ensure confidentiality, when possible, measures were administered with only 
the participant and researcher present. There were several occasions however when a 
carer or staff member was present. Four participants in the community had a 1-to-1 
carer who remained with them at all times, and who was therefore present with them 
during the testing session. The carer was asked not to verbally input to the study, and 
instead, once consent was gained from the participant, they were given the EPS-BRS to 
complete at the same time.   
 Three male participants from the offender group were forbidden from being 
present with a single female according to their risk management plans. Therefore for 
these participants, an additional member of the psychology department sat in their 
sessions with the researcher. It was made clear to the participant that their responses 
would not be recorded in their clinical files, or affect their routine treatment.  
2.6 Ethical Issues 
 A favourable ethical approval was obtained from Essex Research Ethics 
Committee (see Appendix M). Three Research and Development (R&D) committees 
approved the study; Norfolk (Appendix N), Hertfordshire (Appendix O) and Suffolk 
(Appendix P). In addition, one independent hospital group, and two non-NHS day 
services reviewed the study and gave management permission to recruit from their 
organisations (Appendix Q, Appendix R & Appendix S, respectively). Notification of 
the study end was provided to the ethics committee on completion (Appendix T). The 
key ethical considerations for conducting this research project are discussed in turn.  
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2.6.1 Consent. Consent was sought from participants prior to the study 
(Appendix D). An information sheet describing the research objectives and the 
procedures was verbally explained to participants, to ensure that consent was informed 
(Appendices C & G). In addition, participants were asked to consent to the researcher 
speaking to staff (regarding offence information and to clarify whether they had 
previously had an IQ assessment) and to consent to the researcher accessing their case 
notes (if in a clinical setting) to enable clarification of offence-related information. If 
participants chose not to consent to the study after discussing the information sheet, 
they were thanked for their time and the study ended.  
Participants were also asked to consent to a carer completing a questionnaire 
about them (the EPS-BRS). They selected this carer (or family member). Carers were 
provided with an information sheet explaining the study (Appendix I) and were asked to 
sign a consent form prior to completing the measure (Appendix J). 
Participants’ information sheets contained pictorial cues to ensure accessible 
information was provided. These were written in accordance with guidelines produced 
by the Department of Health (2010). The consent form was written in simple language 
and participants understanding of all points was checked verbally whilst the form was 
being completed. Participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the 
research at any time, and that partaking in or withdrawal from the study would not 
affect their routine treatment.  
Standard practice guidelines require participants to initial each statement made 
on a consent form to indicate that they have consented to it. However to simplify this 
procedure and increase its accessibility for the ID population, it was felt that a tick-box 
format would be more suitable, in-line with previous thesis projects (e.g. Rees, 2009).  
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2.6.2 Confidentiality. Participants were ensured anonymity. Their responses on 
the measures were not recorded in their clinical records. However it was made clear 
from the outset, and explicitly stated on both the information sheet and consent form 
that confidentiality would be broken if the researcher felt someone was at risk following 
a disclosure. Participants were told that if this did occur then the need to pass this 
information on would be discussed with them first.  
Within the offender groups, participants were requested to only provide 
information about offences that were known to staff. They were informed that 
confidentiality may not be maintained if an unknown offence was disclosed at any point 
during the study. Participants were advised that should this occur, they would be 
reminded that confidentiality would be broken, and that this new information would be 
shared with an appropriate clinician.  
 In accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998), data will be stored in a 
locked achieve room at the university after project completion for a five year period. 
During the project, data was locked in a filing cabinet. Data was anonymised with 
identification codes, which were stored on an encrypted memory stick and no paper 
copy was held. No information was stored in a way that made it personally identifiable. 
Consent forms were locked separately to the completed data as they had participants’ 
names on.  
2.6.3 Distress. Each participant was asked how they felt and whether they had 
any questions at the session’s end. They were provided with a debrief sheet 
(Appendices K & L), thanking them for participating and providing them with 
recommendations of who to contact if they felt worried or distressed. It also detailed the 
researchers and supervisors contact information if participants had further questions or 
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concerns after study completion.  The information differed slightly with who to contact 
depending on whether they were part of the offender or non-offender groups. 
The study was not designed to cause distress to the participants.  However, if a 
participant started to become restless or show signs of distress during the study, they 
were asked how they were feeling, and they were given the opportunity to take a break 
from the study, or to stop. In these incidences, the researcher offered to approach an 
available familiar staff member or carer to speak to the participant about how they were 
feeling. The participant would have then been given the option of whether to continue 
the study or not.  
Two participants from the offender groups requested a break from the study 
however this was due to a scheduled cigarette or drink break, rather than feeling too 
distressed. One offender participant stopped the study half way through as a medical 
professional entered the ward that she had been waiting to see, however she requested 
that the researcher waited and continued the study immediately afterwards. Only one 
offender participant became tearful during the study, due to an unrelated event, and was 
given the option of stopping or taking a break. He requested a break and to see his 
primary nurse. After 10 minutes his mood improved and he asked to continue the study.  
No community participants requested a break, or asked to talk to staff during, or 
immediately after the study. 
2.6.4 Risk management. A suitable room was used to interview all participants 
within secure services, and staff were informed of the researcher's whereabouts within 
the ward setting. The researcher adhered to any local security procedures, and carried a 
radio or alarm when it was required. The researcher sought advice from the lead nurse 
on the ward regarding whether specific risk assessments required reading prior to 
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meeting with individual participants. Staff were asked to assess the participant’s mood 
prior to the session, to reduce potential risks to the researcher. 
In the community if a participant requested a home visit appointment, the Trusts 
lone-working policy was adhered to. Information regarding participants name, address, 
and appointment times were provided to local LD teams, with arrangements to contact 
the on-call clinician once the appointment was complete. This procedure helped to 
minimise potential risks. However, whenever possible, sessions were arranged at day-
service centres and the local LD team buildings, to further reduce the potential risks of 
lone working.  
Non-offender participants were provided with a stamped addressed envelope to 
pass onto a carer, to return the EPS-BRI to the researcher. These were sent to the 
University of East Anglia for the researcher to collect, as opposed to using a personal 
address. 
2.7 Data Preparation and Analysis 
 2.7.1 Data preparation. The raw data was inputted into a Predictive Analytics 
Software Version 18 (PASW v.18) spreadsheet for analysis. Firstly, data were checked 
for missing data.  
A full dataset for demographic information was obtained, including FSIQ scores 
for all of the participants. Regarding the SRM-SF, only one individual question was not 
answered by one participant. There were multiple responses given by participants that 
did not meet the scoring criteria, and these were replaced on the database with ‘999’. 
However, every participant provided enough scorable responses (≥ 7 answers out of 11) 
to enable a total SRM-SF score and global stage score to be calculated. 
Regarding the EPS, a full dataset for the EPS-SRI measure was obtained. 
However, for the informant respondent measure (EPS-BRS,) 24 questionnaires were not 
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returned. This missing data was scored as ‘999’ on the database. Of these missing 
questionnaires, seven were from the male offender group, six were from the female non-
offender group and 11 from the male non-offender group. The overall response rate for 
the EPS-BRS was 65%. 
2.7.2 Interrater reliability. Thirty percent of the questionnaires in this study (N 
= 20) were second-rated by an expert rater. PASW was used to randomly select five 
participant numbers from each of the four groups, so that each group was equally 
represented. The second-rater was blind to participant group and sex. Rating scores 
were entered into a separate database for the 20 selected participants by both the 
researcher and second-rater. Interrater reliability was computed for the first 10 of the 
randomly selected questionnaires, and scored r = .80 (p < .001). This only marginally 
met Gibbs’ et al. (1992) recommendations of requiring an interrater reliability of           
r ≥ .80. Therefore, the researcher and expert rater discussed in length the moral 
reasoning stage of each individual question on the 10 questionnaires, and looked for 
inconsistencies in scoring. Three words in particular, ‘upset’, ‘hurt’ and ‘feel’ were 
scored by the researcher at too low a level. These were typically scored at stage 1/2 or 
stage 2, rather than stage 2/3 which was a more accurate representation of the stage 
score. These inconsistencies were corrected on the first 10 questionnaires, and interrater 
reliability was recalculated at r = .99 (p < .001), using an intra-class correlation.  
The remaining 58 questionnaires were then re-rated by the researcher to correct 
these inconsistencies, particularly looking for the use of the words ‘upset’, ‘hurt’ and 
‘feel’ in the participant responses, to ensure these were scored correctly. The second 10 
questionnaires were then second-rated by the expert rater. Interrater reliability was then 
computed for these 10 randomly selected questionnaires, and scored r = .99 (p < .001). 
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2.7.3 Data analysis. Data analysis was undertaken by various methods. 
Demographic data was explored using descriptive statistics, and tests of normality were 
conducted on raw data.  
  2.7.3.1. Tests of normality. Firstly, histograms were inspected visually to 
examine normal distribution. Following this, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (K-S test) 
was used to explore whether the distributions of scores significantly differed from a 
normal distribution. Several of the variables were not normally distributed. FSIQ of 
participants was significantly non-normal; D (68) = 0.16, p < .001. A histogram 
illustrating the distribution of FSIQ is presented in Appendix U.  
The total SRM-SF score was normally distributed; D (68) = 0.07, p > .05. 
However in terms of the individual constructs, none of the scores were normally 
distributed; Contract, D (52) = 0.17, p < .001; Truth, D (52) = 0.17, p < .001; 
Affiliation, D (52) = 0.25, p < .001; Life, D (52) = 0.22 p < .001, Property, D (52) = 
0.18, p < .001, Law, D (52) = 0.25, p < .001 and Legal Justice, D (52) = 0.16, p < .01. 
 In terms of the EPS-SRI, the Total Pathology score data were normally 
distributed, D (68) = 0.08, p > .05, along with the subscales, positive impression, D (68) 
= 0.10, p > .05, and anxiety, D (68) = 0.10, p > .05. The remaining four subscales 
however; low self-esteem, D (68) = 0.12, p < .05, depression, D (68) = 0.13, p < .01, 
thought/ behaviour disorder, D (68) = 0.15, p < .001 and impulse control, D (68) = 0.13, 
p < .01, were significantly non-normal. Finally, regarding the EPS-BRS, the 
Externalising Behaviour Problem score data were normally distributed, D (44) = 0.10,  
p >. 05, whereas the Internalising Behaviour Problem score data were significantly non-
normal, D (44) = 0.15, p < .05. 
2.7.3.2 Analysis. As not all of the data were normally distributed, bootstrapping 
was used to achieve a more robust estimate of the mean, standard error and confidence 
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intervals, which were less susceptible to errors. It treats the sample as a population; a 
participant is drawn, the score (e.g. mean) is recorded, and it is replaced into the sample. 
In this study this procedure was performed 5000 times, providing a histogram of 
bootstrapped mean scores. From these, standard error scores, confidence intervals and 
tests of significance can then be computed (Field, 2009).  Bootstrapping is regarded as a 
robust alternative method when parametric assumptions are in doubt, particularly if the 
sample is not overly large (Preacher, Rucker & Hayes, 2007), hence its selection for use 
in this research study. 
ANCOVA was then used to address the first two research questions, to test for 
differences within the calculated means of the SRM-SF and individual constructs. Main 
effects and interactions were examined. Bootstrap parameter estimates were determined, 
with bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals which adjust for bias and 
skewness in the distribution.. The F statistics presented were calculated using the 
original dataset, whereas the significance levels and the 95% BCa confidence intervals 
were calculated through the bootstrapping procedure. When the confidence interval did 
not include the value zero in its range then it was deemed a significant finding; p < .05. 
 The latter two research questions, exploring the relationship between moral 
reasoning and offence severity, and exploring the relationship between moral reasoning 
and emotional and behavioural problems, were addressed using Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient, as data were non-parametric. ANOVA was also used to partially address 
Question 4, comparing the emotional and behavioural problems of offenders and non-
offenders.  
2.7.3.3 Homogeneity of variance. To test homogeneity of variance of the 
regression slopes, Levene’s test of Equality of Error Variances was used. Variances 
were equal across the four groups; F (3, 64) = 1.41, p >.05, therefore homogeneity of 
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variance was assumed. There was no significant effect of sex on SRM-SF total score, 
after controlling for FSIQ; F (1, 60) = 1.26, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -5.50 to 1.65). 
There was no significant effect of offence history on SRM-SF total score, after 
controlling for FSIQ; F (1, 60) = 1.32, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -2.81 to 11.64). In 
addition there was no significant interaction effect between sex and offence history on 
SRM-SF total score, after controlling for FSIQ; F (1, 60) = 0.00, p > .05 (BCa 95%     
CI = -7.96 to 4.73. These were all desirable effects. 
Regarding the EPS, the variances of the total pathology score (EPS-SRI) were 
equal for the four participant groups; F (3, 64) = 1.28, p > .05. Therefore homogeneity 
of variance was assumed. For the externalising behaviours score (EPS-BRS), the 
variances were also equal for the four groups; F (3, 64) = 1.26, p > .05, therefore 
homogeneity of variance was assumed. Finally for the internalising behaviour score 
(EPS-BRS), the variances were equal across the four groups; F (3, 64) = .44, p > .05, so 
homogeneity of variance was assumed. 
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Chapter Three- Results 
 
3.1 Overview of Chapter 
This chapter presents the analysis and results from this study. It begins by 
exploring demographic information, and making comparisons between the groups. The 
study hypotheses are then addressed in turn. Moral reasoning scores are inspected to see 
whether significant differences exist between the four participant groups, exploring the 
effect of sex, offence history, and the interaction between the two. In a similar manner, 
individual constructs from the SRM-SF are then inspected. The chapter moves on to 
explore the relationship between total moral reasoning score and offence severity. It 
then explores the relationship between moral reasoning and the presence of emotional or 
behavioural problems. The chapter ends with a summary of the findings.  
3.2 Descriptive Statistics.  
Descriptive statistics were used to explore the demographic information of the 
overall sample, and to investigate whether there were significant differences between 
the four groups. These are discussed in turn.  
3.2.1 Age. One-way ANOVA was used to compare the mean age of each 
participant group. No significant differences were found between the four groups on 
their mean age; F(3, 64) = 0.88, p > .05 (Table 7).  
3.2.2 Full scale IQ. One-way ANOVA was used to compare the mean FSIQ of 
each group, and found a significant difference between them; F (3, 64) = 5.823,             
p = .001. Post hoc testing revealed that the male offenders had significantly higher FSIQ 
scores than the female non-offenders (p < .05; 95% CI = 1.71 to 11.11). The female 
offenders also had significantly higher FSIQ scores than the non-offender females  
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Table 7. 
Descriptive statistics for men and women from both offender and non-offender groups.  
 Offender Male 
(OM) 
n = 17 
Offender 
Female (OF) 
n = 17 
Non-offender 
Male (NOM) 
n = 17 
Non-offender 
Female (NOF) 
n = 17 
 
Post-hoc Tests 
 
 
 
Age (Years) 
 
FSIQ 
 
 
Offence severity 
 
 
Physical problems              
                            -Yes 
                        - No                          
 
Mental health problems           
b                         -Yes 
                           - No            
 
 
M 
 
35.82 
 
61.94 
 
 
16.41 
 
n 
 
 6 
11
 
12 
 5 
 
(SD) 
 
(14.20) 
 
(4.55) 
 
 
(9.05) 
 
(%) 
 
  (8.8) 
(16.2) 
 
 
(17.6) 
  (7.4) 
 
M 
 
34.12 
 
62.00 
 
 
16.59 
 
n 
 
9 
8 
 
 
12 
 5 
 
(SD) 
 
(12.29) 
 
(5.65) 
 
 
(9.37) 
 
(%) 
 
(13.2) 
(11.8) 
 
 
(17.6) 
  (7.4) 
 
M 
 
39.65 
 
60.12 
 
 
- 
 
n 
 
8 
9 
 
 
 4 
13 
 
 
(SD) 
 
(12.87) 
 
(6.17) 
 
 
- 
 
(%) 
 
(11.8) 
(13.2) 
 
 
 (5.9) 
(19.1) 
 
M 
 
33.12 
 
55.53 
 
 
- 
 
n 
 
8 
9 
 
 
 2 
15 
 
(SD) 
 
(10.88) 
 
(4.16) 
 
 
- 
 
(%) 
 
(11.8) 
(13.2) 
 
 
  (2.9) 
(22.1) 
 
 
 
 
NS 
 
OM > NOF*     
OF > NOF* 
 
NS 
 
 
 
NS 
 
 
 
O > NO *** 
 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001, NS = Non-significant 
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(p < .05; 95% CI = 1.77 to 11.17). Differences between the other groups were not 
significant (Table 7). 
3.2.3 Offence severity. Offences were ranked in terms of severity. To explore 
whether there were significant differences between the severity ranks obtained by men 
and women, the Mann-Whitney test was used. Offence severity ranks did not differ 
significantly between men and women; U = 126.50, z = -0.06, p > .05 (Table 7).  
3.2.4 Physical and mental health difficulties. Pearson’s Chi-square test was 
used to explore whether there were significant differences between the four groups in 
the prevalence of physical or mental health difficulties. No significant differences were 
found between the groups regarding the presence of serious physical health problems; χ2 
(3) = 1.126, p > .05. There was however a significant difference between groups on the 
presence of mental health problems; χ2 (3) = 19.804, p < .001. Offenders self-reported 
more mental health problems than non-offenders (Table 7). 
3.2.5 Summary. Comparing the four groups on demographic information found 
significant differences in two areas; FSIQ and mental health problems reported. Age did 
not differ significantly between the groups, nor did offence severity between male and 
female offenders. 
3.3 Research Question One 
The first research question asked whether there were significant differences in 
moral reasoning between men and women with ID who had offended, compared to men 
and women with ID who had not offended. Two hypotheses were made. These are 
addressed below. 
3.3.1 Hypothesis A: Offenders will have higher moral reasoning scores than 
non offenders. Initially, the correlation between the SRM-SF total score and FSIQ was 
inspected, using Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient as data were not normally 
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distributed. Total SRM-SF score was significantly positively related to participants 
FSIQ (rs = .41, p < .001). Therefore, individuals with higher FSIQ scores yielded higher 
total scores on the SRM-SF. Analysis will therefore be presented twice, firstly using the 
original scores obtained (using ANOVA), and then whilst controlling for FSIQ (using 
ANCOVA).   
3.3.1.1 Total moral reasoning score. Total scores on the SRM-SF were 
significantly different between offenders and non-offenders; F (1, 64) = 45.45, p < .001 
(BCa 95% CI = -58.31 to -25.53; Table 8), with offenders scoring higher than non-
offenders.   
3.3.1.2 Total moral reasoning score: Controlling for intellectual functioning. 
A significant difference was found between offenders and non-offenders on total SRM-
SF score, whilst controlling for FSIQ; F (1, 63) = 32.12, p < .001 (BCa 95% CI = -51.23 
to -19.73). Offenders mean scores fell within stage 2(3) reasoning, whereas mean scores 
for non-offenders fell within stage 2.  
  3.3.2 Hypothesis B: There will be no significant differences between men 
and women in moral reasoning scores.  
3.3.2.1 Total moral reasoning score. There was no significant difference found 
between the moral reasoning scores of men and women F (1, 64) = 0.13, p > .05 (BCa 
95% CI = -14.64 to 18.07; Table 8), nor was the interaction between sex and offence 
history significant; F (1, 64) = 0.02, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -20.54 to 24.16; Table 9).  
3.3.2.2 Total moral reasoning score: Controlling for intellectual functioning. 
Once FSIQ was controlled, there remained no significant differences between men and 
women on total moral reasoning scores; F (1, 63) = 0.00, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -14.44 
to 18.04). Both sexes’ scores fell within stage 2 reasoning. No significant interaction 
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Table 8.  
 Comparing offenders with non-offenders, and men with women on the mean (x100) and standard error scores on the SRM-SF 
SRM-SF: 
Mean x100 (SE) 
Offender Group 
(n = 34) 
Non-Offender Group 
(n = 34)  
Men 
(n = 34) 
Women 
(n = 34) 
 
 
Total score  
 
 
235.68***   (4.10) 
 
 
195.18   (4.36) 
 
216.50   (4.32) 
 
214.35   (4.16) 
Contract 
 
241.18***   (4.60)     198.28   (6.50)     220.10   (5.40)     219.36   (5.90) 
Truth 
 
219.70*      (9.50) 183.30   (9.20) 206.10   (9.70) 197.00   (8.90) 
Affiliation 
 
257.35        (5.30) 228.68   (7.00) 239.71   (6.00) 246.32   (6.30) 
Life 
 
242.65**    (8.20) 204.69   (7.20) 230.30   (6.50) 218.18   (8.90) 
Property 
 
227.30**    (7.40)     178.80   (9.70)     207.60   (8.90)     198.50   (8.50) 
Law 
 
203.10**    (9.10) 167.20   (7.60) 189.10   (9.80) 181.20   (6.60) 
Legal Justice 
 
225.80**   (10.40) 156.70 (10.50) 191.90 (10.30) 191.70 (10.60) 
 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 9. 
Comparing the four groups on the mean (x100) and standard error scores on the SRM-SF 
SRM-SF: 
Mean x100 (SE) 
 
Offender Male 
(n = 17) 
Offender Female 
(n = 17) 
Non-offender  Male 
(n = 17) 
Non-offender  Female 
(n = 17) 
 
Total score 
 
 
236.29   (6.70) 
 
 
235.06  (4.77) 
 
196.71  (5.29) 
 
193.65   (6.85) 
Contract 
 
  238.24   (7.60)   244.12  (5.10)   202.96  (7.50)   194.61 (10.50) 
Truth 
 
    225.00 (15.00)     214.70 (11.60)     188.20 (12.40)     178.10 (13.60) 
Affiliation 
 
    257.35   (7.00)     257.35   (8.00)     222.06  (9.80)     235.29   (9.80) 
Life 
 
239.71   (9.60) 
 
245.59 (13.30) 
 
               220.31   (8.80) 
 
189.06 (11.60) 
 
Property 
 
  232.40 (11.00)   221.90 (10.10)   181.30 (14.10)   176.50 (13.50) 
Law 
 
    206.30 (15.80)     200.00   (9.00)     171.90 (12.00)     162.50   (9.50) 
Legal Justice 
 
    226.50 (14.90)     225.00 (14.50)     150.00 (13.80)     162.50 (15.40) 
 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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Table 10. 
Comparing offenders with non-offenders, and men with women on adjusted mean (x100) and adjusted standard error scores on the SRM-
SF(controlling for FSIQ) 
SRM-SF: 
Mean x100 (SE) 
 
Offender Group 
(n = 34) 
 
Non-Offender Group 
(n = 34) 
 
Men 
(n = 34) 
Women 
(n = 34) 
 
 
Total score 
 
 
  233.51***   (4.21) 
 
 
                 197.35  (4.40) 
 
215.31 (4.32) 
 
215.54   (4.10) 
Contract 
 
  241.10***   (4.50)                  198.40  (6.60)     220.00 (5.30)     219.40   (5.90) 
Truth 
 
  216.40       (10.00)                  186.70  (9.50) 204.70 (9.90) 198.40   (8.90) 
Affiliation 
 
  253.70         (5.60)                  232.40  (6.90) 237.70 (6.00) 248.30   (6.10) 
Life 
 
  238.10*       (8.00)                  209.50  (7.50) 227.50 (6.40) 220.10   (9.00) 
Property 
 
  229.30**     (7.60)                  176.80  (9.60)    207.90 (9.10)     198.10   (8.60) 
Law 
 
  199.70         (9.30)                  170.60  (8.80)                 187.60  (9.60) 182.80   (7.00) 
Legal Justice 
 
  223.10*    (10.80) I 158.80 (11.40)              ii187.20 (10.50) 194.60 (11.00) 
 
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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between sex and offence history on the total SRM-SF score was found, once FSIQ was 
controlled; F (1, 63) = 0.06, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -25.26 to 18.80; Table 10).  
3.3.3 Summary. Overall, offenders with ID demonstrated significantly higher 
moral reasoning scores; stage 2(3), than non-offenders; stage 2. No significant 
differences were found between men and women, nor was the interaction 
between sex and offence history significant. Findings remained once FSIQ was 
controlled. Therefore both Hypothesis A; that offenders would have higher moral 
reasoning scores than non-offenders, and Hypothesis B; that there would be no 
significant sex differences, were supported.  
3.4 Research Question Two 
The second research question asked whether there were significant differences 
between the groups on the moral reasoning construct scores. Based on previous 
literature, specific hypotheses were made regarding the Property, Law and Legal Justice 
constructs. It was predicted that offenders would have significantly higher scores on the 
Property (Hypothesis C), Law (Hypothesis D) and Legal Justice constructs (Hypothesis 
E) than non-offenders. No specific hypotheses were made regarding the remaining four 
constructs, as these have not been directly linked to offending behaviour in the 
literature. However, they were explored for potential differences. 
The scores for the seven constructs are discussed in turn, firstly for the three 
constructs where hypotheses were made, and then for the remaining four constructs. For 
each construct, analysis is presented using the original data and then with FSIQ 
controlled. A summary of findings is presented and specific hypotheses are addressed. 
Bootstrapping was applied once more to 5000 samples, using BCa confidence intervals, 
at the 95% level. 
  
93 
 
3.4.1 Hypothesis C: The offender groups will have higher scores on the 
Property construct than the non-offenders. A significant difference was found 
between offenders and non-offenders mean scores on the Property construct; F (1, 62) = 
14.92, p < .01 (BCa 95% CI = -0.78 to -0.11). Offenders had higher scores (stage 2(3) 
reasoning) than non-offenders (stage 2 reasoning; Table 8). There were no significant 
sex differences; F (1, 62) = 0.37, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.19 to 0.39) nor was the 
interaction between sex and offence history significant; F (1, 62) = 0.05, p > .05 (BCa 
95% CI = -0.51 to 0.40; Table 9). 
Once FSIQ was controlled, a significant difference remained between offenders 
and non-offenders scores on the Property construct; F (1, 61) = 14.99, p < .01 (BCa 
95% CI = -0.87 to -0.16; Table 10). Offenders had higher scores (stage 2(3) reasoning) 
than non-offenders (stage 2 reasoning). No significant differences were found between 
men and women; F (1, 61) = 0.59, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.20 to 0.41), nor was the 
interaction between sex and offence history on this construct significant; F (1, 61) = 
0.00, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.48 to 0.47). Figure 1 presents the adjusted mean scores 
for this construct. 
3.4.2 Hypothesis D: The offender groups will have higher scores on the Law 
construct than the non-offenders.  A significant difference was found between 
offenders and non-offenders scores on the Law construct; F (1, 60) = 9.07, p < .01 (BCa 
95% CI = -0.65 to -0.10), with offenders having higher scores (stage 2) than non-
offenders (stage 2(1); Table 8). No significant differences were found between men and 
women; F (1, 60) = 0.43, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.29 to 0.43), nor was the interaction 
between sex and offence history significant; F (1, 60) = 0.02, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI        
= -0.42 to 0.47; Table 9). 
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Figure 1. Adjusted means across the Sociomoral Reflection Measure-Short Form constructs, controlling for intelligence. 
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However, once FSIQ was controlled, there was no longer a significant difference 
between offenders and non-offenders on this construct; F (1, 59) = 4.67, p > .05 (BCa 
95% CI = -0.56 to 0.04; Table 10). Differences remained non-significant for sex;          
F (1, 59) = 0.15, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.28 to 0.45) and for the interaction between  
sex and offence history; F (1, 59) = 0.03, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.50 to 0.37). Figure 
1 illustrates adjusted mean scores. 
3.4.3 Hypothesis E: The offender groups will have higher scores on the 
Legal Justice construct than the non-offenders. A significant difference was found 
between offenders and non-offenders on their Legal Justice scores; F (1, 57) = 21.72,    
p < .01 (BCa 95% CI = -1.04 to -0.21; Table 8). Offenders had higher scores on this 
construct (stage 2(3) reasoning) than non-offenders (stage 2(1) reasoning). There was no 
significant difference between men and women; F (1, 57) = 0.14, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI 
= -0.37 to 0.41). The interaction between sex and offence history on this construct was 
non-significant; F (1, 57) = 0.22, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.73 to 0.45; Table 9). 
With FSIQ controlled, significant differences remained between offenders and 
non-offenders; F (1, 56) = 0.00, p < .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.95 to -0.13), however 
offenders now reasoned at stage 2 and non-offenders at stage 2(1). Sex; F (1, 56) = 
0.24,  p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.37 to 0.41) and the interaction between sex and offence 
history, F (1, 56) = 0.14, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.73 to 0.34) remained non-
significant. Once again, adjusted means are presented in Figure 1.   
3.4.4 Exploring other construct differences.  
3.4.4.1. Contract. A significant difference was found between offenders and 
non-offenders on their Contract scores; F (1, 64) = 28.52, p < .001 (BCa 95% CI = -0.73 
to -0.28), with offenders having higher scores than non-offenders (Table 8). No 
significant differences were found between men and women on this construct; F (1, 64) 
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= 0.01, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.23 to 0.13). The interaction between sex and offence 
history was also non- significant; F (1, 64) = 0.68, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.19 to 0.46; 
Table 9).  
After controlling for FSIQ, a significant difference between offenders and non-
offenders contract scores was found; F (1, 63) = 23.77, p < .001 (BCa 95% CI = -0.73 
to -0.27; Table 10). Offenders had higher scores (stage 2(3) reasoning) than non-
offenders (stage 2). No significant differences between men and women; F (1, 63)        
= 0.01, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.24 to 0.13) or interaction between sex and offence 
history were found; F (1, 63) = 0.61, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.19 to 0.46).  Figure 1 
presents the adjusted mean scores. 
3.4.4.2 Truth. A significant difference was found between offenders and non-
offenders scores on the Truth construct; F (1, 62) = 7.58, p < .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.73 
to -0.03), with offenders having higher scores than non-offenders (Table 8). There were 
no significant differences between men and women’s scores; F (1, 62) = 0.59, p > .05 
(BCa 95% CI = -0.25 to 0.47). The interaction between sex and offence history was also 
non-significant; F (1, 62) = 0.00, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.52 to 0.51; Table 9).   
Once FSIQ was controlled, there was no longer a significant difference between 
offenders and non-offenders in their mean Truth score; F (1, 61) = 4.27, p > .05 (BCa 
95% CI = -0.63 to 0.09). Findings remained non-significant between men and women’s 
scores; F (1, 61) = 0.22, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.25 to 0.47), and regarding the 
interaction between sex and offence history; F (1, 61) = 0.07, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -
0.57 to 0.43). Adjusted mean scores are presented in Figure 1. 
3.4.4.3 Affiliation. No significant differences were found between men and 
women on their Affiliation scores; F (1, 64) = 0.57, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.21 to 
0.22; Table 8). There was also no significant difference found between offenders and 
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non-offenders on this construct; F (1, 64) = 10.77, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.47 to 
0.03). Finally, the interaction between sex and offence history on the Affiliation 
construct score was non-significant; F (1, 64) = 0.57, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.48 to 
0.21; Table 9).  
Similar findings were found once FSIQ was controlled. No significant 
differences were found between sex; F (1, 63) = 1.49, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.20 to 
0.21) or offence history; F (1, 63) = 5.35, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.39 to 0.15) nor was 
the interaction between sex and offence history significant; F (1, 63) = 1.51, p > .05 
(BCa 95% CI = -0.57 to 0.15; Table 10). Figure 1 presents adjusted mean scores.  
3.4.4.4 Life. A significant difference was found between offenders and non-
offenders’ Life scores; F (1, 62) = 11.84, p < .01 (BCa 95% CI = -0.91 to -0.23; Table 
8), with offenders having higher scores (stage 2(3) reasoning) than non-offenders (stage 
2 reasoning). There were no significant differences between men and women; F (1, 62) 
= 1.32, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.37 to 0.25; Table 8), nor was the interaction between 
sex and offence history on this construct significant; F (1, 62) = 2.83, p > .05 (BCa 95% 
CI = -0.08 to 0.83; Table 9). 
 Once FSIQ was controlled, a significant difference was found between offenders 
and non-offenders scores; F (1, 61) = 6.15, p < .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.74 to -0.12), with 
offenders having higher scores (stage 2(3) reasoning) than non-offenders (stage 2; Table 
10). No significant differences were found between the sexes; F (1, 61) = 0.45, p > .05 
(BCa 95% CI = -0.36 to 0.25), nor was the interaction between sex and offence history 
significant; F (1, 61) = 1.42, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -0.16 to 0.69). Adjusted means are 
displayed in Figure 1.  
3.4.5 Summary of construct findings. The second research question set out to 
explore whether there were significant differences between the groups, among any of 
  
98 
 
the individual construct scores. No significant differences were found between men and 
women, and the interaction between sex and offence history was not significant on any 
of the construct scores. Offenders however had significantly higher moral reasoning 
scores than non-offenders in six of the individual constructs; Contract, Truth, Life, 
Property, Law and Legal Justice. Offenders demonstrated stage 2(3) reasoning in the 
Contract, Life and Property constructs, compared to stage 2 reasoning demonstrated by 
non-offenders. Offenders also demonstrated stage 2(3) reasoning in the Legal Justice 
construct, compared to the non-offenders stage 2(1) reasoning. In the Law and Truth 
constructs, offenders demonstrated stage 2 reasoning whereas non-offenders 
demonstrated stages 2(1), and 2, respectively.   
 However as there was a positive relationship between intelligence and moral 
reasoning, illustrated both by this study and in the literature, controlling for intelligence 
was crucial. This allowed the analysis to partial out the effect of FSIQ on the SRM-SF. 
After FSIQ was controlled, only four constructs remained significantly different; 
Contract, Life, Property and Legal Justice. Offenders typically demonstrated stage 2(3) 
reasoning on the Contract, Life and Property constructs, whereas non-offenders 
demonstrated stage 2 reasoning. On the Legal Justice construct, offenders demonstrated 
stage 2 reasoning whereas non-offenders demonstrated stage 2(1) reasoning.  
Specific hypotheses regarding the Property (Hypothesis C), Law (Hypothesis D) 
and Legal Justice (Hypothesis E) constructs were made, predicting that offenders would 
have significantly higher scores than non-offenders. Hypothesis C and Hypothesis E 
were therefore supported, with offenders demonstrating significantly higher scores than 
non-offenders once FSIQ was controlled. No significant differences were found 
between the groups on the Law construct once FSIQ was controlled. Therefore 
Hypothesis D (Law) was not supported.  
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Without controlling FSIQ, offenders had significantly higher moral reasoning 
scores on the Law construct (stage 2), than non-offenders (stage 2(1) reasoning). 
However, by not controlling for intelligence, differences within the Law construct were 
likely to have been accounted for by differences in FSIQ.    
3.5 Research Question Three  
The third research question asked whether there was a relationship between 
moral reasoning and offence severity. 
3.5.1 Hypothesis F: Moral reasoning stage and offence severity will be 
positively correlated. As data were non-parametric and ranked, Spearman’s correlation 
coefficient was used to investigate this relationship. Two participants were excluded 
from analysis as their offences could not be scored according to Francis’ et al., (2001) 
paired-comparisons method (Appendix H). No significant relationship was found 
between total moral reasoning score and offence severity; rs = -.28, p > .05. Therefore 
Hypothesis F was not supported.  
As offence severity rankings were not significantly different across men and 
women, sex was not likely to have impacted on  the finding that moral reasoning score 
and offence severity were not significantly related.  
3.6 Research Question Four  
The final research question set out to examine the relationship between moral 
reasoning score, and the presence of emotional and behavioural problems. Two 
hypotheses were made (Hypothesis G & H), which are addressed in turn. 
To explore the relationship between the total SRM-SF score and emotional and 
behavioural problems, three separate scores from the EPS were used. The ‘Total 
Pathology’ score was used from the EPS-SRI, along with the ‘Externalising Behaviour 
Problems’ score and the ‘Internalising Behaviour Problems’ score from the EPS-BRS.  
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Mean scores for the individual subscales on the EPS-SRI and the EPS-BRS are 
presented in Table 11 and Table 12, respectively.  
3.6.1 Hypothesis G: Offender groups will score higher in emotional and 
behavioural problems than non-offenders. ANOVA was used to compare the 
emotional and behavioural problem mean scores. Once again, bootstrapping with 5000 
samples was used, and BCa confidence intervals calculated at the 95% level. Regarding 
the EPS-SRI, no significant differences were found between men and women on their 
total pathology score; F (1, 64) = 0.08, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -16.17 to 22.99; Table 
13). There were also no significant differences found between offenders and  
 
Table 11. 
Mean and standard deviation scores on the EPS-SRI for the four study groups 
EPS-SRI: 
Mean (SD) 
 
Offender 
Male 
(n = 17) 
 
Offender 
Female  
(n = 17) 
 
Non-offender  
Male 
(n = 17) 
Non-offender  
Female 
(n = 17) 
 
Total Pathology 
 
 
61.41 (30.67) 
 
58.00 (25.82) 
 
34.71 (20.02) 
 
41.82 (29.63) 
Positive 
Impression 
 
   5.88  (3.81)      6.29   (2.85)      7.41   (2.60)      7.88   (2.76) 
Thought/ 
Behaviour 
Disorder 
 
8.24   (6.57) 7.53   (5.66) 3.71   (3.46) 5.53   (4.65) 
Impulse Control 
 
15.00   (7.37) 15.41   (7.85) 8.76   (6.08) 11.53   (6.28) 
Anxiety 
 
14.47   (5.92) 13.88   (5.37) 11.18   (4.23) 10.76   (8.00) 
Depression 
 
14.65   (9.14) 13.24   (7.00) 6.06   (5.66) 8.59   (8.57) 
Low Self-
esteem 
 
9.06   (5.02) 7.94   (4.41) 5.00   (3.86) 5.41   (4.57) 
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Table 12. 
Mean and standard deviation scores on the EPS-BRS for the four study groups 
EPS-BRS: 
Mean (SD) 
Offender Male 
 
(n = 10) 
Offender 
Female 
(n = 17) 
Non-offender  
Male 
(n = 6) 
Non-offender  
Female 
(n = 11) 
 
Externalising 
Behaviour 
Problem  
 
 
34.90  (24.30) 
 
56.24  (28.37) 
 
27.00  (18.71) 
 
29.91  (21.23) 
Internalising 
Behaviour 
Problem  
 
32.60  (27.54) 52.76  (23.86) 30.33  (13.74) 28.18  (22.19) 
Physical 
Aggression 
 
    4.20    (4.10) 10.18    (8.92)    1.17    (1.17) 3.00    (2.10) 
Verbal 
Aggression 
 
6.60    (5.62) 11.29    (6.49) 3.17    (4.12) 5.55    (5.54) 
Non-compliance 
 
 
15.80  (11.70) 21.41    (9.67) 11.83    (8.18) 12.27    (8.82) 
Hyperactivity 8.30    (6.17)   13.35   (6.50)  10.83    (6.34) 9.09    (6.70) 
 
 
    
Depression 
 
 
Anxiety 
 
 
Self-esteem 
 
9.70    (9.01) 
  
 
10.40    (9.63) 
 
 
12.50  (10.46) 
16.65    (6.84) 
 
 
15.53    (7.02) 
 
 
20.59  (11.35) 
5.33    (3.50) 
 
 
15.50    (7.50) 
 
 
9.50    (5.75) 
6.00    (6.96) 
 
 
10.09    (7.60) 
 
 
12.09  (11.05) 
Thought/ 
Behaviour 
Disorder 
 
Sexual 
Maladjustment 
 
Distractibility 
 
 
Withdrawal 
 
Somatic 
Concerns 
 
13.30    (9.70) 
 
 
1.00    (2.83) 
 
 
9.80    (6.89) 
 
 
7.90    (8.76) 
 
7.50    (9.00) 
 
 
20.47  (11.94) 
 
 
4.53    (5.71) 
 
 
13.82    (6.65) 
 
 
12.65    (7.03) 
 
13.59    (8.61) 
 
 
11.33  (10.78) 
 
 
0.67    (1.21) 
 
 
14.33    (9.93) 
 
 
8.67  (10.58) 
 
10.00  (10.18) 
 
 
13.55    (7.26) 
 
 
0.27    (0.91) 
 
 
12.36    (7.46) 
 
 
6.36    (4.50) 
 
8.27    (7.51) 
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non-offenders on their total pathology score; F (1, 64) = 10.83, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI    
= -34.86 to 2.27), nor was the interaction between sex and offence history significant;   
F (1, 64) = 0.65, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI = -35.55 to 15.32). 
 Regarding the EPS-BRS, a significant difference was found between men and 
women on the externalising behaviour problem score; F (1, 40) = 2.31, p < .05 (BCa 
95% CI = -40.20 to -2.31; Table 13), with women scoring higher than men. There was 
also a significant difference between offenders and non-offenders on their externalising 
behaviour problem score; F (1, 40) = 4.60, p < .01 (BCa 95% CI = -43.44 to -8.80), 
with offenders scoring higher than non-offenders. The interaction between sex and 
offence history on this score was not significant; F (1, 40) = 1.33, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI 
= -9.89 to 47.49). However, only 44 participant’s data was available for this measure.  
 
Table 13. 
Comparing offenders with non-offenders, and men with women on the mean and 
standard deviation scores on the EPS 
EPS: 
Mean (SD) 
 
Offender Group 
 
Non-Offender 
Group 
 
Men 
 
Women 
 
 
 
Total 
Pathology 
 
 
n = 34 
 
59.71 (27.97) 
n = 34 
 
38.26 (25.16) 
n = 34 
 
48.06 (28.88) 
n = 34 
 
49.91 (28.57) 
 
 
 
 
Externalising 
Behaviour 
Problem  
 
 
n = 27 
 
48.33 (28.46)** 
n = 17 
 
28.88 (19.83) 
 
n = 16 
 
31.94 (22.06) 
 
  
n = 28 
 
45.89 (28.56)* 
 
 
Internalising 
Behaviour 
Problem  
 
45.30 (26.67)** 
 
28.94 (19.18) 
 
31.75 (22.79) 
 
43.11 (25.87)* 
     
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
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For the internalising behaviour problem score, a significant difference was found 
between men and women; F (1, 40) = 1.43, p < .05 (BCa 95% CI = -38.64 to -0.43; 
Table 13), with women scoring higher than men. A significant difference was also 
found between offenders and non-offenders; F (1, 40) = 3.18, p < .01 (BCa 95% CI      
= -40.60 to -6.89), with offenders scoring significantly higher than non-offenders. 
Finally, the interaction between sex and offence history on participants’ internalising 
behaviour problem score was non-significant; F (1, 40) = 2.19, p > .05 (BCa 95% CI    
= -5.48 to 48.01). Once more, it must be noted that only 44 participant’s data was 
available for this measure, so caution must be applied when interpreting these findings. 
3.6.2 Hypothesis H: Moral reasoning stage and the level of emotional and 
behavioural problems experienced will be positively correlated. Pearson’s 
Correlation coefficient was used to measure the correlations between the total SRM-SF 
and the total pathology, and externalising behaviour problems as data were normally 
distributed. Spearman’s rho was used to measure correlations between total SRM-SF 
and internalising behaviour problems score as data were non-normally distributed. Data 
was available for 68 participants total pathology scores, however only 44 participants 
had externalising and internalising behaviour problems scores. Scores will be discussed 
in turn.  
3.6.2.1 Total pathology. A significant positive relationship was found between 
total pathology score and total moral reasoning score, r =.32, p < .01. Therefore the 
higher a participant’s total pathology score on the self reported EPS-SRI, the higher 
their SRM-SF score.  
3.6.2.2 Externalising behaviour problems. A significant positive relationship 
was found between participants’ externalising behaviour problem scores and total moral 
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reasoning scores, r =.31, p < .05. Therefore the higher a participant’s externalising 
score on the informant based EPS-BRS, the higher their SRM-SF score.   
 3.6.2.3 Internalising behaviour problems. A significant positive relationship 
was found between participants’ internalising behaviour problem scores and total moral 
reasoning scores, rs =.36, p < .01. Therefore the higher a participant’s internalising 
score, the higher their SRM-SF score.  
3.6.2.4 Additional findings. A significant relationship was found between the 
total pathology score, and both the externalising (r =.26, p < .05) and internalising 
behaviour problem scores (rs =.36, p < .01). Therefore, high total pathology scores 
obtained on the self-report measure were positively correlated with high internalising or 
externalising scores obtained on the informant-completed measure.  
The relationship between externalising and internalising behaviour problem 
scores was highly significant. Therefore, participant’s who scored highly on one scale, 
scored highly on the other scale; rs =.71, p < .001. 
3.6.3 Emotional and behavioural problems summary. It was hypothesised 
that offenders would have higher levels of emotional and behavioural problems than the 
non-offenders (Hypothesis G). The descriptive data at the start of this chapter 
demonstrated that offenders self-reported significantly more mental health problems 
than non-offenders; χ2 (3) = 19.804, p < .001. Nevertheless, no significant differences 
were found between offenders and non-offenders on their total pathology score.  
 There was however, a significant difference between offenders and non-
offenders on both their internalising behaviour score and externalising behaviour 
problem scores. Offenders scored higher rates than non-offenders on both scales. 
Therefore, Hypothesis G was partially supported. However, the participant numbers 
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varied between these, so caution needs to be applied when interpreting the internalising 
and externalising score findings. 
It was also hypothesised that moral reasoning and the level of emotional and 
behavioural problems would be positively correlated (Hypothesis H). This was 
demonstrated through significant positive relationships found between the total moral 
reasoning score and participant’s total pathology, externalising behaviour problem, and 
internalising behaviour problem score. Hypothesis H was therefore supported.  
3.7 Summary of Findings 
 Once FSIQ was controlled, offenders with ID were found to have significantly 
higher total moral reasoning scores than non-offenders, with offender’s typically 
demonstrating stage 2(3) and non-offenders demonstrating stage 2 reasoning. 
Hypothesis A was therefore supported. No significant differences were found between 
men and women, nor was the interaction between sex and offence history significant. 
Hypothesis B was therefore not supported. 
Regarding the individual SRM-SF constructs, no significant sex differences 
were found, nor was the interaction between sex and offence history significant. 
Offenders however had significantly higher moral reasoning scores than non-offenders 
in six constructs; Contract, Truth, Life, Property, Law and Legal Justice. Once FSIQ 
was controlled, four constructs remained significantly different; Contract, Life, Property 
and Legal Justice, with offenders reasoning at stage 2(3) compared to non-offenders 
stage 2 reasoning in the Contract, Life and Property constructs. Regarding Legal Justice, 
offenders demonstrated stage 2 reasoning, whereas non-offenders reasoned at stage 
2(1). Therefore, once FSIQ was controlled, Hypothesis C (Property) and Hypothesis E 
(Legal Justice) were supported; however Hypothesis D (Law) was not supported.  
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In relation to Hypothesis F, no significant relationship was found between total 
moral reasoning score and offence severity. Hypothesis F was therefore not supported. 
Offenders scored significantly higher than non-offenders in their levels of internalising 
and externalising behavioural problems. In contrast, no significant differences were 
found between offenders and non-offenders in their total pathology scores. This resulted 
in Hypothesis G being partially supported. Finally, a positive relationship was found 
between moral reasoning score and level of emotional and behavioural problems 
experienced, providing support for Hypothesis H.  
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Chapter Four – Discussion 
 
4.1 Overview of Chapter 
 The following chapter initially examines the findings from the study in relation 
to the specified research questions and hypotheses, and links these to the literature. 
Theoretical and clinical implications of the study are presented in turn, followed by a 
methodological critique of the study. Suggestions for future research studies are then 
presented and the chapter is closed with an overall study summary.  
4.2 Summary of Study Hypotheses and Results. 
 The research questions and the subsequent study hypotheses will be considered 
in turn, in relation to the study’s findings. 
 4.2.1 Research question one. Are there significant differences in moral 
reasoning scores between men and women with mild ID who have offended, compared 
to men and women with mild ID who have no offence history? 
4.2.1.1 Hypothesis A: Offenders will have higher moral reasoning scores than 
non-offenders. Based on previous research, this study predicted that adults with ID who 
had a history of offending would have higher scores on a measure of moral reasoning 
than adults with ID and no history of offending. Statistical analysis provided support for 
this hypothesis, finding offenders had significantly higher moral reasoning scores than 
non-offenders, placing them at a more mature level. On average, offenders 
demonstrated stage 2(3) reasoning whereas non-offenders demonstrated stage 2 
reasoning. These significant moral reasoning differences remained once FSIQ was 
controlled, therefore differences were not accounted for by intelligence.  
 This finding from the current study supports previous research in this area by 
Langdon et al. (2011b). However, although Langdon et al. (2011b) found that offenders 
had higher moral reasoning scores than non offenders, both groups demonstrated stage 2 
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reasoning. Offenders’ scores fell on average, at the top end of stage 2, with non-
offenders scoring at the lower end of this range. The current research study however 
demonstrated that offenders showed stage 2(3) reasoning, whereas non-offenders 
reasoned at stage 2.  
 Langdon et al. (2011a) proposed that the relationship between moral reasoning 
and anti-social behaviour is moderated by intelligence, forming an inverted ‘U’ shape. 
They suggested that non-offenders with ID are more likely to demonstrate immature 
levels of moral reasoning, typically making decisions based on authority and rules. This 
therefore predicts that the lowest levels of moral reasoning act as a protective factor 
against offending behaviour. Stage 2 reasoning, which is typically characterised by 
egocentric thinking and concerned with meeting one’s own needs, has therefore been 
suggested to result in increased levels of disruptive (Langdon et al., 2011a) and 
delinquent behaviour (Blasi, 1980). However it was stage 2 reasoning that the non-
offenders in the current research study evidenced reasoning at. 
 In this study, offenders on average reasoned at stage 2(3), where responses blend 
aspects of stage 2 and stage 3 reasoning. This transitional stage reasoning typically 
represents perspective taking that is instrumentally oriented, less pragmatic and is 
hypothetical in nature, for example “your friend would help you”. It does not 
demonstrate the truly mutual, interpersonal perspective that stage 3 reasoning does 
(Gibbs et al., 1992). It is also at this stage that someone’s conscience is first considered. 
However conscience is seen as external to the individual and as an annoyance, for 
example if you steal then “your conscience would bother you”.  
It is not until stage 3 reasoning that moral reasoning is based on maintaining 
relationships rather than egocentricity, which Langdon et al. (2011a) linked to a 
reduction in offending behaviour. Regarding the inverted ‘U’ shape curve presented by 
  
109 
 
Langdon et al. (2011a) to illustrate the relationship between moral reasoning and 
offending behaviour (moderated by intelligence), it could be hypothesised that the 
transitional stage 2(3) may in-fact feature at the peak of this curve as it represents the 
middle stage of moral development, and therefore may result in the highest levels of 
illegal behaviour.  
An alternative hypothesis to be considered, however, could be that the offender 
population may have received some type of group-intervention since being in custody. 
As a consequence this may have enhanced an individual’s moral reasoning abilities, 
through building their skills in perspective taking. Moral reasoning would need to be 
assessed prior to the individual receiving any treatment intervention to gain a clear 
understanding of whether it had had an impact. Only recruiting people who had not 
received any intervention prior to the study would be near impossible to implement, and 
beyond the scope of this study.  However, treatment exposure could have been 
documented in the study and whilst it would not have been possible to have controlled 
for this, it may have helped to account for potential group differences.  
Despite findings being slightly different to Langdon et al.’s (2011b) findings 
regarding moral stages observed, both studies found that offenders demonstrated 
significantly more mature reasoning than the non-offenders. In a more recent study by 
Langdon et al. (in press), individuals levels of moral reasoning were measured before 
and after administration of the EQUIP programme. Of the seven male participants, only 
three had diagnosed mild ID, so their findings alone were reflected upon. Two 
participants demonstrated stage 2(3) reasoning before the intervention programme, of 
which, one increased to stage 3(2), and the other to stage 3 reasoning. The third 
participant demonstrated stage 3 reasoning both before and after the 12-week group.  
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Finally, both the current study and that of Langdon et al. (2011b) used 
convenience sampling to recruit participants. The slight observed differences in stages 
may have therefore been the result of differences within the samples. Overall, the 
findings of the current study are similar to those of Langdon et al.’s (in press) study, and 
support previous findings by Langdon et al. (2011b), with offenders engaging in more 
mature moral reasoning than  non-offenders. Hypothesis A was therefore accepted.  
4.2.1.2 Hypothesis B: There will be no significant differences between men 
and women in moral reasoning scores. Following a review of the literature, it was 
predicted that no significant differences between men and women in their level of moral 
reasoning would be found in this study. Sex differences in moral reasoning abilities 
have long been debated, with Gilligan (1982) criticising early models of moral 
reasoning (e.g. Kohlberg, 1976) for discriminating against women. Gilligan stated that 
women tend to adopt a ‘care-oriented’ approach to decision making, compared to the 
‘justice oriented’ approach adopted by men. She argued that using stage models 
automatically assigned women to a less mature level of moral reasoning, as a result of 
their care-orientation.  
Gilligan’s claims have received some support by the literature (e.g. Ford & 
Lowery, 1986; Yacker & Weinberg, 1990), but have also been contested (e.g. Rothbart 
et al., 1986; Walker, 1984). Other studies (e.g. Duckett et al., 1997; Self et al., 1988) 
have countered her research, finding women reasoning at more mature levels of moral 
development than men. Exploration of sex differences in moral reasoning within the ID 
literature also failed to evidence significant differences, however due to limitations, 
findings should be interpreted cautiously. As previously described, many of these 
studies failed to use moral reasoning measures that were standardised for the ID 
population. They typically recruited small samples and did not match their study 
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groups. There was no basis therefore for the researcher to make specific hypotheses 
regarding sex differences in moral reasoning, in this study.   
Statistical analysis within the current study found no significant differences 
between men and women with ID in their level of moral reasoning. This finding 
remained once FSIQ was controlled, and was irrespective of whether individuals had a 
history of offending or not. It therefore provides support for the argument that clear sex 
differences do not exist in moral reasoning abilities, countering Gilligan’s claims 
(Gilligan, 1982).  Hypothesis B was therefore accepted. 
 4.2.2 Research question two: Are there significant differences in any of the 
moral reasoning construct scores between the groups? 
4.2.2.1 Hypothesis C: The offender groups will have higher scores on the 
Property construct than the non-offenders. In line with the research carried out on 
adult males with ID (Langdon et al., 2011b), it was predicted that offenders would have 
higher scores on the Property construct than non-offenders. Langdon et al. (2011b) 
found that male offenders demonstrated stage 2 reasoning on this construct, whereas 
non-offenders demonstrated stage 1(2). The latter group were therefore concerned more 
with avoiding punishment and obeying authority.  
This hypothesis was supported by the current study, with offenders having 
significantly higher scores than non-offenders on this construct. However, in contrast to 
findings by Langdon et al. (2011b), offenders in this study demonstrated stage 2(3) 
reasoning, whereas non-offenders demonstrated stage 2 reasoning; reasoning dominated 
by exchanging and instrumental reciprocity.  
When the stage score ranges are inspected (see Table 6), it can be seen that stage 
2 scores range between 175 and 225. In the current study, the adjusted mean score for 
the offender group on the Property construct was 229.30, which was reasonably close to 
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the top end of stage 2 cut-off (Table 10). In addition, the mean score for non-offenders 
was 176.80, close to the bottom end of stage 2. Although these findings for the Property 
construct were therefore higher than those found by Langdon et al. (2011b), they were 
consistent with the overall moral reasoning stage scores found by this study, illustrated 
in research question one. Once again, although specific stages of moral reasoning were 
not identical to those found by Langdon et al. (2011b), both studies found that the 
offenders demonstrated significantly more mature moral reasoning than the non-
offenders, once FSIQ was controlled. Hypothesis C was therefore supported. 
4.2.2.2 Hypothesis D: The offender groups will have higher scores on the Law 
construct than the non-offenders.  Once again, from drawing on the research by 
Langdon et al., (2011b), it was hypothesised that offenders would score higher on the 
Law construct than the non-offenders. In Langdon’s study (2011b), offenders reasoned 
at stage 2, whereas non-offenders reasoned at stage 1. In the current study, offenders 
mean score on the Law construct fell within stage 2 reasoning, whereas non-offenders 
reasoned at stage 2(1). Differences, despite disappearing once FSIQ was controlled, 
were quite large between the groups, with offenders scoring a mean of 199.7, compared 
to the non-offenders mean score of 170.6 (Table 10).  
The non-offenders lower levels of moral reasoning in this construct, stage 2(1), 
may have been driven by individuals wanting to obey authority figures, the law and 
avoiding punishment, resulting in the absence of any offending behaviours. 
Interestingly, the offenders in this study demonstrated their greatest delay in moral 
reasoning in this construct, which supports Gibbs’ finding among young offenders 
(Gibbs, 2010). However, as scores were not significantly different between the groups, 
Hypothesis D was not supported.  
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4.2.2.3 Hypothesis E: The offender groups will have higher scores on the 
Legal Justice construct than the non-offenders. Drawing again on Langdon et al.’s 
research (2011b), it was predicted that offenders would demonstrate more mature moral 
reasoning in the Legal Justice construct than non-offenders. The offenders in their study 
demonstrated stage 2 reasoning, whereas the non-offenders demonstrated stage 2(1) 
reasoning.  
The findings from the current research study supported this hypothesis, with 
offenders reasoning at a more mature level, stage 2, than non-offenders (stage 2(1); 
Table 10), and were comparable to those of Langdon et al.’s (2011b) study. The non-
offenders demonstrated lower levels of moral reasoning in this construct, which once 
again, may have been driven by wanting to avoid punishment and obey authority, 
resulting in the absence of offending behaviours.    
A closer look at how the three offenders reasoned on this construct (pre-
treatment) in Langdon et al.’s study (in press), revealed that two men scored 250, 
placing them just into the 3(2) range, whereas the third demonstrated stage 2 reasoning. 
Post-treatment, these men demonstrated stage 2, stage 3 and stage 3(2) reasoning, 
respectively. These scores are higher than the average scores presented by Langdon et 
al. (2011b). Scores in the current study on this construct were therefore reasonably 
consistent with the literature, and support Langdon et al.’s (2011b) finding that 
offenders demonstrate more mature reasoning than non-offenders. As a result 
Hypothesis E was supported.  
4.2.2.4 Additional findings. No specific hypotheses were made regarding the 
remaining four constructs; Contract, Truth, Affiliation and Life, as significant 
differences between the groups in the study by Langdon et al. (2011b) had not been as 
pronounced as on the three constructs discussed above. Furthermore, these constructs 
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were not linked to offending behaviour in the literature, so played less of a focus in the 
current study.  
 Although specific hypotheses were not made, findings were still inspected in 
the current study. After controlling for FSIQ, offenders were found to have more mature 
moral reasoning scores than non-offenders in the Contract and Life constructs. In both 
constructs, offenders engaged in stage 2(3) reasoning, whereas non-offenders engaged 
in stage 2 reasoning. No significant differences were found between groups on the 
remaining two constructs.  
Similar findings were identified in the Langdon et al. (2011b) study. They too 
found significant differences between offenders and non-offenders in the Contract and 
Life constructs, but not the Truth or Affiliation constructs. In both of the significantly 
different constructs, offenders demonstrated more mature stage 2(3) reasoning, than the 
stage 2 reasoning demonstrated by non-offenders. The findings from the current 
research study therefore support previous findings by Langdon, increasing the reader’s 
confidence in both studies.  
 4.2.3 Research question three: Is there a relationship between moral reasoning 
stage and offence severity? 
4.2.3.1 Hypothesis F: Moral reasoning stage and offence severity will be 
positively correlated. This hypothesis was made as previous research had indicated that 
moral reasoning tended to be higher in adults with ID who had offended, than non-
offenders with ID (Langdon et al., 2011b). Palmer (2003) suggested that offending 
behaviour can be justified at any stage of moral development. Although justifiable at 
any stage, antisocial behaviour has been typically characterised by stage 2 reasoning, 
where people prioritise their own needs (Palmer, 2003; Tarry & Emler, 2007). It was 
therefore hypothesised in the current study that an individual who commits a more 
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severe offence, may require slightly more enhanced skills to justify their behaviour, 
therefore demonstrating a more mature level of moral reasoning. In contrast, an offender 
who committed a less severe offence would require less cognitive skill to justify their 
behaviour, and therefore could feature at a less mature stage of moral development.  
Statistical analysis did not reveal a significant relationship between total moral 
reasoning score and offence severity in the current study. As a consequence, this 
hypothesis was not supported. It is possible however that statistical significance was not 
picked up due to an inadequate sample size. As documented in the method section, to 
achieve an appropriate level of power, 47 participants were required for correlational 
analysis. For this research question only offenders could be included, as it involved the 
severity of their offence. This therefore immediately reduced the sample by half, 
resulting in 34 participants’ data being available for analysis. A further two participants 
were excluded as their offences could not be scored according to Francis’ et al., (2001) 
paired-comparisons method (Appendix H). Although Hypothesis F was therefore not 
supported, this finding needs to be interpreted cautiously due to the sample size not 
being large enough for appropriate statistical analysis.  
Irrespective of the sample size, it is possible that offence severity and moral 
reasoning score are not in-fact linked, and that offending can be justified at any stage, 
regardless of the offence nature. Langdon et al., (2011b) recorded information on 
participants’ offences and ranked them in order of severity. They compared offence 
severity of the ID-offenders with the comparison-offenders (non-ID), finding no 
significant differences. However they did not analyse the data further or explore the 
relationship with moral development. No research studies have looked at the impact of 
offence severity on the moral reasoning abilities of adults with ID, so it is difficult to 
draw inferences from the findings of the current study, to this area. 
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There may have also been limitations in establishing offence severity in this 
study. A severity score was allocated using data drawn from Francis’ et al.’s (2001) 
study. They looked at offenders who received convictions for pairs of offences at one 
time point, and examined how judges deemed the severity of each offence (e.g. the tariff 
length given for each offence). However this method may have been flawed if the 
offender had previous convictions for one of the pair and not the other, as this may have 
influenced the ratings the judge gave. It is not clear therefore how satisfactory this 
method was at determining offence severity in the current sample. 
4.2.4 Research question four: Is there a relationship between moral reasoning 
stage and emotional and behavioural problems? 
4.2.4.1 Hypothesis G: Offender groups will score higher in emotional and 
behavioural problems than non-offenders. There is a wealth of literature that links 
emotional and behavioural difficulties to offending behaviour. Poor coping strategies 
(Holland, 2004) and mental health difficulties (Murphy et al., 1991) have been 
suggested to predict later involvement with the criminal justice system. Similarly, rates 
of mental illness in offenders with ID have been reported as high, which Barron et al. 
(2002) suggests act as a significant contributor to offending behaviour. It was therefore 
hypothesised that offenders would score higher levels of emotional and behavioural 
problems than non-offenders.  
The descriptive data demonstrated that offenders self-reported significantly more 
mental health problems than non-offenders, which considering the literature above, was 
expected. However this information was self-reported, and inspection into types and 
prevalence rates of different mental health difficulties was not reported.  
Three scores from the EPS were used to look at emotional and behaviour 
problems; the total pathology score (EPS-SRI), and the externalising and internalising 
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behaviour problem scores (EPS-BRS). The internalising behaviour score was 
significantly higher in offenders than non-offenders. This finding was expected, as it 
incorporates scores from the depression, anxiety and self-esteem subscales. As 
previously stated, rates of mental health difficulties are typically higher in offender 
populations than non-offenders (Barron et al., 2002), which was supported by the self-
reported demographic information in the current study.  
Offenders were also found to score significantly higher on the externalising 
behaviour problem score than non-offenders, again a finding that was expected. 
Individuals who act out their feelings tend to have high externalising behaviour problem 
scores. It was no surprise therefore that offenders scored significantly higher on this 
scale, as it is often some type of ‘acting-out’ that resulted in their offending and 
subsequent detainment. Acting out in terms of aggression, self-mutilation or attempted 
suicide, have been identified as common reasons why women are referred to secure 
hospitals (Lindsay et al., 2006). Therefore, as predicted, externalising scores were 
markedly higher amongst the offender groups. 
Interestingly, women scored significantly higher rates of both internalising and 
externalising behaviour problems than men, which may reflect the findings of Lindsay 
et al. presented above (2006). It could be that the women generally expressed higher 
rates of these behaviours, or alternatively, it could be due to differences in scoring. An 
informant was asked to rate the participants on these scales, however these informants 
changed each time. Therefore, two informants may have rated the same behaviour quite 
differently. From this study’s findings, it is impossible to establish the true cause of why 
women scored higher than men.  
It must be noted that for the internalising and externalising scores, analysis was 
conducted on a small sample. The power calculation presented in the method section 
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illustrated that 68 participants were required to achieve sufficient power. However for 
these two scales, only data for 44 participants was received. Sufficient power was 
therefore not achieved, so these findings should be interpreted cautiously.  
No significant differences were found between the four groups on total 
pathology scores. Further inspection of the findings (Table 13) revealed that the 
offenders scored considerably higher than non-offenders on this scale, however this 
difference remained non-significant. Men and women’s scores on this scale were 
comparable, with little difference between them. Findings from this scale are stronger as 
a full data-set was available, which enabled sufficient power to be achieved.  
However this data relied on self-reported information which may have reflected 
the type of day or mood state that the participant was having, at the time of completion. 
To minimise risk, the offenders were ‘mood assessed’ by a nurse prior to engaging in 
the study. It was unlikely therefore that they would have participated had they been in a 
negative mood state. This self-report measure may therefore have captured some ‘false 
positive’ scores amongst these participants, rather than reflect their general feelings on 
an average day. Self-reported data can also be affected by participants aiming to please 
the experimenter by responding with what they believe is the desired answer, limiting 
the usefulness of such data.  
Hypothesis G was therefore partially supported, with offenders scoring higher 
on externalising and internalising problem scores than non-offenders. However 
significant differences were not detected on the self-reported total pathology scores. 
Caution needs to be applied when interpreting these findings due to the small number of 
participants who had data available.  
4.2.4.2 Hypothesis H: Moral reasoning stage and the level of emotional and 
behavioural problems experienced will be positively correlated. Based on the literature 
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presented to support Hypothesis G, it was hypothesised that emotional and behavioural 
problems (using total pathology, externalising, and internalising behaviour problems 
scores), would be positively correlated with total SRM-SF scores.  
A significant positive relationship was found between participants’ total 
pathology score and total SRM-SF score, between participants’ externalising behaviour 
problem score and total SRM-SF score, and between participants’ internalising 
behaviour problem score and total SRM-SF score. Therefore scoring highly on the EPS 
was associated with greater moral maturity. This was predicted, as offenders with ID 
have been shown to have greater moral maturity than non-offenders with ID (Langdon 
et. al., 2011a; 2011b), and offenders have been found to express higher levels of 
emotional (Barron et al. 2002) and behavioural problems, such as aggression (Taylor, 
Novaco, Gillmer & Thorne, 2002) than non-offenders. Hypothesis H was therefore 
supported. 
However, 47 participants were required to achieve sufficient power for 
correlational design. This was achieved for the total pathology score as a full EPS-SRI 
data set was obtained (N = 68). However, only 44 participants had completed EPS-BRS 
data, falling just below the required number. Therefore the correlations between moral 
reasoning score and both the internalising and externalising behaviour scores, need to be 
interpreted with caution.   
The relationship between the total pathology score, and both externalising and 
internalising behaviour problem scores, were positively correlated. Externalising and 
internalising scores were highly correlated with one another. These scores were 
desirable, and expected, however were once again let down by the sample size.  
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4.3 Theoretical Implications.  
The following section will present a general discussion of the main theoretical 
implications of the current research study. As discussed, a clear link between cognitive 
and moral development has been established in the literature, with individuals who 
demonstrate advanced development in one typically demonstrating advanced skills in 
the other. Despite this, less research into moral development has been conducted 
amongst the ID population, and much of the existing research in this field focuses on 
children and adolescents with ID.  
A relationship between moral reasoning and anti-social behaviour has also been 
established in the literature (e.g. Nelson et al., 1990; Stams et al., 2006), with offenders 
in the general population typically demonstrating less mature moral development than 
non-offenders. Low IQ has also been identified as a risk factor for offending behaviour 
(Koenen et al., 2006; White et al., 1989), in both males and females. Therefore there 
was a clear theoretical rationale to investigate and understand more about the roles that 
moral reasoning and anti-social behaviour play within the ID population, where less is 
known.  
Langdon et al. (2011b) recently explored the impact of moral development and 
offence history on adults with ID. However his research was restricted to men. 
Therefore the findings from the current study have substantial theoretical implications, 
as no published research has looked at the impact of sex and offence history, on the 
moral development of adults with ID. Including adult women in this study, along with 
recruiting a male sample to compare the women to, was both clinically interesting and 
theoretically exciting, as has not previously been researched.  
Several important theoretical implications require discussion. Firstly the current 
study supports the use of the SRM-SF measure with the ID population. Langdon et al. 
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(2010b) recommended its use with adults with ID following their exploration of its 
psychometric properties, which they found to be satisfactory when used with men with 
ID. The questions were read out loud to participants in the current study, and often 
required repetition to ensure they were adequately heard and understood. All of the 
participants gave scorable responses to at least seven questions, which was a 
requirement in order to be included in the analysis. Therefore no participant failed to 
provide enough scorable responses to warrant exclusion. This supports the use of this 
measure with people with ID. They clearly understood it well enough to enable it to be 
used correctly and accurately.  
There was one question however that was excluded from analysis more often 
than the other 10 questions. The question “How important is it to live, even if that 
person doesn’t want to?” caused the most confusion, or was answered, but the 
participants’ response was not scorable. This was also found by Langdon et al. (2010b). 
It may be useful therefore if this question could be re-phrased in a revised version of the 
SRM-SF, to ensure a greater number of people understand what they are being asked.  
The second theoretically important finding from this study is the difference 
between offenders and non-offenders in their moral reasoning abilities. These should be 
considered in relation to Langdon et al.’s (2010b; 2011b) recent research studies. Using 
Gibbs’ Sociomoral Stage Theory of moral development (Gibbs et al., 1992), the current 
study found offenders had significantly higher moral reasoning than non-offenders. 
Offenders with ID typically scored at the transitional stage 2(3) of reasoning, compared 
to stage 2 reasoning demonstrated by non-offenders. These remained once FSIQ was 
controlled. This supports previous findings by Langdon et al. (2010b; 2011b), who 
found that offenders with ID engaged in significantly more mature moral reasoning than 
non-offenders.  
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Studies however differed somewhat in the actual reasoning stages.  In his study 
that recruited offenders and non-offenders with ID, Langdon et al. (2011b) found both 
groups reasoned at stage 2. Although within the same stage, offenders were still found 
to have significantly higher total scores than the non-offenders. Within the current 
study, the offenders reasoned at stage 2(3), whereas non-offenders reasoned at stage 2. 
However, approximately equal gaps between offenders and non-offenders existed in 
both studies. 
 There are many potential reasons for the slight differences in the moral 
reasoning scores found between the current study and Langdon et al.’s (2011b) study. 
Samples in both studies were opportunistic, recruiting those participants who were 
available at the time of research and who fitted the inclusion criteria. It is likely 
therefore that there were differences between the samples recruited in the current study 
and Langdon et al.’s (2011b), including demographic differences such as age or FSIQ, 
differences in the number of offences, offence severity, length of stay in secure services, 
amount of treatment received and stage of treatment pathway. In addition, the current 
study recruited both men and women in the sample, compared to the male only sample 
in Langdon et al.’s study (2011b), which may have impacted on the differences in the 
scores.  
Along with two ID groups, Langdon et al. (2011b) included an offender and 
non-offender group in their study who did not have ID. The non-offender groups 
demonstrated both the lowest (ID group) and highest level of moral reasoning (non-ID 
group). They therefore proposed that the relationship between moral reasoning and anti-
social behaviour was moderated by intelligence, forming an inverted ‘U’ shape 
(Langdon et al., 2011a). According to this model, highest rates of offending behaviour 
are committed by those with borderline ID, who engage in the middle stages of moral 
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reasoning. In their research offenders typically engaged in the ‘tit-for-tat’ reasoning that 
underpins stage 2 reasoning (Langdon et al., 2011b).  
 The current study partially supported this model, with non-offenders evidencing 
less mature moral development than offenders, which is consistent with the theory. 
However it cannot fully support the model as adults without ID were not included in the 
study, so findings regarding individuals with greater intelligence were not obtained. 
Nevertheless, from reviewing the literature it appears well evidenced that offenders in 
the general population engage in less mature levels of moral development than non-
offenders. Therefore there is no reason to doubt that this is suggestive of an inverted ‘U’ 
shape curve.  
 No stage numbers feature on the hypothesised ‘U’ shape figure that Langdon et 
al. (2011a) proposed. The authors propose that the highest rates of illegal behaviour are 
displayed by those individuals who engage in the middle stages of moral reasoning, 
predominantly stage 2 reasoning, which has been supported by the literature (e.g. Gregg 
et al., 1994). In the current study offenders overall score fell within stage 2(3) 
reasoning. This represents the middle stage of moral development more accurately in 
terms of stage (see Table 6), so may in-fact feature at the peak of this curve, and 
therefore result in the highest levels of illegal behaviour. More research to investigate 
the relationship between illegal behaviour, moral reasoning and intelligence is required 
to further develop this model, and to define moral stages on the model itself.    
In the current study, the non-offenders demonstrated stage 2 reasoning overall, 
which according to theory would place them at high risk of offending. Offenders 
demonstrated stage 2(3) reasoning. This may be accounted for by differences between 
the groups on the individual constructs. The non-offenders demonstrated reasoning at 
earlier developmental stages on the Law and Legal Justice constructs, stage 2(1) 
  
124 
 
reasoning, and just over the stage 2 boundary on the Property construct. Langdon et al. 
(2011b) also found that non-offenders with ID demonstrated earlier developmental 
stages on these constructs, despite having an overall total score within stage 2 
reasoning. The findings in the current study therefore support the idea that it is the 
scores in these domains (Property, Law and Legal Justice) that may predict offending 
behaviour.  
Similarly to Langdon et al.’s study (2011b), the current study found that 
offenders with ID reasoned at a significantly higher level than non-offenders on the 
Property and Legal Justice construct. Although offenders had higher scores on the Law 
construct than non-offenders, these were not significantly different in this study, 
whereas Langdon et al. (2011b) found they were. Interestingly, in both studies these 
three constructs had the lowest scores for the non-offenders. This was consistent with 
the literature, as decision making in these areas is more typically driven by authority, 
rules, physical and punitive consequences in non-offenders (stage 1), whereas offenders 
typically base decisions on exchanges, own needs, preferences and advantages.  
Similarly, low scores on these constructs have been found in the non-ID 
literature (e.g. Gibbs, 2010; Palmer & Hollin, 1998). Antisocial youths show delay in 
every area of moral development (Gregg et al., 1994), however they have been found to 
show greatest delay in the Law domain (Gibbs, 2010). Gibbs described how non-
delinquent youths typically reason at stage 3 or stage 3(4), providing responses 
concerned with loss of trust. In contrast, delinquents’ responses tend to be significantly 
less developed in terms of moral reasoning, marked with concern for getting caught and 
going to prison. Palmer and Hollin (1998) compared male young offenders with male 
and female non-offenders, and found moral reasoning was poorer on constructs relating 
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to offending behaviour (Property and Law) in both offenders and non-offenders. The 
current study therefore supports what is already understood theoretically in this area.  
A further theoretical implication of the current study is the link between these 
findings and the literature that explores moral reasoning abilities of young offenders.  It 
has been suggested (Langdon et al., in press) that men with ID who have offended have 
a similar developmental delay in moral reasoning to young offenders. The offenders 
with ID in the current study had scores at the low end of the 2(3) stage of moral 
development. This is comparable to the moral ability levels of young offenders without 
ID, presented by the literature. Palmer and Hollin’s (1998) study found young offenders 
moral reasoning ranged between stages 2 and 3(2) across the constructs, compared to 
young non-offender males whose reasoning ranged between stages 3(2) and 3, and 
young non-offender females who reasoned at stage 3. Van Vugt et al. (2011a) found that 
juvenile sex-offenders without ID demonstrated moral reasoning at the transitional 
stages 2(3) and 3(2). As findings from the current study appear to be similar to those 
presented in the young offender literature, it is reasonable to expect that some of the 
interventions that are implemented with young offenders which draw on moral 
development theory, may be of benefit to adults with ID. This will be explored further 
in the clinical implications.  
A final important theoretical implication of the current study regards sex. This 
was the first study to explore moral reasoning and offending behaviour with adults with 
ID across both sexes. It therefore provides valuable information, significantly adding to 
the literature base in this area.  
The presence or absence of sex differences in individual’s moral reasoning 
abilities has been a debate in the literature for many years. Gilligan (1982) criticised 
early stage models of moral reasoning (e.g. Kohlberg, 1976), for discriminating against 
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women by de-valuing their care-oriented approach. Care typically featured at 
Kohlberg’s stage 3 reasoning, whereas decisions based on maintaining laws and societal 
rules, which Gilligan argued typically underpinned males moral decisions, featured 
within stage 4 reasoning. Gilligan also criticised the assessment of moral reasoning for 
being biased towards justice-orientation, therefore discriminating against females 
(Gilligan, 1982). 
Some studies have supported Gilligan’s argument (e.g. Yacker & Weinberg, 
1990), other studies have found no sex differences (e.g. Garrod et al., 1990, Walker, 
1984) whilst some studies have found females to demonstrate more mature reasoning 
than males (Duckett et al., 1997; Palmer & Hollin, 1998) countering her claims. Gregg 
et al. (1994) found that both offender and non-offender females displayed more 
advanced moral reasoning abilities than their male peers, even once age and verbal IQ 
were controlled.  
Overall in this study, no significant differences were found between men and 
women with ID in their moral development. The result remained once FSIQ was 
controlled, and offence status proved irrelevant. This study therefore provides support 
for the argument that men and women are not markedly different in their moral 
reasoning abilities. It adds weight to the research that counters Gilligan’s sex 
differences claims, and is the first study from the offender ID field to do so.   
This finding that sex differences in moral reasoning did not exist in adults with 
ID is important when considering the relationship between moral reasoning and anti-
social behaviour, which Langdon et al. (2011a) proposed is moderated by intelligence. 
Prior to the current study, this model could only be proposed for men, as research had 
not been conducted on women. As this study found no significant sex differences, it 
provides the crucial information that was required to enable such a model to be applied 
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to the general ID adult population, irrespective of an individual’s sex. This therefore, is 
a substantial theoretical implication, as it allows future research to start looking at adults 
with ID as a whole, rather than just apply the previously found theoretical implications 
from other studies, to men. 
It is vital that research aims to explore and understand more about the moral 
development of offenders with ID, as this will help to establish whether interventions 
that aim to enhance moral development abilities are successful (Van Vugt et al., 2011a). 
Although there have been a handful of studies conducted in recent years that explore 
moral development in young males and adult men with ID, very little remains known 
regarding the female ID forensic population. There is also no clear rationale as to why 
this client group remains so under-researched. This study aimed to start building the 
research base for the female ID group, by including both offender and non-offender 
female groups in the sample, and comparative male groups. It also addresses a 
limitation of previous studies (e.g. Langdon et al., 2011b) which did not include women 
in their sample. However, more research is required to enhance and develop further 
theoretical implications.   
4.4 Clinical Implications 
Results from this exploratory study suggest that the moral reasoning abilities of 
adults with mild ID are similar to those of young offenders, which has clear clinical 
implications regarding potential treatment. Young offenders have been described as 
having delayed moral reasoning (Gibbs, 2003; Taylor & Walker, 1997), which presents 
as a potentially suitable area for intervention. Young offenders have also shown poorer 
social skills and more cognitive distortions (Gibbs, 2003; Langdon et al., in press). 
Langdon et al. (2011a) suggested that individuals who demonstrate the highest 
and lowest stages of moral reasoning are the least likely to commit offences. It is 
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therefore important to think about methods of enhancing moral reasoning, for those who 
present with middle-stage reasoning and have already offended. According to cognitive-
developmental theory, moral reasoning can be enhanced through discussion with others  
who reason at higher moral development stages (Kohlberg & Mayer, 1972; Taylor & 
Walker, 1997) as the egocentric thinking that typically shapes immature reasoning, is 
challenged by more advanced peers (Palmer, 2003). This type of intervention has been 
utilised with both juvenile and adult offenders.  
Blatt and Kohlberg (1975) found that group discussion was effective in boosting 
offender’s moral reasoning stage, which has been supported by other studies (e.g. 
MacPhail, 1989; Rest & Navarez, 1994; Walker, 1988). Weekly large-group discussions 
of moral dilemmas were found to enhance moral reasoning in adolescent offenders 
(Arbuthnot & Gordon, 1986; Gibbs et al., 1984; Niles, 1986). Other studies found that 
once moral reasoning was enhanced, it led to a reduction in offending behaviour (Blasi, 
1980; Little et al., 1999; MacPhail, 1989); however such reduction was not always 
observed (Niles, 1986). Claypoole et al. (2000) found group dilemma discussions to be 
ineffective in enhancing moral development in male and female juvenile offenders. 
 Young offenders have been widely researched in this field. Despite appearing to 
be a comparable group to adult offenders with ID, and therefore findings having some 
relevance, it is important to consider treatment approaches that have been successfully 
implemented with individuals with ID. Considerably less research however has looked 
at enhancing the moral development abilities of adults with ID. One intervention 
programme that has been administered to adult males with ID, aiming to enhance moral 
development, was the EQUIP programme (Langdon et al., in press).  
EQUIP aims to reduce cognitive distortions, build social skills, and enhance 
moral development through perspective taking. These are achieved through group 
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settings which utilise moral dilemma discussions, social skills training and anger control 
techniques. EQUIP has been demonstrated to positively influence post-release 
behaviour amongst male juveniles (Gibbs et al., 1996). Langdon et al. (in press) 
delivered an adapted version of the EQUIP programme (Gibbs et. al., 1995; Gibbs et al., 
1996; Potter et al., 2001), to a group of seven adult men. Their findings appear 
promising for people with ID and other developmental disabilities, as participants 
demonstrated an increase in moral reasoning abilities, a reduction in cognitive 
distortions and enhancement of some problem-solving skills. 
Langdon et al. (in press) suggested that the EQUIP programme may be a 
suitable first treatment group for patients as they enter secure services. Skills learnt in 
this group, along with potentially increased moral reasoning, may provide a good 
foundation for offence-specific groups that might be offered at a later stage of their 
treatment pathway.   
However Langdon et al.’s (in press) findings need to be treated cautiously until a 
larger scale study replicates these findings. Their study was restricted due to a small 
sample size, and mixed participant group; with three participants having mild ID and 
four having no ID, but having Asperger Syndrome. This makes it difficult to generalise 
findings to the wider ID population, as results from only three participants can really be 
considered. Furthermore, failure to have a comparison control group limits the findings 
as it is not clear whether residing in a busy inpatient facility itself would provide some 
scope for encouraging perspective taking, building problem solving skills and 
enhancing social skills. This hypothesis could have been easily ruled out had seven 
other members from the same ward completed the measures at the same time point. A 
more accurate understanding of the impact of attending the EQUIP group would 
therefore have been established. 
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   Despite there only being three participants’ results that can be inspected, two 
participants’ moral reasoning improved. Prior to treatment the participants’ 
demonstrated stage 2(3), stage 3(2) and stage 2(3) reasoning. After attending 12 weeks 
of group treatment, participants’ demonstrated stage 3(2), stage 3(2) and stage 3 
reasoning, respectively. The latter of these demonstrated the biggest enhancement of 
moral reasoning.  
 Many interventions offered to inpatient offenders are group-based programmes. 
Both generic groups, such as problem-solving or emotional regulation groups, and 
offence-specific groups, such as fire-setting or substance misuse programmes can be 
offered to offenders. Often groups are adapted to enable effective delivery to the ID 
population, such as the Sex Offender Treatment Services Collaborative – Intellectual 
Disability (SOTSEC-ID) group, which has been shown to increase participants’ sexual 
knowledge and victim empathy, whilst reducing cognitive distortions (SOTSEC-ID; 
2010). Group treatment in general for adults with ID has the added benefit of 
encouraging perspective-taking and the development of social skills. Previous findings 
suggest that as a consequence of being in a group setting, it may enhance the moral 
reasoning skills of those who attend. This may occur regardless of the intervention 
focus. This is a clear advantage of offering group-based treatment as opposed to, or in 
addition to, individual treatment.  
In their research, Ashkar and Kenny (2007) found that individuals displayed 
offence-specific deficits in moral reasoning. They proposed that to enable interventions 
to be successful at reducing reoffending rates, offence-specific deficits require targeting. 
This could therefore be incorporated alongside Langdon et al.’s (in press) suggestions, 
potentially offering the EQUIP intervention to offenders to build skills and enhance 
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moral reasoning, followed by specific offence groups, to target and address these 
offence-specific deficits. 
As no significant sex differences in moral reasoning were found in the current 
study, it is likely that both men and women would benefit from intervention-
programmes to enhance moral reasoning skills. This has clinical implications as 
suggests that groups do not require tailoring to either sex, and can instead take more of a 
generic format. This may have attractive cost and time implications for services, as the 
same resources can be administered to multiple participant groups. If mixed sex groups 
are offered by services, it would mean that interventions such as the EQUIP programme 
could potentially be administered to both men and women with ID at the same time, as 
moral reasoning appears to be similar. 
 An alternative intervention could be to try and reduce moral reasoning amongst 
offenders, to see if a potential reduction would protect them against reoffending, in a 
similar way that it protects non-offenders from offending in the first place. This could 
potentially be initiated through encouraging more rule-based decision making.  
However, whether this would be successful at reducing reoffending behaviour is 
unclear, and resources may therefore be more suitably placed in trying to enhance moral 
development, where supporting evidence exists.   
In addition to IQ, there are other important influences to the development of 
moral reasoning. An individual’s environment plays a key role, and in particular an 
environment that involves interactions which enable exposure to social skill building 
can help to enhance and develop an individual’s moral reasoning abilities.  
A further consideration that should be made therefore regards improving staff 
understanding of moral development. The EQUIP programme as previously described, 
aims to enhance moral development through encouraging perspective taking, reducing 
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cognitive distortions and building social skills. If staff groups, particularly in forensic 
services, were aware of the roles these aspects play in moral development, then they 
may be increasingly likely to encourage these and model these appropriately. Helping 
offenders to perspective take and encouraging social skills would be particularly easy to 
build into the daily working of the ward. For this to be successful, it would be important 
for staff teams to understand the rationale for why enhancing moral development has 
advantages. This could be done through brief training explaining the stage models of 
moral development, such as Gibbs’ Sociomoral Stage Theory (Gibbs et al., 1992), and 
using Langdon et al.’s (2011a) proposed model of moral development and offending 
behaviour, moderated by IQ. This would hope to illustrate how enhancing moral 
reasoning may start to reduce reoffending, and subsequently act as a protective factor 
against offending.  
Moral reasoning theory has been successfully embedded into treatment 
programmes, such as EQUIP, with some promising results. Administering EQUIP has 
been shown to reduce recidivism and improve social skills in young offenders (Leeman, 
Gibbs & Fuller, 1993) and in boosting moral reasoning and social skills in ID offenders 
(Langdon, et al., in press). However other studies have found no reduction in recidivism 
in young offenders (Brugman & Bink, 2010).  
Despite the literature presenting mixed findings regarding whether enhancing 
moral reasoning directly causes a reduction in re-offending rates, by embedding moral 
reasoning principles into already existing treatment interventions, it may increases the 
chances of successfully reducing re-offending rates. This may be supplemented well by 
staff in secure services encouraging social skill building, problem solving abilities and 
encouraging offenders to take the perspectives of their peers on a daily basis. Training 
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staff, providing a clear rationale, and offering examples of how this could be weaved 
into their daily practice, would increase successful implementation of these.  
If staff discussed hypothetical dilemmas about day-to-day occurrences with the 
offenders, it may contribute to enhancement of their moral reasoning. Conversing with 
people of a higher developmental stage has been shown to have positive effects and 
enable adaptation to higher order reasoning, which Kohlberg stated people have a 
preference for, given the opportunity (Kohlberg, 1984). Through encouraging staff 
interaction with offenders on a daily basis may have significant ‘knock-on’ positive 
consequences. This may be of particular relevance to and be particularly beneficial for 
individuals who have grown-up in an environment with minimal social interaction and 
limited available care-givers to model appropriate behaviours and to provide scaffolding 
for learning about morality. Encouraging the enhancement of moral development, either 
through formal group settings or through everyday communication on inpatient wards, 
could therefore have subsequent important clinical implications.   
4.5 Methodological Critique. 
 The current study attempted to address and overcome methodological limitations 
that were identified in previous research studies. However several limitations remain. 
Strengths and weaknesses of this study are discussed below. 
4.5.1 Design.  A mixed method design was used in this study. To explore the 
first and second research questions a 2 X 2 between-subjects descriptive design was 
used, where the main effects and interactions were examined.  
In descriptive designs, different participant groups are compared with each other 
with regard to their performance on a criterion variable, which in this study was moral 
reasoning scores. Using this type of design, group classification criteria needs to be 
mutually exclusive. The current research study achieved distinct groups, with sex and 
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offence history defining the four groups.  However, a limitation of using an independent 
design is that differences detected on the criterion variable (moral reasoning), may be 
the result of differences between participant’s characteristics across the four groups.  
The researcher attempted to address this limitation by conducting tests of 
normality, identifying that groups were significantly different in their FSIQ, and then 
repeating analysis whilst controlling for the effects of FSIQ. This increases the readers 
confidence in the group classification criteria (sex or offence history) accounting for 
differences that were detected, rather than FSIQ. Other differences however remained, 
such as the prevalence of mental health problems.     
To address the latter two questions, a correlational design was used. This was 
appropriate due to the exploratory nature of this study, which investigated whether 
relationships between the variables existed. A correlational design has advantages. 
Information about the level of emotional and behavioural problems, and offence 
severity is gained through correlation, rather than merely grouping people by the 
presence or absence of such behaviour. However, one key limitation of this design is 
that causal relationships cannot be determined. Therefore, conclusions can only report 
that relationships between variables exist, rather than infer their causality.  
Data was cross-sectional, with measures completed at one time point. A 
limitation of cross-sectional design, is if groups are not equivalent then this may 
confound the results. Once again, the researcher attempted to address this by conducting 
tests of normality, identifying that groups FSIQ differed significantly, and conducting 
analysis whilst controlling for FSIQ. An additional limitation of cross-sectional design 
is that it captures how individuals were feeling on the day data was collected, which 
may not necessarily reflect their general experiences. A participant’s response on the 
EPS-SRI (self-report) may reflect the type of day they were having, or particular mood 
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they were in. Responses therefore could have been significantly different had they been 
assessed on a different day. For example, one male offender scored fairly highly on the 
depression based questions, however he had been visited by the police and his solicitor 
that morning and been given some upsetting news. Had he completed the measures the 
week before, he may not have scored the same responses. This ‘snap-shot’ approach is a 
limitation of cross-sectional design. However, undertaking a follow-up measure or 
repeating measures at a later date, was beyond the scope of this study due to time 
restrictions.  
 Finally, to ensure this study was statistically robust, a power calculation was 
conducted prior to recruitment commencing, reporting that 68 participants were 
required. This sample size was achieved; a strength of the study. However, a larger 
sample would have increased the overall power further, and enabled sufficient power to 
have been achieved for the informant-based measure analysis, where response rates 
were lower. 
4.5.2 Sample. Sixty eight adults with mild ID participated in this study. 
Recruiting a clinical sample strengthened this study, as it increased how generalisable 
the findings were to the general ID population. However, as the sample was a 
convenience sample, potential biases may exist. Therefore it is unclear how truly 
representative the sample was of the ID population.  
4.5.2.1 Recruitment. A further strength of the current study was that the 
participant sample required to achieve statistically robust analysis was successfully 
recruited. To enable this, considerable time was spent building rapport with a range of 
services, clinicians and potential participants.  
One community service that was approached (non-NHS) appeared receptive of 
the study initially, however after looking through the EPS-SRI became resistant. This 
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measure includes a vast range of statements including positive statements such as “I am 
always good”, neutral statements such as “It is easy for me to sit still”, and more 
negative statements such as “I am a failure” and “At times I wish I was dead”. After 
reviewing it, the staff expressed feeling that some questions were potentially too 
distressing and provoking for their clients, despite the researcher explaining how 
distress would be managed if it occurred during or after the session. However, this 
service chose not to partake in this study. It appeared that they may have felt that by not 
asking the participants about difficult thoughts or feelings, meant that these thoughts or 
feelings didn’t exist. This is a hurdle therefore that needs addressing in future studies.  
4.5.2.2 Non-offenders. The non-offenders groups comprised a range of clinical 
and non-clinical participants. Perhaps having a full clinical sample would have provided 
a more accurate reflection of whether it was offence history that proved the significant 
difference, rather than involvement with services, or the higher prevalence of mental 
health problems. However, the sample reflected the participant group and time-frame 
available for recruitment. There were considerably more individuals from the day-
services who were willing to partake in the study, and having mental health difficulties 
or contact with clinical services was not a requirement of the study, therefore there was 
no reason to exclude them.  However, having a mixture of community participants from 
clinical and non-clinical settings is likely to be a fairer representation of the general ID 
population, which may strengthen the findings.  
An additional strength of this study was that the community groups were 
screened for offence histories. Clinicians were asked to screen this at the start of the 
recruitment process and not to recommend any individuals who had offended. One 
clinician contracted the researcher to double check the criteria as had a potential 
participant who had received a caution (and was therefore screened out), and a fellow 
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participant who had historical police involvement as a victim. This person met inclusion 
criteria as had not committed an offence. All participants were asked by the researcher 
about potential offence histories and police involvement in their initial meeting. It also 
featured as a demographic question. This was an advantage of the study, as Stams et al. 
(2006) previously criticised studies for failing to screen the non-delinquent groups for 
offending behaviour. This was crucial to prevent contamination of the study findings.  
4.5.2.3 Offenders. The offenders were recruited from both low and medium 
secure services, depending on where there were suitable participants who met the 
inclusion criteria and were keen to engage. However, groups were not matched to 
ensure even numbers of men and women were recruited from medium and low secure 
units. This may have meant that people were at different stages of their treatment 
pathway and recovery. If these groups had been matched with equal numbers of men 
and women from each level of security, this would have increased the validity, and 
subsequent readers trust in the findings. This did not occur in this study due to time 
restraints and the significantly lower proportion of women in ID secure services in 
general available for recruitment.    
Another limitation of the current study is the likelihood that the offender 
participants had at some stage, received some type of intervention for their offending 
behaviour. This may therefore have impacted on their moral reasoning ability, 
particularly if they received group-based treatment, as groups typically encourage 
perspective-taking. Perspective taking as previously described, can contribute to the 
enhancement of moral reasoning skills.  
4.5.2.4 Comparisons. One focus of this study was to draw sex comparisons. 
Therefore, equal numbers of men and women were recruited. This addresses the flaw of 
many studies in this area, where authors often fail to justify why their research was 
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restricted to one sex alone. Groups were not initially matched on their FSIQ, therefore 
in attempt to address this, analysis was completed controlling for FSIQ. This helps to 
understand the true impact of the variable being measured (e.g. sex or offence history).  
Prevalence rates of mental health difficulties were higher in offenders than non-
offenders; however cause and effect could not be determined. Finally, Langdon et al. 
(2010a) criticises many ID studies for failing to provide clear information about their 
participant sample. This study addressed this by clearly documenting demographic 
information, and drawing comparisons between the groups.    
4.5.3 Definition of ID. One methodological limitation of studies in this area, 
concerns the definition of ID used.  As previously stated, it is clear that ID is not always 
defined by adherence to DSM-IV guidelines, with studies often including individuals 
with borderline IQ scores (FSIQ = 71 - 84) (e.g. Barron et al., 2004; Van Vugt et al., 
2011a). There are problems therefore in drawing comparisons between studies if 
different definitions of ID are used, and caution needs to be applied when making 
references or generalisations to the wider ID population.  
A strength of the current study was the use of the WASI to determine 
individuals FSIQ (Wechsler, 1999). By administering this formal measure of IQ and 
strictly adhering to the cut-off scores presented by the DSM-IV for mild ID (DSM-IV-
TR; APA, 2000), and excluding those individuals who did not meet criteria, this study 
addressed this common methodological flaw. Where possible, the four subtest version 
of the WASI was used, as it yields stronger psychometric properties than the two-
version subtest, such as on test-retest reliability (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2005).  
However, with six participants, the two-subtest version was used due to physical 
restrictions. A timed block manipulation task was therefore deemed unsuitable. Using 
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the two-subtest WASI enabled these participants to engage in the study, promoting 
inclusion. 
A flaw of using the WASI however, was the floor effect. The minimum FSIQ 
that could be obtained on the WASI was 55, which restricted the range that could be 
obtained (Young, Martine & Dudgeon, 2002), and may have resulted in people with 
FSIQ scores below this figure being included. The range of the sample in this study 
spanned the full IQ range for mild ID, 50 – 70, the lowest range obtained by those who 
completed the WAIS-III or WAIS-IV as part of their clinical care. Had this study 
administered the WAIS rather than the WASI, it would have been less likely to produce 
floor effects, so a more accurate profile of IQ would have been determined. 
Administering the WAIS however would have had considerable time and cost 
implications. 
According to the American Psychiatric Association (2000), along with having a 
FSIQ score between 50 - 70, individuals diagnosed with a mild ID also have associated 
difficulties with their adaptive behaviour. As discussed, FSIQ was measured in this 
study, whereas adaptive behaviour difficulties were assumed to exist if the individual 
was accessing local ID services, as this is typically a requisite of accessing such 
services. However, the current study could have been strengthened if adaptive 
behaviour was formally assessed.  
The Adaptive Behaviour Assessment System (ABAS- 2nd Edition; Harrison & 
Oakland, 2003) is one measure that could have been administered in this study to assess 
participants adaptive functioning. This would have clarified and strengthened the 
participant’s diagnosis of Mild ID, providing a more accurate picture of whether 
participants met the study’s inclusion criteria. The ABAS measures 10 areas of adaptive 
functioning, including skills in communication, self-care and community use, in 
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individuals between 0 - 89 years old. Scores are grouped into three domains; the 
conceptual, social and practical domains. The relationship between adaptive behaviour 
scores on the ABAS (2nd Edition) and intelligence scores on the WASI, or the WAIS-IV 
can be explored to determine validity, an added advantage as would have strengthened 
the diagnosis of ID.  
The ABAS (2nd Edition) can be completed with the individual (self-report) or by 
a carer or parent. Considering the 65% response rate of the EPS-BRS, the self report 
ABAS may have been the most useful version of the ABAS to use, to obtain a full 
dataset. Administration is reported by the authors to take between 15 and 20 minutes to 
complete. However it is not clear whether this is the estimated time required for staff, 
parents and general informants, or the individual themselves. It is unlikely that an 
individual with suspected ID would complete this measure in the same time as a parent 
or carer. It can therefore be assumed that the time frame to complete the ABAS with an 
individual with ID would be longer than the 15-20 minutes estimated.  
Adding this measure to the testing session of the current study would have 
therefore expanded the length of the session significantly, which may have had a 
detrimental impact on recruitment. Participants may have been less likely to want to 
engage with a study that required more of their time. In addition, administering a 
measure of adaptive functioning would have had cost implications for this study. 
Therefore, there would have been both clear advantages and disadvantages in having 
measured adaptive functioning alongside FSIQ in this study.  
4.5.4 Measures. Any intervention administered to adults with ID requires 
adaptation so that it is in an accessible format and understood by all of the recipients. In 
the current research project, all of the questions on the measures were read aloud to 
prevent limitations in reading and writing having an impact on their responses. 
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Information sheets and consent forms were also read to the participants and queries 
responded to. Making all of the information in this study accessible appeared to work 
appropriately. 
4.5.4.1 Moral reasoning. In their review of the literature of moral reasoning 
within the ID population, Langdon et al. (2010a) identified that the vast majority of 
studies administered unstandardised forms of measurement of moral reasoning. 
Therefore the validity and reliability of studies measurement tools was unknown, 
limiting the usefulness of their findings. In attempt to rectify the lack of standardised 
measurement tools of moral reasoning abilities for the ID population, Langdon et al. 
(2010b) explored the psychometric properties of two measures of moral reasoning. 
They compared the MTI (Narvaez et al.,1999) with the SRM-SF (Gibbs et al., 1992), 
concluding that the SRM-SF demonstrated better psychometric properties than the MTI 
for both men with and without ID.  
The current research study therefore utilised this information and administered 
the SRM-SF, as had been proved to be psychometrically sound. This was a strength of 
this research project as it helps to address the common methodological flaw of many 
existing studies into moral reasoning, particularly within the ID field. The only 
limitation of using this measure was that it was not validated to use with women, as 
Langdon et al.’s (2010b) study comprised only men. However, in the current study no 
significant sex differences were found on scores obtained from this measure. 
The SRM-SF has also been described as being particularly good at detecting 
variation around the stage 2 - stage 3 boundary (Tarry and Emler, 2007), a further 
advantage of using this measure. A final strength regarding this measure was the level 
of inter-rater reliability achieved. Although scores were lower (yet acceptable) on the 
first attempt (r = .80), ratings were discussed in depth between the two people who 
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rated the data, and scores were amended. This enhanced the inter-rater reliability scores 
to an excellent level (r = .99). 
4.5.4.2 Emotional Problems Scale. Both EPS scales were used in this study. 
Every participant completed the EPS-SRI within the testing session, and so a full data 
set was obtained. Regarding the EPS-BRS, 44 completed questionnaires were returned 
to the researcher, resulting in a 65% response rate. Of the completed questionnaires, 27 
belonged to the offender groups, whereas 17 belonged to the non-offenders. Groups 
were not matched which may have had an impact on the findings. For example, when 
comparing the total sample of men with the total women on both internalising and 
externalising behaviour problems, there were uneven proportions of offenders and non-
offender participants within the groups. However, both the male and female groups 
comprised more offender than non-offenders participants. 
The offender participants were ‘mood assessed’ prior to partaking in the study, 
to ensure they were settled in mood, minimising potential risks. However, doing so may 
have produced some false positive scores by only assessing participants who presented 
in an average or good mood. It raises the question about how individuals may have 
scored on this measure had they presented in a less settled mood, and whether scores 
reflect how they typically present. This is a limitation of this type of measure that 
gathers information from one time point; it only truly provides a snap-shot of their 
presentation.  
 The response rate for the EPS-BRS differed considerably between the groups. 
For the offender groups, the response rate was 79.4%, compared to 50% of non-
offenders. This is likely to be the result of differences in the methodology. For the 
offenders, the researcher directly passed the questionnaire on to a staff member, or left it 
for their key worker to complete. Staff were asked to post these back to the researcher 
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once complete. As the researcher was aware of who the measure had been passed to, it 
gave some scope to follow up questionnaires that had not been returned. This is likely to 
have improved the response rate.  
For the non-offenders, if the participant was accompanied by a carer to the 
appointment or if it was at their home where someone was present, they were asked to 
complete the questionnaire at the same time. However, more often than not, the 
participant attended the assessment alone. These participants were given the EPS-BRS 
along with an information sheet to pass onto a suitable person to complete and post back 
to the researcher. As the researcher did not directly meet with an informant in these 
cases, it is not known how many of the participants failed to pass this information on 
and how many carers chose not to do it after reading the information sheet.   
As the response rate was 65% for the EPS-BRS, the number of participants 
required to achieve statistically robust analysis was not achieved. Therefore analysis 
involving this measure needs to be interpreted with caution. Had greater effort been put 
into following up the non-offenders measures in particular, the study would have been 
more likely to have achieved sufficient power. The researcher anticipated a lower 
response rate from the community groups, and tried to maximise the chance of 
responding by providing a stamped addressed envelope, reducing the cost for the carer.  
Perhaps more could have been done however in attempt to boost response rates 
from the community groups, such as requesting that the clinician or day-service staff 
member who nominated the participant originally, prompted or tried to follow-up 
whether these had been completed and returned. The researcher was however cautious 
not to ask too much of participating staff members, as maintaining a good working 
relationship was vital to enable successful recruitment. 
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4.5.4.3 Offence-related information. Participant’s offences were scored 
according to Francis’ et al., (2001) paired-comparisons method (Appendix H), and 
ranked by their most severe conviction.  Of the 34 offenders, two participants’ offences 
(one male, one female) could not be scored, as did not suitably match any of those 
presented by Francis’ et al., (2001). One was charged with Property destruction and the 
other with carrying a knife but not threatening with it. As these offences could not be 
suitably scored, it resulted in their exclusion from the analysis for research question 
three. This was a limitation of using this method of scoring, as two participants 
warranted exclusion despite being convicted for offences, and being detained in a secure 
hospital as a result.  
By ranking offenders by their most severe conviction alone may have however 
had limitations. It would have been more clinically valuable to have established a 
method of ranking offenders in a way that incorporated both the number of convictions 
an individual has, and the severity of these. In the current study, an offender who 
committed one crime may be ranked as a ‘more severe offender’ than another offender 
who committed a dozen offences deemed slightly less serious. By using a scoring 
system that incorporated both severity and frequency of offences would have provided a 
more accurate picture of each offender and their profile of offending behaviour.  
Finally, regarding the offender group, it would have been useful to have 
documented whether each participant had received any treatment intervention or not. 
Although it would have not been possible to have controlled for treatment exposure, 
knowledge of this may have helped to account for potential differences. 
4.5.4.4 Additional measures. As the measure of moral reasoning required 
participants to verbalise their responses to each question, it may have been clinically 
useful to have conducted a measure of participants spoken language ability. This would 
  
145 
 
have enabled exploration of whether language ability was correlated to responses on the 
SRM-SF. In Langdon et al.’s study (2011b) they administered three subtests from the 
Test of Adolescent and Adult Language –Fourth Edition (TOAL-4; Hammill, Brown, 
Larsen & Wiederholt, 2007) to assess spoken language skills; Word Opposites, Word 
Derivations and Spoken Analogies. The authors found that spoken language and moral 
reasoning were positively correlated, suggesting that spoken language ability accounted 
for 59% of the moral reasoning score variability (Langdon et al., 2011b). Significant 
effects remained for the total moral reasoning score and each individual construct, once 
spoken language was controlled. It was therefore unlikely that language ability had a 
significant effect on moral reasoning scores.  
Although this formed part of the rationale for why language was not assessed in 
the current study, the study would have been strengthened had it measured spoken 
language itself. This would have enabled direct measurement of the impact of language 
ability on the obtained data, rather than relying on findings from a previous study. Once 
again, having increased time and resources to have expanded the study would have 
enabled further investigation, and increased the readers confidence in the findings 
obtained.  
4.5.5 Testing session.  
4.5.5.1 Managing risk. Following assessment, each participant was asked how 
they felt, and given a debrief sheet with information of who to contact if they felt 
worried or distressed afterwards. Participants who responded ‘yes’ on the EPS to any 
question that indicated a suicidal risk were asked about this afterwards. Several 
participants expressed that this was a feeling or thought they had previously had. No 
participant indicated current suicidal ideation, however this was documented regardless. 
For the offenders this information was fed back to the lead-nurse, with participants 
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consent, increasing the teams’ awareness that this conversation had taken place. For the 
one non-offender participant, this information was fed back to the on-call clinical 
psychologist. The researcher routinely spoke to this clinician following all home 
appointments, as part of adherence to the lone working policy.  
4.5.5.2 Managing distress. One male offender became tearful during the study, 
due to a previously mentioned visit by the police that day. The study was paused, whilst 
he spoke to his primary nurse. He requested to continue the session shortly after, when 
he was less tearful. The researcher gave the participant the opportunity not to continue 
with the study, but he stated he was adamant that he wanted to continue.  
 A female offender appeared to get quite frustrated towards the start of her testing 
session, and once more the researcher reminded her that participation was completely 
voluntary. The participant expressed feeling cross that she may miss her scheduled 
cigarette break, but wanted to partake. After she was reassured that the study would be 
paused for her to have her cigarette, her mood settled, and she expressed wanting to 
continue with the study.  
 4.5.5.3 Overall. The researcher was aware of risk management both with 
offenders and non-offenders, following the procedures outlined in the method section. 
Adhering to these ethical procedures and considerations was a strength of the study, as 
ensured that both the researcher and participants were kept safe for the duration of the 
study.  
4.5.6 Mental health diagnosis. The mental health status of the participants in 
this study requires further consideration. Whether someone had a mental health 
diagnosis was recorded, however information was self-reported. The specific type of 
mental health diagnosis was not recorded in the analysis, which was a limitation of this 
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study. Exploring mental health diagnoses may have been clinically interesting to see 
whether there were significant differences between the four groups.  
To explore whether there was a relationship between the total SRM-SF score 
and emotional and behavioural problems (research question four), three EPS scores 
were used; the total pathology, internalising and externalising behaviour problem 
scores. These were selected as were summations of either all, or some of the individual 
subscales. However, it would have been interesting to have conducted analysis on each 
of the subscales (e.g. impulse control, anxiety, non-compliance), to gain a more accurate 
understanding of differences between the groups. There may have been significant 
differences on several of these subscales that were not detected by only looking at the 
summary scores. Not exploring this further is a limitation of this study.  
4.5.7 Summary. The current study set out to explore the differences between 
four groups of participants in their moral reasoning abilities. The study was cross-
sectional in nature and aimed to investigate the relationships between moral reasoning 
and offence severity, and moral reasoning and emotional and behavioural problems. 
Using correlational design for the latter part was appropriate due to the exploratory 
nature of this study. This study took into account the methodological weaknesses of 
previous studies and tried to address these. However, limitations did exist in the current 
study, such as the failure to break-down mental health diagnosis, which future studies 
could attempt to address these.  
4.6 Future Directions 
Although findings from this study appear promising, the study would benefit 
from replication on a larger scale to gain support for the non-existence of sex 
differences in moral reasoning in adults with ID. It would also be interesting to explore 
using a larger scale study, whether offenders with ID demonstrated stage 2 reasoning, or 
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the transitional stage 2(3) reasoning as detected in the current study. This would help 
contribute to the refinement of the hypothetical curvilinear relationship between illegal 
behaviour, moral reasoning and IQ, that was proposed by Langdon et al. (2011a), by 
exploring whether it is stage 2 or stage 2(3) that sits in the middle of the peak that 
represents illegal behaviour.  
This study focused on the Property, Law and Legal Justice constructs, as scores 
in these appeared to be linked to offending behaviour in the literature (e.g. Gibbs, 2010; 
Langdon et al., 2011b). However, both the current study and Langdon et al.’s study 
(2011b) also found that offenders scored significantly higher than non-offenders on both 
the Contract and Life constructs, but not the Truth or Affiliation constructs. It would be 
interesting for future research to further explore these findings, and see whether they are 
repeated. This would help to enhance our knowledge about these constructs, and 
increase our understanding in regards to whether high or low scores in any of them, link 
to, or protect against, offending behaviour.  
 The cross-sectional nature of the study limits the extent to which results can be 
understood within current theoretical frameworks, as provides purely a snap-shot of the 
main effects and interactions between moral reasoning, offending and sex. It would be 
interesting for future studies to adopt longitudinal designs, taking information from 
participants at several time points, to establish a clearer understanding of these 
relationships. It may be particularly useful if the selected emotional and behavioural 
measure used by future studies is administered at several time points, to gain a more 
accurate picture of how someone presents, rather than a reflection of their thoughts and 
feelings on a specific day.  
 Some promising findings have been demonstrated through delivering the EQUIP 
programme with adult males with ID, in enhancing moral reasoning abilities, problem 
  
149 
 
solving skills and reducing cognitive distortions. Research into the effectiveness of this 
programme however needs to be conducted on a much larger scale to achieve a more 
valid, reliable and statistically robust set of findings. Administering the same measures 
of moral reasoning to a control group would also be useful to gain a clearer 
understanding of whether changes can be successfully attributed to attendance of the 
group, rather than being the result of residing in a ward environment that may provide 
alternatively suitable opportunities for perspective taking and social skill development. 
It would also be valuable to pilot this programme on a group of women with ID, or on a 
mixed sex group, to observe whether enhancement of moral reasoning occurs across the 
groups consistently, or whether one sex makes bigger gains than the other.  
In addition, it would be useful to pilot other interventions programmes that 
incorporate moral reasoning principles, and to compare and contrast gains that are 
made. This would enable the most effective programme to be selected by services. It 
may also be clinically interesting to measure moral reasoning before and after 
attendance of any group intervention that is already run by services, to see if gains are 
made without moral reasoning being the direct focus of the intervention. Further 
research would also benefit from exploring whether enhancement of moral reasoning 
has a subsequent impact on re-offending rates.  
Future studies could explore whether there are positive effects on offenders 
moral reasoning, following staff training around moral development and the teams 
potential role in helping to enhance this through their daily interaction with individuals. 
It would also be useful for future research to consider relationship between moral 
development and risk. Understanding more about how moral development and risk are 
linked could have significant implications for working clinically with individuals, and 
in informing care plans and treatment pathways.  
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 Finally, it is important for studies to validate measures of moral reasoning with 
women, to ensure that these are as psychometrically sound for women as they were 
found to be for men with ID (Langdon et al., 2010b). It is important that more research 
is conducted in this field to help build up our knowledge about the links between moral 
reasoning and offending with people with ID, particularly within the female population 
where less is known. Larger sample sizes will help to increase the power of studies and 
as a consequence enable more statistically robust findings to be achieved. It is crucial 
that potential interventions are trialled with people with ID and that outcomes are 
thoroughly measured, to enable effective treatment programmes to be delivered. In 
summary, the relationship between moral development and behaviour in people with ID 
needs further investigation.    
4.7 Final Conclusions 
 The current study aimed to address the need for further research into moral 
reasoning abilities within the ID population, by comparing offenders with non-
offenders. It recruited both men and women in the sample, investigating whether sex 
differences existed in individuals moral reasoning abilities. In line with previous 
research amongst adults with mild IDs, the study revealed that offenders demonstrated 
significantly more mature moral reasoning in terms of their total moral reasoning stage. 
This significant difference remained once FSIQ was controlled.    
 Regarding the individual constructs of moral reasoning, once FSIQ was 
controlled, four constructs were significantly different (Contract, Life, Property and 
Legal Justice). Offenders demonstrated significantly more mature reasoning in all four 
constructs than non-offenders. There were no significant differences between men and 
women, or interaction effects between sex and offence history, on either the total moral 
reasoning score or any of the individual construct scores. 
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 The study did not find a significant relationship between offence severity and 
moral reasoning. The relationship between moral reasoning and emotional and 
behavioural problems was explored, and a significant positive relationship was 
identified between scores on the two measures. Finally, the prediction that offenders 
would score higher levels of emotional and behavioural problems was only partially 
supported by this research study. Methodological limitations of the current research 
study that may have contributed to these findings were discussed.  
 The current research aimed to address some of the methodological limitations 
that arose from other studies in this field, such as the failure to use measures 
standardised for individuals with ID. The findings were then considered in terms of 
their key theoretical and clinical implications. Future research areas are presented which 
may in turn overcome some of the methodological limitations which remained in this 
research study.  
 Despite some recent advances in the research base to increase the readers 
understanding of the moral reasoning abilities of adult males with ID who have 
offended, there are no published studies to date, that explore this within women. This 
research study therefore aimed to address this deficit within the literature. No significant 
differences were found between the moral reasoning of men and women. The study did 
however demonstrate offender’s engaging in more mature levels of moral reasoning 
than non-offenders, supporting the recent work by Langdon et al. (2011a; 2011b; in 
press). Further research into suitable and effective interventions for the ID client group 
is required.  
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Appendix A – Recruitment information sheet for community staff 
 
Doctoral research thesis - Participants required 
 
I am currently working on my research thesis project, which involves 
adults with mild learning disabilities. I would appreciate you passing 
the study handout on to anyone in your service who you think may 
be interested in participating in the study, and who meets the 
inclusion criteria listed below. 
 
Inclusion criteria: 
• Males and females with mild learning disabilities (who do not 
have a formal diagnosis of autism) 
• IQ (if known) between 50-70 
• 18 years or older 
• English speaking 
 
In addition: 
• Have NO known forensic history (arrests, cautions or 
convictions)  
 
If anyone expresses interest in taking part in the study, please 
contact me using the details below, with their contact details. I will 
then arrange to meet with them to discuss the study and provide 
further information.  
 
Anyone who participates in the study will be given a £5 shopping 
voucher to thank them for their time. 
Thank you 
           Emily 
Contact details 
Emily McDermott 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Postgraduate Office 
Faculty of Health 
University of East Anglia 
NR4 7TJ 
e.mcdermott@uea.ac.uk 
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Appendix B – Introductory handout for interested participants - Community 
 
Introduction to the research study 
 
We are working on some research. It looks at 
how people think, feel, behave and make 
decisions.  
 
We are interested in finding out more about people who 
have never been in trouble with the police.  
 
 
We would like both men and women to take 
part.  
 
 
You will be asked to answer some 
questionnaires. You might be asked to do 
some short puzzles.  
 
 
We will give you a £5 shopping voucher to thank you for 
taking part. 
 
If you are interested in taking part and would 
like more information, please tell your staff 
member. 
 
  
 Thank you for your help. 
Emily 
  
Emily McDermott, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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Appendix C –Information Sheet – Community groups 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Introduction 
You are being asked to take part in some 
research. This sheet will help you to decide if you 
would like to take part. 
 
What is this study about? 
We are trying to understand why some people 
commit crimes.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you have never 
been in trouble with the police. There will be 
about 70 people in Suffolk and Norfolk taking 
part. 
 
It is your choice if you want to take part. If you 
want to take part we will ask you to sign your 
name on a consent form.  
 
What will I have to do? 
Tasks will be explained to you before you do 
them. You may be asked to answer some 
questions and solve some puzzles. You will be 
asked some questions about different situations. 
You will also be asked questions about how you 
feel and behave.  
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We will ask you if we can have a look at your 
case files or speak to a staff member you know to 
see if you have done any of these tests before.  
 
A staff member or carer will also be asked to fill 
out a questionnaire. This will ask questions about 
your mood and behaviour. You can choose who 
this carer is. 
 
How long will it take? 
The study will take about one hour. I can come to 
your house to complete it, or somewhere else if 
you prefer. After the study you will be given a £5 
shopping voucher to thank you for taking part. 
 
Are there any risks of taking part? 
The questions should not cause you any 
problems. But if you do feel tired or upset you can 
ask for a break or ask to stop. You do not have to 
answer any question you do not want to. 
Remember, you can stop at any time you want.  
 
You will be given contact details to talk to 
someone if you feel concerned.  
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
We hope this study will help us to understand why some 
people get into trouble with the police.  
 
Will my information be kept private? 
What you tell me will be private.  Your name will not be 
written on the forms we use.  We will use numbers instead 
of names to make sure these stay private. 
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But if you tell us something that makes us worry 
about you or somebody else we might have to tell 
someone about this. This might be a member of 
staff. We would tell you if we were going to do 
this. 
 
Can I stop if I change my mind? 
Yes. It is your choice to take part, you do not 
have to. If you start but change your mind you 
can stop at any stage. You do not have to tell us 
why you want to stop. 
 
If you stop, any information or questionnaires you have 
completed will be kept in the study. You will not be asked 
any new questions. 
 
Why is this research being done? 
This research is being done as part of a university project. 
The university has insurance in case anything goes wrong.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you feel unhappy after the study and want to 
make   a complaint you can talk to Dr Langdon. He 
is from the university and is supervising this study. 
Or you can tell your staff and they can talk to him. 
His details and phone number are below. 
 
Who are the researchers? 
The researchers are called: 
 
   Emily McDermott and Dr Peter Langdon 
 
Thank you for reading this! 
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You can contact us on: 
 
 
Dr Peter Langdon     Emily McDermott   
Clinical Senior Lecturer             Trainee Clinical Psychologist      
Dept of Psychological Sciences    Dept of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School    Norwich Medical School  
University of East Anglia    University of East Anglia 
Norwich, NR4 7TJ     Norwich, NR4 7TJ  
Norwich Research Park    Norwich Research Park 
p.langdon@uea.ac.uk    e.mcdermott@uea.ac.uk  
01603 593599  
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Appendix D – Participant consent form 
Consent form 
Please tick the boxes if you agree: 
 
I have read the information sheet.        
 
I have understood the information sheet and had a    
chance to ask questions. 
 
I understand this is my choice to take part and I can       
stop at any time. If I stop, I understand that my     
information will be kept but no new information will be 
collected. Stopping the study will not affect my treatment.  
 
I understand if I tell you something that worries you,        
you may have to share this with other staff. You will tell     
me if you have to do this. 
 
I understand that some of my notes may be read by the 
researcher. I give permission for this. 
 
I understand that the researcher may want to talk to my  
staff member about me. I give permission for this.  
 
I understand a carer I have chosen will be asked to fill      
out a questionnaire about me. I give permission for this.  
 
I agree to take part in the study. 
 
   
Name of participant    Date   Signature 
 
Name of researcher    Date   Signature 
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Appendix E – Recruitment information sheet for forensic staff 
 
Doctoral research thesis - Participants required 
 
I am currently working on my research thesis project, which involves 
adults with mild learning disabilities. I would appreciate you passing 
the study handout on to anyone in your service who you think may 
be interested in participating in the study, and who meets the 
inclusion criteria listed below. 
 
Inclusion criteria: 
• Males and females with mild learning disabilities (who do not 
have a formal diagnosis of autism) 
• IQ (if known) between 50-70 
• 18 years or older 
• English speaking 
 
In addition: 
• Have committed at least one offence dealt with by a Crown 
Court. 
• Detained under the Mental Health Act  
 
If anyone expresses interest in taking part in the study, please 
contact me using the details below, with their contact details. I will 
then arrange to meet with them to discuss the study and provide 
further information.  
 
Anyone who participates in the study will be given a £5 shopping 
voucher to thank them for their time. 
   Thank you, Emily 
Contact details 
Emily McDermott 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Postgraduate Office 
Faculty of Health 
University of East Anglia 
NR4 7TJ 
e.mcdermott@uea.ac.uk 
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Appendix F – Introductory handout for interested participants - Forensic 
 
Introduction to the research study 
 
We are working on some research. It looks at 
how people think, feel, behave and make 
decisions.  
  
We are interested in finding out more about people who 
have been in trouble with the police in the past.  
 
 
We would like both men and women to take  
part.  
 
 
You will be asked to answer some 
questionnaires. You might be asked to do 
some short puzzles.  
 
 
We will give you a £5 shopping voucher to thank you for 
taking part. 
 
 
If you are interested in taking part and 
would like more information, please tell 
your staff member. 
 
Thank you for your help. 
Emily 
  
Emily McDermott, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
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Appendix G –Information Sheet- Forensic groups 
 
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Introduction 
You are being asked to take part in some 
research. This sheet will help you to decide if you 
would like to take part. 
 
What is this study about? 
We are trying to understand why some people 
commit crimes.  
 
Why have I been chosen? 
You have been chosen because you have gotten 
into trouble with the police. There will be about 70 
people in Suffolk and Norfolk taking part. 
 
It is your choice if you want to take part.  If you 
want to take part we will ask you to sign your 
name on a consent form.  
 
What will I have to do? 
Tasks will be explained to you before you do 
them. You may be asked to answer some 
questions and solve some puzzles. You will be 
asked some questions about different situations. 
You will also be asked questions about how you 
feel and behave.  
 
We will ask you briefly about any crimes you have 
committed. We will ask you if we can have a look 
at your case files or speak to a staff member you 
  
188 
 
know, to check the information that you give us 
about your crimes, and to see if you have done 
any of these tests before. 
 
A staff member or carer will also be asked to fill out a 
questionnaire. This will ask questions about your mood and 
behaviour. You can choose who this staff member is. 
  
How long will it take? 
The study will take about one hour. I will come to 
visit you at the hospital to complete the study. 
After the study you will be given a £5 shopping 
voucher to thank you for taking part. 
 
Are there any risks of taking part? 
The questions should not cause you any 
problems. But if you do feel tired or upset you can 
ask for a break or ask to stop. You do not have to 
answer any question you do not want to. 
Remember, you can stop at any time you want.  
 
You will be given contact details to talk to 
someone if you feel concerned.  
 
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
We hope this study will help us to understand why some 
people get into trouble with the police.   
 
Will my information be kept private? 
What you tell me will be private.  Your name will not be 
written on the forms we use.  We will use numbers instead 
of names to make sure these stay private. 
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But if you tell us something that makes us worry 
about you or somebody else we might have to tell 
someone about this. This might be a member of 
staff. We would tell you if we were going to do 
this. 
 
Please only tell us about crimes that other people know 
about. If you tell us about crimes that people don’t know 
about then we would have to tell other people, such as a 
staff member. We would tell you if we were going to do this. 
 
Can I stop if I change my mind? 
Yes. It is your choice to take part, you do not 
have to. If you start but change your mind you 
can stop at any stage. You do not have to tell us 
why you want to stop. 
 
If you stop, any information or questionnaires you have 
completed will be kept in the study. You will not be asked 
any new questions. 
 
Why is this research being done? 
This research is being done as part of a university project. 
The university has insurance in case anything goes wrong.  
 
What if there is a problem? 
If you feel unhappy after the study and want to 
make a complaint you can talk to Dr Langdon. He 
is from the university and is supervising this study. 
Or you can tell your staff and they can talk to him. 
His details and phone number are below. 
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Who are the researchers? 
The researchers are called: 
 
Emily McDermott and Dr Peter Langdon 
 
 
Thank you for reading this! 
 
 
 
 
You can contact us on: 
 
 
Dr Peter Langdon      Emily McDermott   
Clinical Senior Lecturer              Trainee Clinical Psychologist      
Dept of Psychological Sciences     Dept of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School     Norwich Medical School  
University of East Anglia     University of East Anglia 
Norwich, NR4 7TJ      Norwich, NR4 7TJ  
Norwich Research Park     Norwich Research Park 
p.langdon@uea.ac.uk     e.mcdermott@uea.ac.uk  
01603 593599  
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Appendix H: Offence Ranks 
Top 20 most serious offences from the paired-comparisons method (Francis, Soothill & 
Dittrich, 2001) 
Rank Offence Score 
1 Murder, manslaughter, attempted murder 6.111 
2 Rape 1.842 
3 Wounding/ other acts endangering life 1.705 
4 Robbery and assaults with intent to rob 1.632 
5 Buggery 1.502 
6 Blackmail 1.482 
7 Arson 1.453 
8 USI with girl under 13 1.362 
9 Housebreaking/ aggravated burglary 1.261 
10 Incest 1.252 
11 Burglary 1.128 
12 Procuration 1.017 
13 Breaking into shops, warehouses 0.961 
14 Abduction 0.820 
15 Forgery 0.785 
16 Attempted buggery/ indecent assault on male 0.784 
17 Child abduction 0.769 
18 Unauthorised taking 0.712 
19 Larceny by a servant 0.650 
20 Threats, conspiracy or incitement to murder 0.626 
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Appendix I –Carer Information Sheet 
 
Carer Information Sheet 
 
Introduction 
We would like to invite you to take part in our research study. This 
information sheet will help you to decide if you would like to take 
part. 
 
What is this study about? 
This study is looking at how adults with learning disabilities think, 
feel, make decisions and behave. We are also interested in people 
who have committed crimes in their past, as well as people who 
have not committed crimes. We hope that this research will help us 
to understand these areas better. 
 
Why have I been chosen? 
We are interested in finding out more about people with mild 
learning disabilities. You have been chosen because someone with 
a learning disability has nominated you as their chosen carer, to 
complete a questionnaire about them. This person may be your 
friend, family member, partner or patient.  
 
There will be about 70 adults with learning disabilities across Suffolk 
and Norfolk taking part in the study. Each participant has been 
asked to nominate a carer to complete a questionnaire about them. 
 
It is your choice if you want to take part in the study. If you agree to 
take part you will be asked to provide written consent. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Your participation is entirely voluntary. 
 
What will I have to do? 
You will be asked to complete a questionnaire about the person who 
nominated you. The questionnaire lists 135 statements about 
various behaviours and you are asked to rate how often the person 
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engages in them. An example a statement is how often do they 
‘complain of being tired’. The options to select from are ‘almost 
never’, ‘rarely’, ‘occasionally’ or ‘often’. You are asked to select 
which you think is the most accurate answer. There are no right or 
wrong answers. 
 
You may be asked to complete this questionnaire whilst the person 
who nominated you is completing their assessment with the 
researcher. Alternatively, you may be asked to complete the 
questionnaire and return it in the stamped and addressed envelope 
provided. Please also include the signed consent form in this 
envelope.  
 
How long will it take? 
The questionnaire will take approximately 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Are there any risks of taking part? 
This questionnaire should not cause you any problems. However, 
you will be given contact details to talk to someone if you feel 
concerned.  
 
What are the benefits of taking part? 
We hope this study will help us to understand some of the factors 
that may be associated with criminal offending. 
 
Will my information be kept confidential? 
Yes. Any personal information that we collect from you about 
yourself and the person who nominated you, will be kept private and 
confidential. Both of your names and personal details will not be 
included in the study. We will use numbers instead of names to 
identity people in order to make sure these stay private. These 
numbers will only be known to the researchers. Once the data has 
been collected it will be stored securely in a locked archive at the 
University of East Anglia for 5 years. After 5 years this information 
will be destroyed.  
 
 
  
194 
 
Can I stop if I change my mind? 
Yes. It is your choice to take part. If you start to complete the 
questionnaire but change your mind you can stop at any stage. You 
do not have to tell us why you want to stop. The study is voluntary. 
 
If you chose not to participate, or to stop the questionnaire once you 
have started, any information gathered from the person who 
nominated you will be kept in the study. You will not be asked any 
new questions. 
 
Why is this research being done? 
This research is being done as part of a university thesis research 
project.  
  
What if there is a problem? 
If you feel unhappy after the study and want to make a complaint 
you can talk to Dr Langdon. Dr Langdon is from the university and is 
supervising this study. His details and phone number are below.  
 
In the unlikely event that something does go wrong and you or the 
person who nominated you are harmed during the research, as a 
result of someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for 
legal action for compensation against the University of East Anglia. 
The University of East Anglia has insurance that covers this 
research project. 
 
Who are the researchers? 
The researchers are called: 
 
Emily McDermott and Dr Peter Langdon 
 
Thank you for reading this. If you require any further information 
about the study please contact either researcher using the details 
below. 
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You can contact us on: 
 
Dr Peter Langdon      Emily McDermott   
Clinical Senior Lecturer              Trainee Clinical Psychologist      
Dept of Psychological Sciences     Dept of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School     Norwich Medical School  
University of East Anglia     University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park     Norwich Research Park 
Norwich, NR4 7TJ      Norwich, NR4 7TJ  
p.langdon@uea.ac.uk     e.mcdermott@uea.ac.uk  
01603 593599  
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Appendix J –Consent form for carer 
 
Carer consent form 
 
Name of Researcher:  Emily McDermott 
 
Name of person who nominated me to answer a 
questionnaire about them:  
 
 
Please write your initials inside the boxes if you agree 
with these statements: 
 
I have read the carer information sheet provided  
and have understood the information. 
 
I understand that my participation is voluntary and  
I am free to withdraw at any time without giving a 
reason. 
 
The person who nominated me is happy for me to 
complete the questionnaire. 
 
I agree to take part in the study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Name of carer     Date      Signature 
 
 
Name of researcher    Date      Signature 
  
197 
 
Appendix K –Debrief Sheet Community Groups 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this 
research study! 
 
The study looked at how people think, feel, 
behave and make decisions.  We spoke to 
people who have not gotten into trouble with 
the police.  We also spoke to people who 
have gotten into trouble with the police.  
 
The questions were not meant to cause you any problems.  
 
But if you do feel unhappy or worried afterwards, 
please talk to the staff member who told you 
about the study. If you still feel unhappy, please 
call Dr Langdon on the phone number below, or 
ask your staff to do this for you. 
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
Thank you for helping. 
     Emily 
       You can contact us on: 
 
Dr Peter Langdon      Emily McDermott   
Clinical Senior Lecturer              Trainee Clinical Psychologist      
Dept of Psychological Sciences     Dept of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School     Norwich Medical School  
University of East Anglia     University of East Anglia   
Norwich Research Park     Norwich Research Park 
Norwich, NR4 7TJ      Norwich, NR4 7TJ  
p.langdon@uea.ac.uk     e.mcdermott@uea.ac.uk  
01603 593599    
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Appendix L –Debrief Sheet Forensic Groups 
 
Participant Debrief Sheet 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this 
research study! 
 
The study looked at how people think, feel, 
behave and make decisions.  We spoke to 
people who have not gotten into trouble with 
the police.  We also spoke to people who 
have gotten into trouble with the police.  
 
The questions were not meant to cause you any problems.  
 
But if you do feel unhappy or worried after the 
study, please talk to one of your staff members. If 
you still feel unhappy, please call Dr Langdon on 
the phone number below, or ask your staff to do 
this for you.  
 
Do you have any questions? 
 
Thank you for helping. 
     Emily 
You can contact us on: 
 
Dr Peter Langdon      Emily McDermott   
Clinical Senior Lecturer             Trainee Clinical Psychologist      
Dept of Psychological Sciences     Dept of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School     Norwich Medical School  
University of East Anglia     University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park     Norwich Research Park 
Norwich, NR4 7TJ      Norwich, NR4 7TJ  
p.langdon@uea.ac.uk     e.mcdermott@uea.ac.uk  
01603 593599  
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Appendix M: NHS ethics committee study approval letter 
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Appendix N: R&D committee study approval letter - Norfolk 
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Appendix O: R&D committee study approval letter - Hertfordshire 
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Appendix P: R&D committee study approval letter – Suffolk 
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Appendix Q: Non-NHS organisation study approval letter – Partnerships in Care 
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Appendix R: Non-NHS organisation study approval letter – Mencap 
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Appendix S: Non-NHS organisation study approval letter – Build 
 
Church House, Church Alley,  
Redwell Street, Norwich, NR2 4SN 
Tel 01603 618029 
 E Mail admin@buildnorwich.org.uk 
                                     www.buildnorwich.org.uk 
  
 
Mrs Emily McDermott 
 
 
         21st November 2011  
 
Dear Emily, 
 
Research Project 
 
Further to our recent correspondence, and meetings I am pleased to confirm our formal 
approval of your engagement with BUILD, and its members with disabilities to take part 
in your research project. 
 
I understand that this is being done under the supervision of my colleague, Roy 
McGee, who can be your first point of call in raising any issues. 
 
I hope that you find the exercise useful and rewarding and would welcome a meeting at 
the end of the project for you to share your findings with us. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
 
 
 
James Kearns 
Chief Executive  
 
 
 
 
BUILD is an independent Registered Charity 264584 
Incorporating:  The Wednesday Club, My Time, AwayDays, MTV, BeFriends,  
Research, Training and Consultancy Services and  
BUILD Youth Groups in Norwich and Dereham. 
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Appendix T – End of study acknowledgement letter 
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Appendix U – Histogram of the FSIQ distribution 
 
A graph to show the distribution of Full-Scale IQ scores across the whole participant 
sample. 
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Appendix V – Final report sent to REC 
REC Reference: 11/EE/0282 
Summary of Research 
 
Study title:  Exploring the impact of sex and offence history on moral reasoning in 
adults with mild intellectual disabilities 
 
Background: There is a small growing body of literature exploring moral reasoning in 
adult male offenders with mild intellectual disabilities (ID). These offenders have 
demonstrated more mature moral reasoning than their non-offending counterparts. No 
published studies have explored this in females with ID, despite the existence of sex 
differences in moral reasoning being widely debated. This study aims to address this 
gap in the literature.  
Methods: Using a cross-sectional 2 (Sex: Men vs Women) X 2 (Offence history: 
Offenders vs Non-Offenders) between-subjects design, 68 adults with mild ID from 
secure settings and community settings were recruited. In addition to an assessment of 
intellectual functioning, participants completed the Socio-Moral Reflection Measure-
Short Form (SRM-SF; Gibbs, Basinger & Fuller, 1992) and the Emotional Problem 
Scale (EPS; Prout & Strohmer, 1991). An informant version of the EPS was also used.  
Results: Offenders with ID demonstrated stage 2(3) reasoning, significantly higher than 
the stage 2 reasoning demonstrated by non-offenders. Offenders’ moral reasoning was 
higher on six of the individual SRM-SF constructs, however differences disappeared on 
two constructs after controlling for Full Scale IQ. Non-offenders reasoned below stage 2 
on the Law and Legal Justice constructs, where decision making driven by obeying 
authority and avoiding punishment was likely to have prevented them offending. No 
significant sex differences were found. Total SRM-SF scores were not significantly 
related to offence severity. A significant positive relationship was found between moral 
reasoning and emotional/behavioural problems, with the study partially supporting the 
prediction that offenders would have higher EPS scores. 
Conclusions:  This study achieved its objectives. Offenders, irrespective of sex, 
engaged in more mature moral reasoning than non-offenders, supporting previous 
findings. This study attempted to address methodological limitations of previous 
studies, such as through using a measure standardised for ID. Further research would be 
valuable to help develop suitable and effective interventions for this client group.  
 
Publication/ Dissemination: Any service or participant who requests information about 
the findings of the study will be given the above summary (or a simpler, more 
accessible version). All services and participants were given the contact details of the 
researcher and project supervisor, so can request information via this pathway. The 
researcher hopes to publish this research project in a peer reviewed journal, for example 
the Journal of Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities (JARID) or the Journal of 
Intellectual Disabilities Research (JIDR).   
